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Introduction
This dissertation is composed of three self-contained essays on strategic interactions
under incomplete contracting. Chapter 1 considers the evolution of reciprocal prefer-
ences in a setting where individuals live in separate groups and where there exist no
higher level institutions that could enforce socially beneficial norms by offering rewards
to cooperators and/or by punishing free-riders. Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and ben-
efits of a separation of powers in an incomplete contracts framework. Chapter 3 finally
shows that, even when important parts of a relationship could be arranged perfectly
by a complete contract, contractual incompleteness arises endogenously if the proposal
of a complete contract is perceived as a signal of distrust.
Economists typically analyze incentive problems under asymmetric information in
the framework of contract theory: two or more parties can commit to a binding contract
and there is an independent institution - the court - that enforces this agreement if
the contract conditions only on verifiable contingencies. This framework is a powerful
instrument to analyze optimal (second-best) incentives. In fact, most modern societies
have institutions designed to enforce contracts that were deliberately signed by all
relevant parties - at least if one party appeals to court.
The existence of a properly functioning judiciary system, however, requires a highly
developed social system. A contract is nothing but ink written on paper. By itself,
this does not force anybody to behave in a certain way. Nor does the sentence of a
court by itself enforce the decision. A contract is worth the paper it is written on
only if at least some individuals feel committed to enforce it.1 Someone has to be
1A similar point is made by Mailath-Morris-Postlewaite [60] in the context of laws: Laws are
nothing but cheap talk. They can only offer a focal point - selecting one equilibrium out of many and
thereby changing the behavior of individuals.
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willing to carry out the punishment, although this is costly. The purely self-centered
agent of standard economic theory would only do so if someone offers him rewards or,
alternatively, credibly threatens to punish him. But then, somebody else has to take
the costs of giving this second order incentives, someone who will do so only if there
is yet another person giving third order incentives and so forth. Either, there has to
be an infinite chain of higher order punishments, or there must exist at least some
individuals who are willing to enforce certain norms even if taking such a costly action
is against their narrowly defined self-interest. The existence of individuals with social
preferences is thus the basis for a developed social system and for institutions that are
committed to enforce laws and contractual agreements.2 In particular, players with
reciprocal preference are committed to punish unfairly acting opponents or to reward
friendly behavior. They can thus enforce norms if they consider it unfair that a norm
is violated.
Recent economic experiments have shown that not all individuals always act self-
ishly and that some people are willing to give up monetary payoffs to reward friendly
behavior and to punish hostile behavior even if interactions are anonymous and no
future benefits can be expected. For a survey of these experimental findings see Fehr-
Gächter [28] or Fehr-Schmidt [31]. From an evolutionary standpoint, however, these
findings seem surprising. A purely self-interested agent always chooses an action that
maximizes his material payoff. Thus, he should perform at least as good as any other
type and finally dominate the population as a result of natural selection.
Chapter 1 offers an explanation for this puzzle. If individuals interact within sep-
arate groups, preferences for rewarding friendly behavior or preferences for punishing
hostile behavior can survive evolution - even with randomly formed groups and even if
individual preferences are unobservable. Intuitively, there are two evolutionary forces
in our model: On the one hand, the material costs of rewarding or punishing favor the
selfish relative to the reciprocal type. On the other hand, the preferences of each agent
have a marginal influence on the distribution of preferences within each group. If the
2In return, once these institutions function properly, they may serve as a substitute for social
preferences by offering a commitment device.
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number of reciprocal players in a group is below a certain threshold cooperation breaks
down and all members of such a group suffer a loss. In case an agent is pivotal for the
enforcement of cooperation in his group he profits materially from having reciprocal
preferences.
Preferences for rewarding can survive evolution as well as preferences for punishing.
Yet, there exists an important structural difference between the evolution of these two
types. Rewarders can always invade a selfish population of agents, but they can never
drive out the selfish type completely. Punishers, in contrast, can not invade a purely
selfish population, but once their fraction is above a certain threshold, they drive
out all other preference types. This structural difference can be understood by the
following observation: being a rewarder is particularly costly if many people cooperate
- which happens frequently when there are many reciprocal players. In contrast, being
a punisher is costly only if many players defect. Yet, being a punisher is cheap if most
players cooperate - then no punishment is necessary. When there are many reciprocal
players, cooperation is frequent.
This structural difference between the evolution of rewarders and punishers can lead
to interesting co-evolutionary effects between both sides of reciprocity: punishers can
not invade a purely selfish population directly, but rewarders can. The more rewarders
invade, the higher the level of cooperation, and the easier it becomes for punishers
to invade, too. Once they can invade successfully, they help to establish even more
cooperation, and thus become even more successful. Eventually, punishers drive out
all other preference types - rewarders as well as selfish agents.
In the context of social norm enforcement we can interpret cooperation as compli-
ance with a social norm. The evolutionary process may for example be interpreted
as a learning process by reinforcement - the more successful a player is with a certain
behavior, the more likely he is to stick with it. Then the results of chapter 1 suggest
that, firstly, rewards may be helpful for the development of a social norm. Yet, in the
long run norms are more likely to be enforced by the threat of punishments. Secondly,
to sustain a norm it is very crucial that there is a common agreement about a norm.
Otherwise, those some people will violate it. This leads to punishments that are costly
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to both sides. Even worse - the norm may become unsustainable as individuals who
punish norm-violators perform worse than individuals who do not enforce this norm.
This line of argument suggests that it is difficult to change a norm. More precisely,
the attempt to switch from one norm to another can be very costly and may even fail
- unless the change happens well coordinated and simultaneously for the entire popu-
lation. This suggests a rationale for the institution of government: if some parameters
of the economic environment change stochastically and if thereby the socially optimal
norm changes over time - then proclamations of the government may serve as a focal
point and coordinate the change from one norm to another.
This choice of a focal point gives decision-making power to the government which
it can misuse led by its private interests. The population would like to have a control
mechanism that enables it to change the focal point in case the government’s decisions
deviate too much from the social interest. Yet, again, an uncoordinated attempt to
change the focal point would cause large social costs. Thus, clear rules are needed to
control the government - a constitution is required that provides simple instructions
when and how to change the focal point from the incumbent to another predetermined
person or body. Such a constitutional rule can assign the focal point - the right to
define a norm - for different functional tasks to separate entities.3 The separation of
powers is the most prominent example for such a rule - and the focus of chapter 2.
Chapter 2 analyzes the costs and benefits of a separation of powers in an incomplete
contracts approach.4 The assumption that only certain incomplete contracts can be
written is present at two levels: Firstly, citizens only have the choice between consti-
tutions: they choose either a constitution of a single ruler or they choose to separate
the legislative from the executive power. Secondly, legislature can condition laws only
on some exogenously given categories that classify public projects in general terms.
However, the legislature cannot condition laws on the specific characteristics of every
potentially upcoming project. Those can only be taken into account by the executive
who makes case-to-case decisions.
3Similarly, such a constitutional rule could state “hold elections every 4 years and if the incumbent
looses the majority of votes change the focal point to the candidate of the opposition”.
4Chapter 2 is joint work with Kira Börner.
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Thus, the legislature provides a decision-making framework by means of writing
laws. The executive is left with the residual decision making rights. The legislature
constrains the executive by law for some types of decisions and empowers it to decide
in other policy areas. Chapter 2 considers this functional division of tasks as the
key difference between legislature and executive. The executive has private interests
which distort the policy choice away from the social optimum. Laws written by an
independent legislation have the advantage of curbing this abuse of executive power.
The legislature, however, can also have private interests which distort the law with
respect to the socially optimal law. Yet, a law must be written in general terms
and affects always a large number of potential policy-decisions. The legislature can
only account for its expected private interests averaged over an entire category of
potential projects. Extreme private interests of the legislature in some projects tend
to cancel out with other projects of the same category, where the private bias is in
the opposite direction. Whether a separation of powers or a single ruler is the better
constitution depends on the relative intensity of private interests in the executive and
in the legislature. Chapter 2 argues that a separation of powers is more important on
the national or supra-national level, where decisions can have far-reaching consequences
and private interests differ strongly. On a regional or local level, where governments
have less scope for extreme decisions and the special characteristics of each project
are particularly important, a separation of powers is less attractive and other control
mechanisms tend to be more effective.
Chapter 3 now takes a social system with well functioning institutions and a court
that enforces contractual agreements for granted. Individuals can write binding con-
tracts, conditional on verifiable contingencies. The focus of chapter 3 is to demonstrate
how the fear to signal distrust can lead a principal to refrain from writing a complete
contract. Thus, asymmetric information about how much one party is trusting the
other one can endogenously lead to contractual incompleteness for strategic reasons.
According to standard results in contract theory an optimal incentive contract
should be conditional on all verifiable information containing statistical information
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about an agent’s action or type.5 Most real world contracts, however, condition only
on few contingencies and often no explicit contract is signed at all. Chapter 3 offers
an explanation for this stylized fact. If trust is an important element of a relationship,
the fear to signal distrust to the other party can endogenously lead to contractual
incompleteness. Designing a sophisticated complete contract with fines, punishments,
and other explicit incentives signals distrust to the partner. A trustworthy partner
would choose the desired action anyway. Insisting on explicit contractual incentives
means therefore that the partner’s trustworthiness is called into question. An atmo-
sphere of trust, however, is of crucial importance for the functioning of most economic
and noneconomic relationships. A principal may therefore prefer to leave a contract
incomplete rather than to signal her distrust by proposing a complete contract.
More precisely, in our model an agent is one of two possible types, trustworthy or
untrustworthy. The trustworthy agent is intrinsically motivated to work for a joint
project with the principal - or to comply with a socially beneficial norm. The un-
trustworthy type is purely self-interested. In other words, the trustworthy agent works
hard for a project - with or without a contractual enforcement. The untrustworthy
agent, however, shirks - unless a contract forces him to work hard. The principal can
have different beliefs about the agent’s type: the stronger her belief that the agent is
trustworthy the stronger the principal’s trust in the agent. The relationship consists
of two parts - in the first part high effort can be enforced by a contract. The second
part is not contractible. Due to this second non-contractible part of the relationship it
is important for the principal that the agent believes to be trusted.
If the belief of the principal were common knowledge, the principal - whatever her
belief - would prefer to enforce high effort in the contractible part in order to avoid the
risk that an agent shirks. However, a trusting principal expects the costs of forbearing
from such a prescription to be lower. According to her belief the agent is likely to
work hard anyway. Thus - under asymmetric information about the principal’s belief,
a trusting principal can separate herself from a distrusting one by proposing a less
complete contract.
5See e.g. Holmstöm [47] or Laffont and Tirole [55].
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The beginning of this introduction argued that the existence of some individuals
with social preferences is the basis for a developed social and political system with
institutions that enforce contracts signed between parties. Social preferences are thus
the foundation for an environment in which binding contracts can be written. The very
existence of heterogenous social preferences, however, can endogenously cause parties
to refrain from the opportunity to write a complete contract - caused by the fear that
proposing such a contractual agreement would signal distrust to the other party.

Chapter 1
Carrot or Stick?
The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences
in a Haystack Model
1.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses three questions concerning the evolution and co-evolution of
the two characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and
the willingness to punish hostile behavior. 1) How can preferences for rewarding,
and preferences for punishing, survive the evolutionary competition with purely self-
interested preferences? 2) What structural differences distinguish the evolution of the
willingness to reward from the evolution of the willingness to punish? 3) How is the
evolution of one side of reciprocity influenced by the evolution of the other side?
Self-interested preferences are a standard assumption in economic theory. From an
evolutionary standpoint1 this assumption seems justified due to the following argument:
a rational self-interested individual can always mimic other behavior if by doing so
he can maximize his expected material payoff. But, in the event of his action being
1The process of evolution may be interpreted in terms of both biological and cultural evolution
or even as a process of learning. Under the weak assumptions described below, our results hold
independently of which interpretation is used. Therefore, we postpone the discussion of the relevance
of each interpretation to Section 1.3.
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unobservable or punishment being impossible, he behaves selfishly and receives a higher
material payoff. Apparently, self-interested individuals should always outperform other
types and social preferences should vanish as a result of natural selection.
Several experimental studies however, offer substantial evidence that at least some
people are not exclusively driven by self-interest. A significant number are willing to
reward friendly and/or to punish hostile behavior of an opponent even if this is costly
and does not maximize their own material payoffs2. In addition, a recent experimental
study by Andreoni et al [4] finds interesting interactions between the possibilities of
rewarding and punishing: when subjects have the option to reward as well as the option
to punish the demand for rewards decreases significantly compared to a treatment
where there is no option to punish. The demand for punishments in response to very
bad offers3 is however significantly higher compared to a treatment without the option
to reward. How can we understand this pattern of behavior from an evolutionary
standpoint, and how could reciprocal preferences survive natural selection in the first
place?
This chapter shows that preferences for both rewarding and punishing can sur-
vive evolutionary competition with purely self-interested preferences if players interact
within separate groups4 and if they can condition their strategy on the distribution of
preferences within their own group. This holds even if individual preferences are un-
observable, groups are formed randomly and players interact anonymously in random
pairings.
However, there are important structural differences between the evolution of prefer-
ences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing. Rewarders can suc-
cessfully invade a population of self-interested players, but they cannot drive them out
completely. Preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested
preferences. Preferences for punishing on the other hand either drive out self-interested
2For a survey of the experimental literature see Fehr and Gächter [28] or Fehr and Schmidt[31].
3For medium range offers there is no significant change in the demand for punishments.
4The expression “Haystack Model” for settings where players interact only within randomly formed
groups which are reshuffled after reproduction goes back to Maynard Smith’s [63] example of mice
living and replicating over the summer within separate haystacks. At harvest time when the haystacks
are cleared mice scramble out into the meadow and mix up completely before colonizing new haystacks
in the next summer.
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preferences or they die out themselves. The option to punish hostile behavior results
either in a “culture of punishment” - where all players are willing to punish hostile
behavior - or in a “culture of laissez faire” - where nobody is willing to incur the costs
of punishing.
If there is both an option to reward friendly behavior and an option to punish
hostile actions, further interesting effects arise from the co-evolution of the two aspects
of reciprocity. Rewarders enhance the evolutionary success of preferences for punishing,
but punishers tend to crowd out preferences for rewarding. In fact, rewarders may
serve as a catalyst for the evolution of punishers. Rewarders can invade a population
of self-interested types. Their existence can enable punishers to invade successfully,
and finally to crowd out, both self-interested and rewarding types. Hence the option
to reward friendly actions can crucially influence the equilibrium outcome even if in
equilibrium nobody takes this option.
Our results are driven by the marginal effect a player has on the distribution of
preferences within his group. This marginal effect is advantageous for a reciprocator
and can outweigh the costs of rewarding or punishing. To see this, consider pairwise
interactions of the following structure: a first moving player (player 1) may either
cooperate or defect. Cooperation is costly for player 1 but profitable for a second
moving player (player 2). Player 2 observes this action and can then reward and/or
punish player 1 (both are costly) or remain inactive. Player 1 cooperates only if he
expects player 2 to reciprocate with a sufficiently high probability. Since individual
preferences are unobservable, player 1 estimates the probability of meeting a certain
type by the fraction of this type in his group. Hence players 1 cooperate if the number
of reciprocal players in their group is above a certain threshold, otherwise they defect.
Having reciprocal preferences leads to a material advantage for player 2 when he is
pivotal in his group, i.e. his type is decisive for whether the number of reciprocal
preferences in his group is just above or just below the threshold for cooperation.
Under what circumstances does this material advantage outweigh the losses incurred
for rewarding or punishing? The intuition for our main result is derived from the
following observation: the hope for reward as well as the fear of punishment can induce
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players 1 to cooperate. But when most players 1 cooperate it is relatively expensive
for player 2 to reward cooperation whereas the willingness to punish is almost for free.
On the other hand, when most players 1 defect, the willingness to reward is almost
for free, whereas it is expensive to punish defection. A higher fraction of rewarders or
punishers leads to a higher fraction of groups in which cooperation occurs. Therefore,
rewarders are relatively successful when most players 2 are self-interested, whereas
punishers become more successful the more players 2 have reciprocal preferences.
The existing evolutionary literature has paid little attention to the structural dif-
ferences between the evolution of a willingness to reward and a willingness to punish
and their mutual interaction. However, the question about how reciprocity or social
preferences can survive evolution in sporadic interactions has been tackled by several
authors from biology, psychology, economics and other social sciences.5 The existing
explanations6 relate to three basic themes7: commitment, assortation, and parochial-
ism.
Commitment: If preferences are observable, reciprocal preferences may serve as
an advantageous commitment device. A reciprocal player is credibly committed to
rewarding friendly or punishing unfriendly behavior. Therefore, he may induce friendly
behavior of a first-moving player. This may enhance his evolutionary success. The
results of Güth and Yaari [41], Güth [40], Bester and Güth [11] and partly Sethi [82],
Höffler [46], and Guttman [42] are based on this argument.
Assortation: Efficiency enhancing behavior becomes evolutionarily more successful,
5On the separate issue of whether evolution selects the Pareto efficient equilibrium in coordination
games see Robson [75], Kandori-Mailath-Rob [50], Robson-Vega-Redondo [76], and Kuzmics [52].
6For surveys of this literature see Sober and Wilson [86] and more recently Bergstrom [10] or Sethi
and Somanathan [85].
7Eshel, Samuelson and Shaked [25] find a different explanation how altruism may survive based on
the assumptions that people learn by imitation and interact and learn only locally on a 1 dimensional
circle.
Huck and Oechssler [49] exploit a further mechanism to explain how preferences for punishing unfair
behavior might survive evolution. They look at ultimatum games in which costs of punishing unfair
behavior are very small compared to the punishment and the inverse group-size. In the role of a
proposer punishers have the relative advantage over materialists in their group, that they are slightly
less likely to be matched with a punisher. Therefore, unfair offers of materialists are more likely to be
rejected. In the role of responders punishers have the disadvantage of incurring the costs of punishing.
But if these costs are sufficiently small this disadvantage is more than compensated by the relative
advantage when being in the role of a proposer.
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if players are not matched randomly, but interact with higher probability with players
of their own type. In particular, most of the literature on group selection focuses
on this idea to explain the evolutionary survival of social preferences. Price [73] first
offered a mathematical description. Bergstrom [9] investigated the relation between
assortative matching and the evolution of cooperation. Notice that initially random
groups may become assortative over time by the evolution of preferences inside groups
if no reshuffling of groups occurs8 (compare e.g. Cooper and Wallace [18]).
Parochialism: Types that act to enhance efficiency if they are in a group of mainly
their own type and act to reduce efficiency if they are in a group of mainly self-
interested players may survive in evolution even if the matching is non-assortative.
Sethi and Somanathan [84] showed that conditional altruists who behave in a friendly
way towards other altruists but spitefully towards materialists may be more successful
than pure materialists. Similarly Gintis [36] looked at conditional punishers who punish
defectors only if there are enough other punishers in their group. They also survive
evolution9.
The explanation of this chapter for the survival of reciprocal preferences is related
to the idea of commitment. But we go beyond the existing literature by relaxing
the assumption that individual preferences are observable10. Players observe only the
overall distribution of preferences within their own group.11 The marginal effect of a
player on the distribution of preferences in his group drives our results12. Even more
8A different endogenous justification of assortative matching arises if preferences are partly observ-
able, see e.g. Frank [32].
9Notice that punishers may enhance efficiency, because they can induce cooperation of a first-
moving player.
10Bowles and Gintis [13] and Friedman and Singh [34] consider also the case when individual pref-
erences are unobservable for the evolution of types who punish non-cooperative behavior. However,
Friedman and Singh implicitly need the assumption that second-order punishment (i.e. the punish-
ment of non-punishers) is costless. Bowles and Gintis consider a model where punishment takes the
from of ostracism. Their model is too complex for an analytical solution but in simulations they also
find that punishers can survive.
11Ely and Yilankaya [21] show in a model without group structure and with unobservable preferences
over the outcome of the game that the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium. See
also Ok and Vega-Redondo [68] for a justification of the evolution of self-interested preferences when
preferences are unobservable. Dekel et al [20] analyze how the evolution of preferences changes with
the degree of observability of individual preferences.
12A similar effect plays a role in the model by Höffler [46]. He considers a learning process of
bounded rational workers in a stylized principal agent model. In equilibrium some agents play fair
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importantly, our setting allows the analysis of both sides of reciprocity in a unified
framework. We find crucial structural differences between the evolution of preferences
for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing. Finally, our framework
enables us to demonstrate that the co-evolution of both sides of reciprocity influences
the results decisively. Rewarders enhance the evolutionary success of punishers whereas
punishers crowd out rewarders.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the
model and analyzes the three cases that arise naturally: 1) Player 2 might have only
the costly option of rewarding cooperation. 2) Player 2 might have only the costly
option of punishing defection. 3) Player 2 might have both the options - rewarding
cooperation and punishing defection. Section 1.3 discusses our results and Section 1.4
concludes.
1.2 The Model
We use the indirect evolutionary approach13 to describe the evolution of preferences:
individuals may have different preferences. We only impose the restriction that prefer-
ences can be described by subjective utilities for each possible outcome. The subjective
utility an individual assigns to an outcome may not coincide with the material payoff
he receives. Individuals choose their strategies according to their own preferences and
their knowledge about preferences of their opponents, i.e., they play perfect Bayesian
equilibria. They receive material payoffs according to strategies played. A type who re-
ceives higher material payoffs has more offspring (or imitators) and his fraction grows.
Subjective utilities of an individual are only important for determining his actions.
The evolutionary success is only influenced by the resulting material payoffs.
We consider pairwise sequential interactions of the following structure: Player 1
moves first. He can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). Cooperation leads to a material
gain for player 2 (c2 > d2) but is costly for player 1 (d1 > c1). Player 2 observes the
and other don’t - like the coexistence result in case 1 of our model.
13Compare Güth and Yaari [41].
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action of player 1 and then chooses his reaction. Three cases are analyzed. In case 1,
player 2 can reward cooperation of player 1 (by the amount of r) but this is costly
(costs cr) . In case 2, player 2 can punish defection of player 1 (by the amount p)
which is also costly (costs cp). In case 3, player 2 can do both and either reward or
punish player 1. The interaction of case 3 is illustrated in figure 1.1. Case 1 and case 2
are obtained from this figure by removing the option to punish or the option to reward
respectively.
Figure 1.1: Interaction
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with c1 + r > d1 > c1 > d1 − p and c2 > c2 − cr > d2 > d2 − cp.
If all players maximize only their own material payoff (and are known to do so) all
three games are solved easily by backward induction. Player 2 never incurs any costs
in the last stage. This is anticipated by player 1. Therefore, player 1 defects in the
first stage. This outcome also tends to result in an evolutionary setting, if individual
preferences are unobservable and if all players are matched randomly within the total
population (i.e, no group structure is imposed)14. The reason is simple: someone who
chooses a strategy which maximizes his material payoffs earns more than someone who
doesn’t. However, results change when the total population is divided up into separate
groups and players interact only within their own group.
14Nöldeke and Samuelson [67] give an example to illustrate that in general the subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium is not the only evolutionary stable equilibrium. Similarly, the results by Sethi and
Somanthan [83] rely on the fact that non-credible threats can survive in certain evolutionary settings.
However, Hart [44] and Kuzmics [51] show that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium results if certain
limits are taken in a suitable way. See also Ok and Vega-Redondo [68] for a justification of the evolution
of self-interested preferences when preferences are unobservable.
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Whether the fraction of players of a certain preferences type grows or shrinks de-
pends on their individual material payoffs. With the law of large numbers in mind,
we concentrate our analysis on deterministic approximations to the evolutionary dy-
namics15. The results of this chapter hold for any payoff-monotonic dynamics. By
payoff monotonicity we mean that the fraction of a preference-type with higher (equal)
average material payoff grows faster than (as fast as) the fraction of a preference-type
with lower (equal) average material payoff. Furthermore, it is convenient to assume a
continuous dynamics.
Assumption 1 The evolutionary dynamics can be described by regular payoff mono-
tonic growth rates.16
Furthermore, we say that a population state forms a stable equilibrium if it is an
Asymptotically Stable State - a standard concept in evolutionary game theory.17
What preference types are relevant for our analysis? In general, each player assigns
a subjective von Neumann-Morgenstern-utility to each outcome. These subjective
utilities depend on the actual position of the player and may differ completely from
his material payoffs.18 We are mainly interested in the evolution of preferences for the
position of player 2 - reciprocal behavior is only possible in that position. However, the
evolutionary success of preferences for position 2 depends on the behavior of players 1.
In proposition 9 in the appendix we show that in position 1 no type of preferences can
do better than self-interested ones and that in any stable equilibrium all players 1 must
act consistently with payoff maximization. This result justifies simplifying the analysis
by the slightly stronger
Assumption 2 In position 1 all players maximize their expected material payoffs.
15This is very common in evolutionary game theory even if not entirely innocuous. For some caveats
for this approach see Boylan [14]. For a thorough discussion of a deterministic dynamics as a limit of
a stochastic dynamics see Benaim and Weibull [7].
16The formal definition of a regular payoff monotonic growth rate can be found in Weibull [95] or
in the appendix of this chapter.
17See Weibull [95] or the appendix of this chapter for the precise definition.
18In the most general case 3 there exist 4 possible outcomes. A preference type is therefore char-
acterized by a tuple of 8 subjective utilities (modulo a linear transformation). The first 4 subjective
utilities describe a players preferences if he happens to play in position of player 1, the remaining 4
subjective utilities describe his preferences in position of player 2.
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But, when players happen to play in position 2, four classes of preferences may be
relevant: we call someone a “rewarder” if he is willing to incur costs to reward a
friendly action, a “punisher” if he is willing to incur costs to punish a hostile action,19
a “reciprocator” if he is willing to do both, and “self-interested” if he is willing to do
neither. We say someone has “social preferences” if he is either a rewarder, a punisher
or a reciprocator. In case 1 and case 2 only two of these types matter.
An infinite population is divided up randomly into separate groups of (2N) players.
N players are drawn randomly to play in position 2, the remaining N players play
in position 1.20 By “randomly” we mean that a player’s type does not influence the
probabilities of the types of his group-members, i.e.:21
Assumption 3 The probability that k+ of the N players 2 in a group are rewarders, k−
are punishers, krc are reciprocal and ks are self-interested (with k+ +k−+krc +ks = N)
is multinomial distributed:22
MN,γ−,γ+,γrc,γs(k+, k−, krc, ks) =
N !
k+!k−!krc!ks!
γ
k+
+ γ
k−
− γ
krc
rc γ
ks
s (1.1)
where γi is the fraction of the i-th type in the total population
(hence γ+ + γ− + γrc + γs = 1).
In case 1 and case 2 only two types of preferences are relevant. Then, the multino-
mial distribution reduces to the binomial distribution:
BN,γ(k) =
N !
k!(N − k)!γ
k(1− γ)N−k. (1.2)
19The literature also calls preferences for rewarding “positively-reciprocal” and preferences for pun-
ishing “negatively-reciprocal”.
20We might also reshuffle the positions of all players for each interaction. The main results would
not change.
21Assumption 3 of regularly reshuffling may seem strong for real world applications. But precisely
this assumption allows us to abstract from assortative group selection effects and to isolate the effects
we are interested in. From a theoretical standpoint this strengthens our results: preferences for
punishing or rewarding can survive evolution even without effects of assortative matching.
22An even more natural choice would be the multi-hyper-geometrical distribution (drawing without
replacement). For simplicity we approximate it by the multinomial distribution. The qualitative
results are not affected and the approximation is good for a large total population.
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Individuals interact in random pairings within their group. Individuals do not know
the type of their respective counterpart, but we assume them to know the frequency
of each preference-type in their group:
Assumption 4 Individuals know the fractions of the different types within their own
group (but they don’t know the type of their randomly matched opponent).
Most authors in this branch of literature make the stronger assumption that indi-
vidual preferences are observable. We relax this assumption considerably by assuming
only that the distribution of preferences within a group is observable. It may be im-
possible to guess your counterparts’ individual preferences in a sporadic interaction.
But most people will have a good estimate how likely they are to encounter one or the
other type in their environment.23
In order to abstract from repeated games effects, we assume that individuals play
anonymously and finitely often. Hence, player 2 need not fear any consequences in a
later stage whatever action he takes.
After a finite number of interactions preferences are replicated according to received
material payoffs and all groups are completely reshuffled. A new cycle starts with the
new fractions γi of the different preference types in the total population. Timing of
events in our model is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Timing of events
0 1 2 3 4 5
H
t
©
Total population
with certain frac-
tions of different
preference types
Groups of N
players 1 and
N players 2
are drawn
randomly
Players learn
the distribution
of preferences
within their
group
Interaction in
random pairings
within groups
Replication ac-
cording to indi-
vidual material
payoffs
Reshuffling of all
groups with the
new total popu-
lations and the
new fractions of
preference-types.
23However, Assumption 4 is not entirely innocuous. If the fraction of self-interested types is not
common knowledge - as assumed here - but has to be learned from other people’s behavior in previous
periods, then even a self-interested player 2 might have an incentive to reward cooperation because he
anticipates his marginal influence on the learning of players 1. Hence self-interested players 2 might
try to build a reputation - not individually, but of their group. Modelling the consequences of such a
learning process seems an interesting but complicated task and is therefore left to future research.
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1.2.1 Case 1: Costly Rewarding
Case 1 concentrates on the possibility that player 2 can reward friendly behavior of
player 1. First, player 1 decides whether to cooperate or defect. Player 2 observes
this action. In case player 1 cooperates, player 2 may either incur the costs to reward
player 1 or refuse to do so.24. This game is also known as ”trust game” and is illustrated
in figure 1.3
Figure 1.3: Interaction in case 1
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with c1 + r > d1 > c1 and c2 > c2 − cr > d2.
Player 1 maximizes his expected material payoff. Player 2 either has preferences
for rewarding and rewards cooperation or he has self-interested preferences and does
not reward cooperation of player 1. The evolutionary process determines the fractions
of each type in equilibrium.
We consider a group where k of the N players 2 have preferences for rewarding
cooperation. Player 1 will base his decision whether to cooperate or defect on his
expected material payoff. Player 1 does not know the type of his opponent, but he
does know the fraction k
N
of players 2 in his group who would reward cooperation.
Hence player 1 expects an average material payoff of (c1 +
k
N
r) for cooperation. If
player 1 defects, he receives surely a payoff of d1. Therefore, player 1 will cooperate if
24We could give player 2 an additional option to reward player 1 after defection. But it is straight-
forward to show that preferences for rewarding defection cannot be part of any stable equilibrium.
Therefore, we ignore this possibility.
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c1+
k
N
r > d1 or equivalently if k > N
d1−c1
r
.25 Hence, cooperation occurs in a group only
if the number of rewarding players 2 is above this threshold. We denote this threshold
by k∗.
Definition 1 k∗ is the highest number of rewarding players 2 in a group which is still
not sufficient to induce player 1 to cooperate. In other words
k ≤ k∗ ⇒ player 1 defects
k > k∗ ⇒ player 1 cooperates.
Calculation of k∗ is straightforward:
k∗ =
⌊
N
d1 − c1
r
⌋
, (1.3)
where bxc denotes the largest natural number smaller or equal to the real number x.
k∗ is an integer with 0 ≤ k∗ ≤ N − 1.
In groups with k∗ or fewer rewarding players 2 no cooperation occurs. Players 1
defect and players 2 receive a material payoff of d2 - independently of their types. In
groups with more than k∗ rewarding players 2 players 1 cooperate. A rewarding player 2
receives a material payoff of (c2− cr). A self-interested player 2 exploits cooperation of
player 1 and receives a material payoff of c2. These payoffs are summarized in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Material payoffs of player 2
Payoffs in groups with k ≤ k∗ Payoffs in groups with k > k∗
Rewarder d2 c2 − cr
Self-interested d2 c2
For a player 2, the probability that exactly k of the other (N − 1) players 2 in his
group have preferences for rewarding is BN−1,γ(k) =
(N−1)!
k!(N−1−k)!γ
k(1 − γ)N−1−k, where
γ is the fraction of rewarders in the total population. If this player has preferences for
rewarding the total number of rewarders in his group is (k + 1), otherwise it remains
25For notational simplicity we define the tie breaking rule that player 1 defects if his expected payoff
for defecting equals that for cooperating.
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k. Hence, a self-interested player 2 receives an expected material payoff of26
ūs(γ) = d2
k∗∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + c2
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γ(k) (1.4)
and a rewarding player 2 receives an expected material payoff of
ū+(γ) = d2
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + (c2 − cr)
N−1∑
k=k∗
BN−1,γ(k). (1.5)
Due to the assumption 1 of payoff monotonicity, the fraction of rewarding players
grows (falls) if they receive a higher (lower) average payoff than the self-interested
type. Hence, we can see from the sign of the difference
ū+(γ)− ūs(γ) = (c2 − cr − d2)BN−1,γ(k∗)− cr
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γ(k) (1.6)
= (c2 − cr − d2)
(
N − 1
k∗
)
γk
∗
(1− γ)N−1−k∗ − cr
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
(
N − 1
k
)
γk(1− γ)N−1−k
when the fraction of rewarding players increases, decreases or remains stable. First,
we consider the case c2 − d2 − cr ≤ 0, i.e. gains of cooperation for player 2 are smaller
than costs of rewarding. Then, all terms on the right hand side of equation 1.6 are
negative (or zero) and a self-interested player 2 earns always more than a rewarding
player 2.
Proposition 1 If c2 − d2 − cr ≤ 0, i.e. the cost for rewarding exceed player 2’s gains
from player 1’s cooperation, then only an entirely self-interested population is stable27.
But mainly we are interested in the case c2−d2−cr > 0, i.e. gains from cooperation
for player 2 exceed his costs of rewarding. Then, there is a chance for the survival of
26A different way to calculate this is to multiply the payoff of a rewarding (self-interested) player 2
in a group of k rewarding players 2, multiply it by k (N − k) and weight it by the probability that a
group has k rewarding players 2 (i.e. the binomial coefficient). If we sum this up over all 0 ≤ k ≤ N
and divide it by the total number of players 2 of that type we get the average payoff. Of course, the
results remain unchanged.
27A population is called stable if it is an asymptotical stable state of the dynamics. For details see
e.g. Weibull [95] or the appendix of the working paper version.
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preferences for rewarding . In fact, for k∗ < N − 1 preferences for rewarding and
self-interested preferences coexist in any stable equilibrium28:
Proposition 2 (Coexistence) Let c2 − d2 − cr > 0 and k∗ < N − 1. Then, the
monomorphic population states (i.e. states with a fraction γ = 0 or γ = 1 of rewarders)
are unstable for any payoff monotonic dynamics. Preferences for rewarding can invade
a self-interested population and self-interested preferences can invade a population of
rewarders.
Remark 1 If c2 − d2 − cr > 0 and k∗ = N − 1 then only a monomorphic population
of preferences for rewarding forms a stable equilibrium.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
For an intuitive understanding of Proposition 2 first consider a population consist-
ing almost entirely of rewarders. Then, almost all groups consist almost entirely of
rewarding players 2. Therefore, players 1 cooperate in almost all groups. A rewarding
player 2 receives a payoff of (c2 − cr) only, whereas a self-interested player 2 saves
the costs of rewarding and earns the higher payoff of c2. Therefore, the fraction of
self-interested players grows.
The intuition for why preferences for rewarding can invade a self-interested pop-
ulation is slightly more involved. Consider a population consisting almost entirely of
self-interested players. Then the vast majority of groups contain too few rewarding
players 2 to induce cooperation of players 1. In these groups self-interested and re-
warding players 2 receive the same payoff d2. But in a small number of groups the
fraction of rewarding players 2 is above the threshold k∗ and players 1 are willing to
make the advanced concession of cooperation. Every player in these groups receives
a higher payoff than most players in groups without cooperation. But the fraction of
rewarding players 2 in these groups is at least k
∗
N
and therefore far above the fraction of
28We could generalize this result slightly: Take any trait that (a) when the fraction of a group
possessing the trait is less than 1 < k∗ < N , those with and without the trait do equally well; (b)
when the fraction is above k∗, all agents in the groups do better, but those with the trait do worse
than those without; (c) agents are randomly assigned to groups. Then there is a positive fraction of
agents with the trait in equilibrium. I would like to thank Herb Gintis and Bob Evans for pointing
this out.
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rewarders in the total population (which is close to zero). Therefore, rewarding play-
ers profit relatively more from these successful groups and can invade a self-interested
population.
If k∗ = N −1 the result changes for the following reason: in this case self-interested
preferences cannot invade a population of rewarders. Even if a self-interested player 2
is the only invader in his group he destroys cooperative behavior of players 1. Hence,
if k∗ = N − 1 rewarding players 2 always do at least as well as self-interested players 2.
According to proposition 2 only mixed populations are candidates for stable pref-
erence distributions. In fact, there exists a unique stable equilibrium.
Theorem 1 (Unique mixed equilibrium) Let c2 − d2 − cr > 0 and k∗ < N − 1.
Then there exists a unique stable equilibrium. Self-interested preferences and prefer-
ences for rewarding coexist in this equilibrium.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the dynamics of the evolutionary process for an example.
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Figure 1.4: The difference in average material payoffs between rewarders and self-
centered individuals (ū+ − ūs) plotted as function of γ for N = 20, d1 = 1, c1 = 0, r =
2, d2 = 5, c2 = 0, cr = 1.The fraction of rewarders in the stable equilibrium of this
example is γeq ≈ 0.5876. If the fraction γ of rewarding individuals is below γeq then
they earn a higher average material payoff and their fraction γ increases. If γ > γeq
rewarding players earn less and γ decreases. Due to the assumed continuity of the
evolutionary dynamics, γ converges to γeq.
Efficiency: Player 1 cooperates only if his expected material payoff under coopera-
tion is higher than under defection. On the other hand, preferences for rewarding can
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only survive if player 2 receives a higher material payoff after cooperation and reward-
ing than after defection. Hence the existence of preferences for rewarding can only
lead to a Pareto-improvement (in material payoffs) relative to a purely self-interested
population. But for k∗ < N − 1 non-rewarding self-interested players survive, too.
Hence, inefficient defection occurs in some groups and the outcome is still inefficient.
Comparative Statics for Case 1
The fraction γeq of rewarders in the unique stable equilibrium is characterized by the
equation ū+(γ
eq)− ūs(γeq) = 0. Inserting equation 1.6 and rearranging leads to
c2 − cr − d2 = cr
N−1−k∗∑
k=1
(N − 1− k∗)!k∗!
(N − 1− k∗ − k)!(k∗ + k)!
(
γeq
1− γeq
)k
, (1.7)
for 0 < γeq < 1. The comparative statics is easily derived from this condition.
First, we consider the dependence of the equilibrium fraction γeq of rewarding play-
ers on the group-size N . N enters into equation 1.7 not only directly but also via
k∗ =
[
N c2−d2
r
]
. Due to the truncation, k∗ is only almost proportional to N . In general,
a higher group size N tends to decrease γeq. But, for some values, the truncation
can invert this effect slightly. To avoid such problems, in the following proposition we
concentrate on sequences of N for which k
∗
N
≡ c is kept constant.
Proposition 3 An increase in the group size N , keeping k
∗
N
constant, lowers the frac-
tion γeq of preferences for rewarding in equilibrium.
Intuitively, larger groups reduce the probability of being pivotal. Therefore, the advan-
tage of being a rewarder is reduced. Hence, the fraction of rewarding players decreases
in equilibrium.29 This result is consistent with the common feeling that in large anony-
mous groups the level of cooperation is lower. The influence of a single player on the
29The last argument is not entirely complete. The probability of having to bear the costs for
rewarding may also decrease and therefore a counterbalancing effect may arise. We can show that
the equilibrium fraction of rewarders decreases with the group size, but so far we have not be able to
show whether the equilibrium fraction does, or does not, converge to zero if the group size goes to
infinity. Numerical results suggests that γeq decreases only slowly and may not converge to zero.
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reputation of a large group is small. In larger groups, a smaller number of rewarding
players survive in equilibrium.
Now we consider the dependence of γeq on the parameters of the game. We start
with the influence of the costs cr player 2 has to incur if he rewards cooperation.
Proposition 4 Higher costs cr of rewarding lead to a lower fraction γ
eq of the prefer-
ences for rewarding in equilibrium. Furthermore, lim
cr→0
γeq = 1 and lim
cr→(c2−d2)
γeq = 0.
Intuitively, higher costs of rewarding do not influence the incentives of player 1, but
reduce the fitness of rewarding players 2. Therefore, their fraction is reduced in equi-
librium.
Proposition 5 Higher gains of cooperation (c2 − d2) lead to a higher fraction γeq of
rewarding players 2 in equilibrium. Furthermore, lim
(c2−d2)→cr
γeq = 0 and lim
(c2−d2)→∞
γeq =
1.
The intuition is again straightforward. If gains of cooperation increase, then gains from
being pivotal increase for a rewarding player 2. The costs are not affected. Therefore,
the fraction of rewarding players 2 increases.
Lemma 1 If the threshold k∗ of rewarding players 2 in a group (above which players 1
in that group start to cooperate) increases, then the fraction of rewarding players 2 in
equilibrium increases.
An increase in k∗ means that there have to be more rewarding players 2 in a group
in order to induce cooperation of player 1. Hence a smaller number of self-interested
players 2 can free-ride without putting cooperation in danger. Therefore, the total
number of self-interested players 2 decreases.
From lemma 1 we can easily derive two further results. The costs of cooperation
for player 1 (d1 − c1) and the amount of the possible reward r enter in equation 1.7
only through k∗. Hence,we obtain
Corollary 1 The equilibrium fraction γeq of rewarding players increases (weakly) if
the costs (d1 − c1) of cooperation for player 1 increase.
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Corollary 2 The equilibrium fraction γeq of rewarding players decreases (weakly) if
the amount r by which a player 1 can be rewarded cooperation increases.
Both corollaries might seem counterintuitive at first glance. But the intuition is similar
to that of lemma 1. Increasing costs of cooperation or a decreasing rewards make
it more difficult to induce player 1 to cooperate. Therefore, free-riding by a self-
interested player 2 becomes more likely to destroy cooperation. Hence, the fraction of
self-interested players has to decrease in equilibrium.
1.2.2 Case 2: Costly Punishment
In case 1, player 2 had only the possibility of reciprocating positively, i.e. rewarding a
friendly action. In case 2, we analyze the evolution of preferences if it is only possible
for player 2 to punish hostile behavior (i.e. defection) of player 1. This punishment is
costly30. The interaction is illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5: Interaction in case 2
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with c1 + p > d1 > c1; c2 > d2; cp > 0.
Player 2 has either preferences for punishing or self-interested preferences. A pun-
ishing player 2 is willing to incur the costs for punishing player 1 in case of defection.
But if player 2 is self-interested, he avoids these costs and does not punish defection
30We might allow for this punishment after cooperation as well as after defection of the first player.
But - similar to case 1 - preferences which lead to punishment after cooperation (e.g. spiteful prefer-
ences) vanish in our model due to natural selection. Again, we simplify the analysis by looking at the
possibility of punishment only if player 1 defects.
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of player 1. Player 1 maximizes his expected material payoff. In a group where k of
the N players 2 have preferences for punishing player 1 expects an material payoff of
(d1− kN p) after defection. After cooperation he receives a material payoff of c1. There-
fore, player 1 cooperates if and only if31 c1 > d1 − kN p or equivalently if k > N d1−c1p .
Analogously to case 1 we denote the threshold by k∗∗.
Definition 2 k∗∗ is the largest number of punishing players 2 in a group that is still
insufficient to induce a self-interested player 1 to cooperate. In other words
k ≤ k∗∗ ⇒ player 1 defects
k > k∗∗ ⇒ player 1 cooperates.
The calculation of k∗∗ is straightforward:
k∗∗ =
[
N
d1 − c1
p
]
. (1.8)
k∗∗ is an integer with 0 ≤ k∗∗ ≤ N − 1.
In groups with k∗∗ or fewer punishing players 2 no cooperation occurs. Players 1
defect. In response, punishing players 2 receive material payoffs of (d2 − cp). Self-
interested players 2 avoid costs of punishing and receive higher material payoffs of d2.
In groups with more than k∗∗ punishing players 2, players 1 cooperate. Therefore,
players 2 receive - independently of their types - material payoffs of c2. The payoff
structure is summarized in table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Material payoffs of player 2
Payoffs in groups with k ≤ k∗∗ Payoffs in groups with k > k∗∗
punisher d2 − cp c2
self-interested d2 c2
Now let γ be the fraction of punishers in the total population. Analogously to
case 1 self-interested players 2 receive an expected material payoff of
ūs(γ) = d2
k∗∗∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + c2
N−1∑
k=k∗∗+1
BN−1,γ(k) (1.9)
31Again, we assume the tie breaking rule that player 1 defects if he is indifferent.
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and punishing players 2 the expected material payoff of
ū−(γ) = (d2 − cp)
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + c2
N−1∑
k=k∗∗
BN−1,γ(k). (1.10)
Due to the assumption of payoff monotonicity, the fraction of punishers grows (falls) if
punishing players 2 receive a higher (lower) average payoff than self-interested players 2.
Hence we are interested in the sign of the difference
ū−(γ)− ūs(γ) = (c2 − d2)BN−1,γ(k∗∗)− cp
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) (1.11)
= (c2 − d2) (N − 1)!(k∗∗)!(N − 1− k∗∗)!γ
k∗∗(1− γ)N−1−k∗∗ − cp
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
(N − 1)!
k!(N − 1− k)!γ
k(1− γ)N−1−k.
For 0 < γ < 1 follows
ū−(γ)− ūs(γ) T 0 (1.12)
⇔ c2 − d2 T cp
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
(k∗∗)!(N − 1− k∗∗)!
k!(N − 1− k)!
(
1− γ
γ
)k∗∗−k
. (1.13)
The right hand side of equation 1.13 is strictly decreasing and continuous in γ, tends
to 0 if γ tends to 1 and to infinity if γ tends to zero. The left hand side of equation 1.13
has a fixed positive value. Hence, there exists only one equilibrium of mixed types that
is unstable. We denote the fraction of punishers in this unstable equilibrium by γcut.
The only stable equilibria are the corner solutions32.
Theorem 2 Let k∗∗ > 0. Then, the two monomorphic equilibria - in which either all
players have preferences for punishing or all players have self-interested preferences -
are stable.
The unique mixed equilibrium is not stable.
In contrast to case 1, the option for punishing defection drives the population to
32Like in Proposition 2 we could generalize this result. Take any trait such that (a) when the
fraction of a group possessing the trait is above s∗ (with 1N < s
∗ < N−1N ) then all agents do equally
well; (b) when the fraction is less then s∗ then all agents in the group do worse, but those without the
trait do better; (c) agents are randomly assigned to groups. Then the two monomorphic equilibria -
in which either all agents do have the trait or all agents do not have the trait are stable.
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a monomorphic state. Either a “culture of punishment” develops, where all players
are willing to punish, or a “culture of laissez faire”, where nobody bothers to punish
defectors. Figure 1.6 illustrates the evolutionary dynamics in Case 2.
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Figure 1.6: The difference in average material payoffs between punishers and self-
centered individuals (ū− − ūs) is plotted as a function of γ for N = 20, d1 = 1, c1 =
0, p = 2, d2 = 5, c2 = 0, cp = 1. The mixed equilibrium at γ
sep ≈ 0.443 is unstable and
separates the basins of attraction of both stable monomorphic equilibria. If γ < γsep
punishers perform worse and γ decreases to 0. If γ > γseppunishers perform better and
γ increases to 1.
Theorem 2 is very intuitive. If virtually no player 2 is willing to punish defection, a
single punisher is very unfit. In almost any group he is the only punisher and is unable
to enforce cooperation of player 1. Player 1 defects and the punishing player 2 has to
pay the costs cp of punishing. Therefore, he is less fit than a self-interested player 2
who does not punish. On the other hand, if virtually all players 2 are willing to punish,
they seldom have to prove this. Players 1 in almost all groups cooperate in order to
avoid punishment. Only in a few groups in which the number of punishing players 2
is below the threshold k∗∗, the self-interested and punishing players 2 receive different
payoffs. But most of these groups are just one punisher below the threshold. In these
groups, a punishing player 2 is pivotal in inducing cooperation. Therefore, he benefits
from his preferences.
In the equilibrium of a population of punishers, players 1 always cooperate and no
player 2 has to prove his willingness to punish. How would the results change if play-
ers 1 make mistakes and fail to cooperate sometimes? Appendix 1.5.3 demonstrates
that results change only slightly if the probabilities of mistakes are sufficiently small.
There remain two stable equilibria. The equilibrium consisting only of self-interested
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preferences remains stable. However, a population consisting only of punishers is no
longer stable. A small fraction of self-interested players can invade. But the fraction
of self-interested invaders remains arbitrarily small if probabilities of mistakes are suf-
ficiently small33. Hence, there might still develop a culture of punishment with a high
fraction of punishers and a small fraction of self-interested players.
The results of Case 2 also differ from Case 1 in terms of efficiency (in material
payoffs). In order to be able to rank the outcomes we take the point of view of a
player who does not know yet whether he plays in player-position 1 or 2 and might
play in either position with equal probability. Then, cooperation is efficient if d1−c1 <
c2 − d2, i.e. if player 2 profits more from cooperation than player 1 loses. However,
defection (and no punishment) is efficient if d1− c1 > c2−d2. The option for punishing
defection can enforce complete cooperation (in a world without mistakes and in the
right equilibrium). If d1 − c1 < c2 − d2, this is efficient. But cooperation can also be
enforced by the threat of punishment in cases where cooperation is inefficient. Hence,
the possibility of punishing defection can be both efficiency enhancing or efficiency
reducing.
The unstable mixed equilibrium separates the basins of attraction of both stable
equilibria. If the initial fraction of punishers is below γcut then only self-interested
players survive, otherwise only punishers. The lower the value of γcut the more initial
population states evolve to a population of punishers. We relegate the comparative
statics of γcut to appendix 1.5.2.
In case 2 there are two equilibria and we don’t know whether a “culture of pun-
ishment” or a “culture of laissez faire” develops. However, case 3 suggests that the
survival of preferences for punishing becomes more likely if player 2 has both options -
punishing and rewarding. In fact, under suitable conditions only an entirely punishing
population forms an evolutionary stable equilibrium in case 3.
33However, a moderate probability of mistakes may result in a significant shift of the punisher
equilibrium. See Appendix 1.5.3 for details.
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1.2.3 Case 3: Costly Rewarding or Costly Punishment
In case 3 player 2 has both options - costly punishing after defection and costly re-
warding after cooperation. This allows us to analyze the co-evolution of preferences
for rewarding and preferences for punishing, i.e. how the evolution of one side of
reciprocity influences the evolution of the other side. The interaction is illustrated in
Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.7: Interaction in case 3
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Player 2:
c1 + r
c2 − cr
c1
c2
d1
d2
d1 − r
d2 − cp
with c1 + r > d1 > c1 and c2 > c2 − cr > d2 > d2 − cp.
All players 1 maximize their expected material payoffs. There are four different
types of players 2 34: Self-interested players neither reward cooperation nor pun-
ish defection. Punishers do not reward cooperation, but do punish defection. Re-
warders reward cooperation, but do not punish defection. Reciprocal players both
reward cooperation and punish defection. In order to reduce technical problems, we
make the following35
Assumption 5 The material loss p for player 1 after being punished equals his mate-
rial gain r after being rewarded, i.e. p = r.
Due to Assumption 5, punishers and rewarders have exactly the same influence on the
behavior of players 1 in their group. Hence, material payoffs of all other players 2
34Again, we neglect generic cases of preferences which associate the same subjective utility with
different outcomes.
35The general intuition for the results of this section holds without this assumption, but assumption 5
simplifies the analysis considerably.
Chapter 1 Carrot or Stick? 32
are not affected if we replace a punisher by a rewarder or vice versa. We know from
the analysis of case 2 that preferences for punishing are more successful if their own
fraction grows. Hence, punishers also profit from a growing fraction of rewarders. Any
kind of reciprocity helps to induce cooperation of players 1 and reduces the costs of
being a punisher.
Remark 2 Higher fractions of rewarders and higher fractions punishers enhance the
evolutionary success of preferences for punishing.
Conversely, we know from case 1 that the evolutionary success of preferences for re-
warding relative to self-interested preferences decreases if their own fraction becomes
too large. Hence the same must hold for too large a fraction of punishers. Further-
more, relative to preferences for punishing, the success of preferences for rewarding is
reduced by an increase of the fraction of any type of reciprocity. The higher the fraction
of rewarders or punishers, the more groups are above the threshold for cooperation.
Therefore, costs of rewarding grow, whereas the costs of punishing fall.
Remark 3 Higher fractions of rewarders and higher fractions of punishers reduce the
evolutionary success of preferences for rewarding relative to the success of preferences
for punishing.
This interdependence between the evolution of both types of reciprocity has interesting
consequences. Consider an entirely self-interested population. Preferences for punish-
ing cannot invade such a population directly, as shown in Case 2. But preferences
for rewarding can invade (see Case 1). If enough rewarders invade, they may serve
as a “catalyst” and enable the invasion of punishers. The more punishers invade, the
more successful they become and finally they drive out self-interested players as well
as rewarders.
Remark 4 Preferences for rewarding may serve as a catalyst for the evolution of pref-
erences for punishing. Rewarders can invade an entirely self-interested population.
Their existence enables punishers to invade, too. Finally, preferences for punishing
become more and more successful and drive out self-interested preferences as well as
preferences for rewarding.
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Now we look for stable equilibria in case 3. First, we check for stable monomorphic
populations, i.e stable populations of only one preference-type.
Proposition 6 The only monomorphic stable equilibrium consists entirely of punish-
ers.
Are there other stable equilibria consisting of several preference types? The answer
depends on the parameters of the model. For certain parameters, this is the only stable
equilibrium. For others, further stable equilibria exist. It is easier to capture the basic
intuition if reciprocal preferences are neglected. Hence for the moment we restrict
ourselves to the possibilities of self-interested preferences, preferences for rewarding and
preferences for punishing. Consider a population consisting only of rewarders and self-
interested and players. According to Case 1 this population evolves towards a unique
equilibrium containing both preference types. Can a small fraction of punishers invade
this equilibrium? The answer depends on the fraction γeq of rewarders in equilibrium.
Since we assumed p = r, the effect of a rewarding player 2 on any other player 2 in
his group is precisely the same as the effect of a punishing player 2 at the same place.
Hence, preferences for punishing can invade this equilibrium if, and only if, the fraction
γeq of rewarders in this equilibrium (determined by Equation 1.7) is higher than the
threshold γcut (determined by Equation 1.13) above which preferences for punishing
become more successful than self-interested ones. Preferences for punishing become
relatively more successful, the higher their own fraction of the population. Therefore,
once preferences for punishing can invade, they drive out all other preferences and the
dynamics leads to the monomorphic equilibrium of preferences for punishing.
Proposition 7 Let γeq be defined by equation 1.7 and γcut by equation 1.13.
If reciprocal preferences are neglected, i.e. only the subspace of self-interested prefer-
ences, preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing is considered, then
a) if γeq > γcut, then the only stable equilibrium is a monomorphic population, where
all players have preferences for punishing. The population converges to this equi-
librium from any interior state.
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b) If γeq < γcut, then there are precisely two stable equilibria. One stable equilibrium
is the monomorphic population of preferences for punishing. In the other stable
equilibrium preferences for rewarding and self-interested preferences coexist36. In
this equilibrium the fraction of preferences for rewarding is γeq.
rewarder
punisher
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Figure 1.8: Case 3 with γeq > γcut: (ū+ − ūs) and (ū− − ūs) as functions of γ ≡ γ++γ−
for N = 20, d1 = 1, c1 = 0, r = 2, d2 = 5, c2 = 0, cr = 1.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the dynamics of the evolutionary process in case 3 with the
parameters of our previous examples. Here we have γeq > γcut and the equilibrium
with a fraction γeq of rewarders and a fraction (1− γeq) of self-interested players is not
stable: punishers earn a higher average payoff, invade successfully and drive out all
other preferences.
Including reciprocal preferences does not change the basic intuition. Preferences
for punishing still form a stable equilibrium and a mixture of a fraction of γeq with
preferences for rewarding and 1− γeq self-interested preferences remains a stable equi-
librium under the slightly more restrictive condition γeq < min{γcut; γh}, where γh is
36Notice that, even in the case of Prop.7b where we have still two stable equilibria, it is in Case 3
more likely to end up in the monomorphic equilibrium (compared to Case 2). This is meant in the
spirit of the model by Kandori et al. [50]: imagine that each member of the entire (large but finite)
population mutates with small probability to any other preference-type. Then, the minimum number
of mutations necessary to move from the monomorphic equilibrium to the basin of attraction of the
other equilibrium is exactly the same as in case 2. But the other way round fewer mutations are
sufficient to move the population from the bi-morphic equilibrium to the basin of attraction of the
monomorphic equilibrium. That is because the rewarders are advantageous for the invasion of the
punishing type.
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defined by the equation
c2 − d2 − cr = cp
k∗∗−2∑
k=0
(k∗∗ − 1)!
k!
(N − k∗∗)!
(N − 1− k)!
(
1− γh
γh
)k∗∗−1−k
. (1.14)
The tightening of the condition is necessary to ensure that reciprocal preferences cannot
invade the mixed equilibrium either. Furthermore, reciprocal preferences can be part
of an equilibrium only under very special conditions. If most groups induce players 1 to
cooperate, preferences for punishing tend to outperform reciprocal ones, since they do
not have to bear the costs of rewarding. If, on the other hand, most groups are not able
to induce cooperation, then preferences for rewarding tend to outperform reciprocal
ones since they do not bear the costs of punishing in the frequent cases of defection.
But for certain parameters there exist equilibria with a positive fraction of reciprocal
preferences. These additional equilibria are not robust to small changes in parameters
of the model and are not very plausible. Therefore, we relegate the discussion of
these equilibria to the appendix 1.5.4 and focus attention on the discussed equilibria
summarized in the following
Proposition 8 Let γeq be defined by equation 1.7,γcut by equation 1.13 and γh by
equation 1.14. Then, for any payoff-monotonic selection dynamics holds
a) a monomorphic population of punishers forms a stable equilibrium.
b) If γeq < min{γcut, γh}, then also a population with a fraction γeq of rewarders and
a fraction (1− γeq) of self-interested players forms a stable equilibrium.
So far, preferences for punishing will - once they invade - drive out preferences for
rewarding completely. In equilibrium either preferences for rewarding or preferences
for punishing survive, but not both. However, both sides of reciprocity can survive
in one equilibrium, if player 1 cannot be forced to participate in the interaction, i.e.
player 1 has an additional outside option as illustrated in figure 1.9.
Now, a population consisting only of punishers is no longer stable. The threat of
punishment alone can only deter player 1 from defecting. But player 1 opts out as long
as he does not expect to be rewarded for cooperation. Analogous to case 1, reciprocal
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Figure 1.9: Interaction in case 3 with outside option
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with c1 + r > d1 > o1 > c1; c2 > c2 − cr > o2 > d2 > d2 − cp.
players who reward and punish can invade the population of punishers. In some groups
their willingness to reward induces players 1 to cooperate instead of opting out. This
makes reciprocal preferences initially more successful until reciprocal preferences and
preferences for punishing are in a mixed equilibrium37. Hence there is an equilibrium
in which all or most players are willing to punish defection, some of them do reward
cooperation and others don’t38.
A different explanation for the survival of both types of reciprocity arises if individ-
uals engage in different types of interaction - sometimes similar to case 1, sometimes
similar to case 2 or case 3. If players have general preferences and do not have different
preferences for different types of interaction, then some rewarders, some punishers and
some reciprocators can survive39.
37This equilibrium is only Lyapunov stable but not asymptotically stable. That is because payoffs
do not change if some reciprocal players are replaced by rewarders. But the set of population states
with a fraction of (1− γeq) of punishers, γ ∈ [0; γeq] of reciprocators and (γeq − γ) of rewarders forms
an asymptotically stable set of equilibria.
38For certain parameters there exist further equilibria, but the detailed analysis is beyond the scope
of this chapter.
39The question of how far preferences may depend on the respective interaction is a subtle one. On
the one hand, preferences should not be expected to evolve independently for any type of interaction.
On the other hand, people may well classify interactions by broad categories and their preferences
may well depend on whether they assign a certain interaction to one category or another. Empirical
evidence as well as theoretical approaches in the direction of Samuelson [79] could offer interesting
insights to this question.
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1.3 Discussion
Our results hold for any payoff-monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Hence, our selection
dynamics can be interpreted as genetic evolution, cultural evolution or as a process of
learning by success and failure. Furthermore, our results are robust to small mistakes:
in appendix 1.5.3 we demonstrate that sufficiently small mistake-probabilities of players
change the results only slightly.
How well do the findings of our evolutionary analysis fit empirically observed hu-
man behavior? A recent experimental paper by Andreoni et al. [4] studies human
behavior in four treatments called Dictator, Carrot-Stick, Carrot and Stick. The last
three treatments have the same structure as our three analyzed interactions, with the
distinction that the choice variables in the experiment are not binary: first proposers
can choose the fraction of their wealth they want to transfer to a responder. Then the
responder can choose how much money he wants to invest in rewards or punishments40.
The “Carrot treatment” and the “Stick treatment” replicate qualitatively the findings
of several experimental studies41: the higher the transfer of the proposer, the higher the
average reward and the lower the average punishment by the responders. In particular,
virtually no punishments occur when offers are above the equal share. Furthermore,
even after very generous proposals, some responders do not invest in rewards and, even
after very small proposals, some responders do not spend money on punishments.
Most interestingly for our purpose, Andreoni et al. compare experimentally the
demand for rewards in the Carrot versus the Carrot-Stick treatment and the demand
for punishments in the Stick versus the Carrot-Stick treatment. If rewards and punish-
ments are available, the demand for rewards decreases significantly (compared to the
Carrot treatment) and the demand for punishments increases significantly for very low
offers (compared to the Stick treatment). For medium and large offers, the demand for
punishments does not change significantly.
These experimental findings have a natural interpretation in the light of our evo-
40For each cent invested by the responder five cents were added to (if it was a reward) or subtracted
(if it was a punishment) from the proposer’s wealth.
41These studies typically analyze either the possibility of punishing or the possibility of rewarding,
but not both.
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lutionary model. Suppose the willingness to punish or reward differs for different
contexts42. In a context where only rewards are available, in agreement with the ex-
perimental findings of the Carrot treatment, Case 1 of our model predicts that some
subjects reward and some don’t. In a context where only punishments are available,
Case 2 of our model suggests that either a norm of punishment or a norm of no punish-
ment prevails. We can interpret the observations for offers above the equal share as a
norm of no punishment. Offers below the equal share are often punished. However, in
contrast to the predictions of Case 2 of our model, not all responders punish low offers.
Two simple extensions can naturally explain the experimental findings: first we show
in Appendix 1.5.3 that already relatively small mistake-probabilities of the proposer
shift the ”only punishers equilibrium” to a mixed equilibrium with a non negligible
fraction of non-punishers. Second, since there exist two equilibria in Case 2, different
norms may have evolved for different real life contexts. In the artificial situation of the
laboratory environment, some subjects may imagine themselves in a real life interac-
tion where punishment is the norm, while others may compare it to an environment
where non-punishment is the norm. Then the result is a mixture of punishers and
non-punishers such as observed in the experiment.
Most interestingly, in an environment where rewards and punishments are both
available, our evolutionary model predicts that the propensity to reward cooperation
tends to be crowded out by a propensity to punish non-cooperation. This is consistent
with the experimental results: the demand for rewards is drastically reduced in the
Carrot-Stick treatment compared to the Carrot treatment, whereas the demand for
punishments in the Carrot-Stick treatment compared to the Stick treatment increases
at least in response to very low offers.
42In fact, if different types of interaction play an important role during the process of evolution,
then natural selection will favor such context dependent preferences. Also, the well documented
fact that framing effects can influence experimental findings significantly points to context dependent
preferences. Admittedly, context dependent preferences cause serious and subtle problems for our
modelling strategies as economists. Therefore, it may help to think instead of general preferences that
refer to a context dependent norm.
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1.4 Conclusions
This non-assortative group selection model offers an explanation for the evolutionary
survival of both sides of reciprocal preferences. Despite the fact that individual behav-
ior and preferences are unobservable, individuals continue to have a marginal effect on
the “reputation” of their group, and this influences the behavior of the other players
in their group. This effect is sufficient to enable preferences for rewarding and pref-
erences for punishing to survive in the evolutionary competition with self-interested
preferences. Both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can induce
cooperative behavior. But there is an intrinsic difference between the two prefer-
ence types: preferences for rewarding tend to coexist with self-interested preferences,
whereas preferences for punishing tend either to dominate the population completely
or to vanish entirely. Furthermore, rewarders enhance the evolution of preferences for
punishing. Preferences for rewarding are able to invade a self-interested population and
may then, as a “catalyst”, enable the invasion of preferences for punishing. Punishers,
on the other hand, crowd out rewarders and may even drive them out completely.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
Equation 1.6 describes the difference between expected material payoffs as a function of
the fraction γ of rewarders in the entire population. N is kept constant. The first term
of the right hand side has a positive sign, the remaining terms are negative. First we
consider small γ. The positive first term is of the order k∗ in γ whereas the remaining
negative terms are at least of the order (k∗ + 1) in γ. Hence the right hand side of
equation 1.6 is positive for sufficient small γ. Therefore, γ grows if the fraction of the
rewarders is sufficiently small. In other words, an entirely self-interested population is
not stable.
In a similar way we prove that the fraction of self-interested players increases if
most players have preferences for rewarding, i.e. if γ is close to 1. If γ converges to
1, then the first term of equation 1.6 converges to zero whereas the remaining sum of
negative terms converges to (−cr) (in fact, the last term converges to −cr and all the
remaining terms to zero). Hence, the fraction γ of rewarders decreases if their fraction
of the total population is sufficiently large. In other words, a population consisting
entirely of rewarders is not stable either, q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 1
From proposition 2 we know that the difference between the average material payoffs
ūpos(γ)− ūs(γ) is above zero for small γ and below zero for γ close to 1. Since ūpos(γ)−
ūs(γ) is continuous in γ, there must exist an interior γ
eq with ūpos(γ
eq)− ūs(γeq) = 0.
We will see in the next step, that γeq is the unique value strictly between 0 and 1
satisfying this equation. Hence, for all values below γeq, the difference is above 0 and
for all values above γeq the difference is below 0. Hence this equilibrium is stable.
Uniqueness follows directly from the necessary condition for an interior equilibrium,
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i.e. equation 1.7:
c2 − cr − d2 = cr
N−1−k∗∑
k=1
(N − 1− k∗)!k∗!
(N − 1− k∗ − k)!(k∗ + k)!
(
γ
1− γ
)k
. (1.15)
The right hand side is strictly increasing in γ. The left hand side is constant. Therefore,
equation 1.15 is satisfied at most for one γeq, q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3
We assumed k
∗
N
≡ q constant, i.e. k∗ = qN with 0 < q < 1. We can rearrange the
equilibrium condition 1.7 into
c2 − cr − d2 = cr
N−1−k∗∑
k=1
((
k∏
l=1
N − k∗ − l
k∗ + l
)(
γ
1− γ
)k)
(1.16)
= cr
N(1−q)−1∑
k=1
((
k∏
l=1
(1− q)N − l
qN + l
)(
γ
1− γ
)k)
. (1.17)
Now we prove that for constant γ the right hand side is strictly increasing in N . Since
the left hand side is constant, γeq has to fall in order to equilibrate the two sides again.
The number of terms increases with N . Since all terms in equation 1.16 are positive it
is sufficient to prove that each term increases in N . By extending N to real numbers
we find
∂
∂N
(
(1− q)N − l
qN + l
)
=
l
(qN + l)2
> 0, (1.18)
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4
The right hand side of equation 1.7 is strictly increasing in γ. For any value of cr
equation 1.7 must hold in equilibrium. If we now choose a new cnewr > cr, the left hand
side becomes smaller whereas, if we keep γ fixed, the right hand side would increase.
Therefore, γ has to decrease in order to decrease the right side and satisfy equation 1.7
again. Hence the new equilibrium fraction of rewarders is lower. Furthermore, if cr
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tends to 0, then the left hand side tends to the positive value c2−d2, whereas the right
hand side would tend to zero if γ
1−γ remained bounded from above. Therefore, γ must
tend to 1 if cr tends to zero. Finally, if cr tends to (c2 − d2), then the left hand side
tends to zero, but the right hand side can only tend towards zero if γ tends to zero,
too, q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of proposition 5 is completely analogous to the proof of proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 1
We consider the equilibrium condition in form of equation 1.16. The left hand side is
not affected by a change in k∗. The right hand side is affected in two ways if k∗ increases.
First, the number of terms is reduced and second, each of the remaining terms becomes
smaller. Both effects diminish the value of the right hand side. Therefore, γeq has to
increase in order to equilibrate both sides again, q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2
k∗ = [N d1−c1
r
] is weakly increasing in (d1 − c1) and weakly decreasing in r. Hence,
corollary 1 and 2 follow directly from lemma 1, q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 6
Neither an entirely self-interested population nor a population consisting entirely of
rewarders can be stable, since both are not even stable in the subspace of rewarders
and self-interested players (case 1). Furthermore, an entirely reciprocal population
can not be stable, since punishers perform strictly better in the subspace of punishers
and reciprocators. (In this subspace cooperation occurs in all groups, but preferences
for punishing save the costs of rewarding.) The only stable monomorphic population
consists entirely of punishers. Take any state γ in a sufficiently small neighborhood of
(γ+ = 0, γ− = 1, γrc = 0, γs = 0). Rewarders, reciprocators and self-interested players
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all earn strictly less than punishers in such a neighborhood (rewarders and reciprocators
because they have to pay the costs of rewarding in most interactions; self-interested
players by reasons completely analog to case 2). Therefore the fraction of punishers
grows faster than all other types and the state must converge to the monomorphic
punisher population.
Proof of Proposition 7
Step 1 proves that the equilibria in proposition 7 are stable. Step 2 shows that no
other equilibrium can be stable (in the subspace without reciprocal preferences). Step 3
proves that in case a the population converges from any interior state to a monomorphic
population of punishers.
Step 1: The monomorphic population of punishers forms a stable equilibrium by
prop. 6. Theorem 1 in case 1 states that there exists a unique stable equilibrium with a
fraction of γeq rewarders in the subspace of self-interested preferences and preferences
for rewarding. It remains to be shown that, for γeq < γcut (i.e. in case b)), this
equilibrium is also stable in the subspace which includes preferences for punishing. Let
γ+ be the fraction of rewarders, γ− the fraction of punishers in the total population and
define γ̃ ≡ γ+ + γ−. Due to p = r (assumption 5) the action of player 1 depends only
on the total fraction γ̃ of rewarders and punishers. Hence, expected material payoffs
of any type of player 2 depend only on γ̃, too:
ūs(γ̃) = d2
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ̃(k) + d2BN−1,γ̃(k∗) + c2
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γ̃(k) (1.19)
ū+(γ̃) = d2
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ̃(k) + (c2 − cr) BN−1,γ̃(k∗) + (c2 − cr)
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γ̃(k)(1.20)
ū−(γ̃) = (d2 − cp)
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ̃(k) + c2BN−1,γ̃(k∗) + c2
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γ̃(k) (1.21)
Chapter 1 Carrot or Stick? 44
Hence we obtain for the differences in average material payoffs
ū+(γ̃)− ūs(γ̃) = (c2 − d2 − cr) BN−1,(γ̃)(k∗) + (−cr)
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,(γ̃)(k) (1.22)
ū−(γ̃)− ūs(γ̃) = −cp
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,(γ̃)(k) + (c2 − d2) BN−1,(γ̃)(k∗) (1.23)
ū−(γ̃)− ū+(γ̃) = −cp
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,(γ̃)(k) + cr
N−1∑
k=k∗
BN−1,(γ̃)(k) (1.24)
The first equation corresponds to equation 1.7 of case 1 - only γ is now replaced by
(γ̃). In particular, the fraction of rewarders will increase relative to the fraction of
self-interested preferences if γ̃ < γeq ( and decrease if γ̃ > γeq). Similarly, the second
equation corresponds to equation 1.13 of case 2. In particular, this means that the
fraction of punishers decreases relative to the fraction of self-interested players as long
as γ̃ < γcut. By putting these two observations together we see that, for γeq < γ̃ < γcut,
both the fraction of preferences for rewarding γ+ and the fraction of preferences for
punishing γ− decrease relative to the fraction (1−γ+−γ−) of self-interested preferences.
Hence, (γ̃) decreases in absolute terms. The dynamic is continuous in γ+ and γ− and
therefore also in (γ̃). Hence, if initially γ0+ + γ
0
− < γ
cut, then (γ̃) remains below (or
equal to) min{γ0+ + γ0−, γeq}. In particular, γ− decreases relative to the fraction of self-
interested preferences with a rate strictly above a constant strictly positive rate. Hence
γ− also converges absolutely to zero. Now it is straightforward to prove asymptotic-
stability of the population-state (γ+, γ−, γs) = (γeq, 0, 1 − γeq). Let ε < γcut−γeq3 . For
any initial population state in the ε-neighborhood of (γeq, 0, 1 − γeq), γ0+ + γ0− < γcut
holds. Therefore, γ− converges to zero. Due to the continuity of all average payoff
functions in γ+ and γ− the convergence of γ− to 0 implies convergence of γ+ to γeq.
Step 2: Now we prove that there are no other equilibria in the subspace of pref-
erences for rewarding, preferences for punishing and self-interested preferences. First
preferences for punishing cannot coexist with self-interested preferences in a stable
equilibrium: replacing any small fraction of the self-interested players by punishers
enhances material payoffs of punishers relative to self-interested players. Hence an
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equilibrium containing both types cannot be stable. Furthermore, preferences for re-
warding and preferences for punishing cannot form an equilibrium: cooperation would
occur in all groups and rewarders earn less because they have to bear the costs of
rewarding. A completely rewarding or completely self-interested population is not sta-
ble as shown in case 1. Hence the only remaining candidates for stable equilibria are
either a population of only punishers (in fact, this equilibrium is stable by prop. 6) or
a heterogenous population of self-interested preferences and preferences for rewarding.
Case 1 showed that in equilibrium the fraction of preferences for rewarding has to be
γeq and the fraction of self-interested preferences 1−γeq. In step 1 we have shown that
this equilibrium is stable for γeq < γcut. It remains to be shown that this equilibrium
is not stable for γeq > γcut. At (γ+ = γeq, γ− = 0, γs = 1− γeq) we have γ̃ = γeq > γcut
and therefore punishers earn a strictly higher profit than self-interested players. This
contradicts stability as a result of43
Lemma 2 If a state γ is asymptotically stable in some payoff-monotonic selection
dynamics, then all types in the support C(γ) earn at γ an expected payoff at least as
high as any other type.
Step 3 It remains to be shown that for γeq > γcut the population converges from
any interior state to the equilibrium of a monomorphic population of punishers. From
any interior state, and for any regular selection dynamics, the population state does
not reach the boundaries in finite time44, i.e. no preference-type vanishes completely
in finite time. If initially γ̃ < γeq, then γ+ grows with positive rate relative to self-
interested preferences as long as γ̃ < γeq and, in particular, the point where (γ̃) =
γcut+ γ
eq−γcut
2
is reached in finite time. In the area where γcut < (γ̃) < γeq preferences for
rewarding and preferences for punishing are both more successful than self-interested
preferences. Therefore, once (γ̃) ≥ γcut + γeq−γcut
2
holds, the dynamic process never
changes this. Hence, after a finite time, γ− increases with a strictly positive rate
compared to γs. In particular, this implies that γs converges to 0. Hence (γ̃) converges
43The proof of lemma 2 is analogous to the proof of prop. 4.8 in Weibull [95] and written upon
request.
44Compare e.g. Weibull [95] page. 141
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to 1 and, in particular, (γ̃) > γeq after some finite time. Then rewarding players 2
become less successful than self-interested players 2 (and therefore less successful than
punishing players 2) and converge to 0, too. In the end, only preferences for punishing
survive and the fractions of other preferences converge to zero.
Proof of Proposition 8
Part a): See prop 6.
Part b): If γeq < min{γcut, γh}, then we can show that in the state (γ+ = γeq, γ− =
0, γrec = 0, γs = 1 − γeq) punishers and reciprocators earn strictly less than rewarders
and self-interested players. Since average material payoffs of all types are continuous in
γ+, γ−, γrc and γs, this means that punishers and reciprocators earn also strictly less in
a sufficiently small neighborhood of this state. Hence, from any sufficiently close state
the population will converge to the state (γ+ = γ
eq, γ− = 0, γrec = 0, γs = 1 − γeq).
That punishers earn a strictly lower material payoff in this equilibrium was show in the
proof of proposition 6. To see that reciprocators earn a strictly lower expected material
payoff consider the average material payoffs of a rewarder and of a single reciprocal
invader in this equilibrium:
ū+ = d2
k∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γeq(k) + (c2 − cr)
N−1∑
k=k∗
BN−1,γeq(k) (1.25)
ūrc = (d2 − cp)
k∗−2∑
k=0
BN−1,γeq(k) + (c2 − cr)
N−1∑
k=k∗−1
BN−1,γeq(k) (1.26)
Hence
ūrc − ū+ = −cp
k∗−2∑
k=0
BN−1,γeq(k) + (c2 − d2 − cr)BN−1,γeq(k∗ − 1). (1.27)
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For 0 < γeq < 1 we obtain by dividing through BN−1,γeq(k∗ − 1) the equivalence
ūrc − ū+ T 0 (1.28)
⇔ c2 − d2 − cr T cp
k∗−2∑
k=0
(k∗ − 1)!
k!
(N − k∗)!
(N − 1− k)!
(
1− γeq
γeq
)k∗−1−k
. (1.29)
The right hand side of equation 1.29 is strictly decreasing in γeq. Furthermore, the
right hand side would be equal to the left hand side if γeq = γh (this was precisely the
definition of γh). Hence, for γeq < γh, the right hand side is strictly larger than the
left hand side and therefore ūrc − ū+ < 0, q.e.d.
Preferences in Position 1
The following proposition helps to justify the Assumption 2 that all players 1 maximize
their expected material payoff.
Proposition 9 Let M′ be the set of a finite number of any possible subjective prefer-
ences about outcomes and let M⊃M′ include in addition to each preference type m′ in
M′ a corresponding type m that has identical preferences in position 2 but purely self-
interested preferences in position 1. Let M = |M| and let ∆ = {(γ1, . . . , γM)|
∑M
i=1 γi =
1} be the state space of all probability distributions over the preference types in M.
Furthermore, take Assumption 1 and Assumption 3 that now refers to the Multinomial
distribution MN,γ1,...,γM (k1, . . . , kM) =
N !∏M
i=1 ki!
∏M
i=1 γi.
a) No preference type can earn a higher expected material payoff than the corresponding
type that has identical preferences in position 2 but purely self-interested preferences in
position 1.
b) In any stable state γ all preference types mi ∈ M with a fraction γi > 0 must act
consistently with payoff maximization in player-position 1 in all groups that occur with
positive probability.
Proof of Proposition 9 Player 2 conditions his choice of action only on the action
chosen by player 1. In particular, he does not condition his behavior on the distribution
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of preference-types in his group, even if he could do so. This fact is due to our assump-
tion that players have preferences only about outcomes and not about other players’
preferences or their distribution. Since player 2 can observe the action of player 1, he
can guess the outcomes resulting from his own action directly. Hence player 2 chooses
his strategy independently of his beliefs about the other players’ preferences and there-
fore independently of the distribution of preference-types in his group. Now consider
the pair of preferences described in part a): In position 2 both types are identical
and earn therefore the same expected material payoff. In position 1 expected material
payoffs depend only on the choice of whether to cooperate or to defect. Since the self-
interested type chooses by definition the option that maximizes his expected material
payoff, no other type can do better. We prove part b) by contradiction. Assume that
there exists a stable state γst with a positive fraction of players 1 acting with positive
probability in a way that earns them an expected material payoff strictly below the
optimum. Then the corresponding type from part a) earns a strictly higher expected
material payoff. This contradicts stability as a result of lemma 2, q.e.d.
1.5.2 Comparative Statics for Case 2
Let γcut be the fraction of punishers in the unstable mixed equilibrium. This fraction
separates the basins of attraction of the stable equilibria. If the initial fraction of
punishing players is below the cutoff γcut then this fraction decreases until the entire
population has self-interested preferences and nobody punishes defection. If, on the
other hand, the initial fraction of punishing players is above the cutoff γcut, then this
fraction increases until the entire population has preferences for punishing. One might
therefore interpret the value of γcut as an indicator for how likely it is to end up in one
or the other equilibrium45. The comparative statics of γcut is analogous to case 1 and
can be derived directly from equation 1.13.
Higher costs of punishing diminish the basin of attraction of the punisher equilib-
rium:
45Again, this interpretation is in the spirit of the model by Kandori et. al [50], where the size of the
basins of attraction determines the long run equilibrium
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Proposition 10 If the costs cp - which a player 2 has to bear in order to punish - in-
crease, then γcut increases, i.e. there have to be initially more punishers in order to end
up in the punishing equilibrium. Furthermore, limcp→0 γ
cut = 0 and limcp→∞ γ
cut = 1.
The intuition is straightforward: the higher the number of punishing players, the
cheaper it is to be a punisher. If the costs of punishing increase, punishers become less
fit. Hence punishing players need a higher fraction of punishers in order to be at least
as successful as non-punishers.
Higher gains from cooperation for player 2 are good for punishers. Hence the basin
of attraction for their equilibrium becomes larger:
Proposition 11 If the gains of cooperation for the players 2 (c2 − d2) increase, then
γcut decreases, i.e. a lower initial fraction of punishing players is necessary in or-
der to end up in the punishing equilibrium. Furthermore, lim(c2−d2)→0 γ
cut = 1 and
lim(c2−d2)→∞ γ
cut = 0.
Again, the intuition is straightforward: the higher the gains of cooperation for a
player 2, the higher his profit from being pivotal in inducing cooperation of play-
ers 1. Therefore a lower fraction of punishers is necessary in order to make punishing
more successful than non-punishing.
Lemma 3 If the threshold k∗∗ of punishing players 2 in a group above which the play-
ers 1 start to cooperate increases then γcut increases, i.e. there are more punishing
players necessary in order to end up in the punishing equilibrium.
Intuitively, a higher threshold k∗∗ makes it more probable for an individual to be in
a group in which the number of punishers is too low to induce cooperation. In these
groups being a punisher is costly. Therefore, fitness of punishers is lower and a higher
initial fraction of punishers is necessary to make punishing more successful than non-
punishing.
Corollary 3 If player 1’s costs for cooperation (d1 − c1) increase, then γcut increases
weakly, i.e. a higher or equal fraction of punishers is necessary in order to end up in
the punishing equilibrium.
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Corollary 4 If player 2’s losses due to a punishment p increase, then γcut decreases
weakly.
1.5.3 Extension: Small Mistakes
This appendix considers the possibility that some players 1 fail to play optimally.
Assume that player 1 makes a mistake with small probability ε. In that case, he
defects even so he should cooperate and vice versa. If ε is sufficiently small, results of
case 1 and case 2 change only slightly:
Proposition 12 If players 1 make a mistake with sufficiently small probability ε then
in Case 1 there exist two stable equilibria: in the first equilibrium the fraction γeqε
of preferences for rewarding is close to the equilibrium fraction without mistakes γeq. In
the second equilibrium only self-interested preferences survive (i.e. γ = 0). If ε tends
to zero then γeqε tends to γ
eq. Moreover, the basin of attraction of the self-centered
equilibrium tends to zero.
in Case 2 there remain two stable equilibria. The monomorphic equilibrium where
all players have self-interested preferences is still stable. But a monomorphic population
of punishers is no longer stable. Instead, there is a second stable equilibrium with a
high fraction of punishers and a low fraction of self-interested players. If ε tends to
zero, the fraction of preferences for punishing in this equilibrium is arbitrarily close
to 1.
We discuss and prove only Case 2. The proof for Case 1 is analogous and written
upon request.
The intuition for Case 2 of proposition 12 is straightforward. In a world of no
mistakes and in the equilibrium where all players 2 are willing to punish, this threat is
costless: player 1 cooperates and no punishment is necessary. But, if players 1 make
sometimes mistakes, being a punisher is costly. If almost everybody else is a punisher,
the probability of being pivotal tends to zero. But because of mistakes the costs of
punishing do not vanish. A monomorphic population of punishers is therefore no longer
stable.
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For a more formal proof consider average payoffs of both types. A self-interested
player 2 receives an average material payoff of
ūs(γ) = (d2 + ε (c2 − d2))
k∗∗∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + (c2 − ε (c2 − d2))
N−1∑
k=k∗∗+1
BN−1,γ(k) (1.30)
and the punishing type receives
ū−(γ) = (d2 − cp + ε (c2 − d2 + cp))
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k)+(c2 − ε (c2 − d2 + cp))
N−1∑
k=k∗∗
BN−1,γ(k). (1.31)
Hence the difference in average payoffs between the two types is
ū−(γ)− ūs(γ)
= − (1− ε) cp
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + ((1− 2ε) (c2 − d2)− εcp) BN−1,γ(k∗∗)
−εcp
N−1∑
k=k∗∗+1
BN−1,γ(k)
= (1− 2ε)
(
−cp
k∗∗−1∑
k=0
BN−1,γ(k) + (c2 − d2) BN−1,γ(k∗∗)
)
− εcp. (1.32)
This difference is continuous in γ and ε. For γ = 0, the difference is negative. Hence
the monomorphic equilibrium of self-interested preferences remains stable. For γ =
1 the difference is also negative. Therefore, self-interested preferences can invade a
population of punishers. However, for ε sufficiently small, there still exists a second
stable equilibrium in addition to γ = 0. In this second equilibrium punishers and self-
interested types coexist. The fraction of punishing types in this equilibrium converges
to 1 if ε tend to 0.
Proof: Existence: for ε = 0, there exits a γ0 where the difference is positive. Due
to continuity in ε, the difference at this γ0 is still positive for sufficiently small ε. Since
the difference is negative at γ = 1, there must exist a stable equilibrium between γ0
and 1 due to continuity in γ.
Exactly one more stable equilibrium: the term in large brackets in equation 1.32
is a polynomial of finite order. Hence there are only a finite number of local minima.
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Let ∆ be the minimum value of all local minima above zero. For ε < ∆
2∆+cp
we obtain
(1− 2ε)∆− εcp > 0 and therefore all local minima with positive value remain positive.
Hence, for sufficiently small ε, there are still only two γ for which ū−(γ) − ūs(γ) = 0
- one (still unstable) equilibrium close to the old unstable equilibrium and one stable
equilibrium close to γ = 1, q.e.d.
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Figure 1.10: Case 2 with mistakes of probability ε = 0.1 and with γeq > γcut: (ū+ − ūs)
and (ū− − ūs) as functions of γ ≡ γ++γ− for N = 20, d1 = 1, c1 = 0, r = 2, d2 = 5, c2 =
0, cr = 1.
Equation 1.32 is also helpful for analyzing the case of mistake probabilities that
are not arbitrarily small but are of moderate size. We can adjust the payoff difference
(ū− − ūs) by re-scaling it slightly with (1− 2ε) and then shifting it downwards by εcp.
Figure 1.10 demonstrates this for our example of case 2 with a mistake probability
of ε = 0.1. Here, in the stable “punisher equilibrium” with mistakes, a fraction of
γ− ≈ 0.73 has preferences for punishing, but a fraction of (1 − γ−) ≈ 0.26 has self-
interested preferences.
1.5.4 Further Equilibria in Case 3
First, we derive a sufficient condition under which there are no other stable equilibria
than those of proposition 8. Second, we analyze the conditions under which there exist
stable equilibria consisting only of reciprocal and self-interested preferences and third
we give the intuition for why no further stable equilibria exist.
The following lemma limits the possible candidates for stable equilibria.
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Lemma 4 An equilibrium with a positive fraction γrc of reciprocal players can only be
stable if the fraction of γs self-interested players is also positive.
Proof: If γs = 0 then players 1 cooperate in all groups. Therefore, preferences for
punishing earn c1 in all groups, whereas reciprocal preferences earn only c1− cr. Hence
the equilibrium is not stable, q.e.d.
In case 3 players 1 cooperate in their group if, and only if, c1+
k++krc
N
r > d1− k−+krcN r,
i.e. k+ + k− + 2krc > N d1−c1r . We define kef ≡ k+ + k− + 2krc, γ̃ ≡ γ+ + γ− and
W (kef ) ≡ WN−1,γ−+γ+,γrc(kef ) as the probability that a group of N − 1 players has the
characteristic kef , i.e.
W (kef ) =
N−1∑
k̃,krc=0
k̃+2krc=kef
(
N − 1
k̃, krc
)
γ̃k̃γkrcrc (1− γ̃ − γrc)N−1−k̃−krc . (1.33)
The probabilities of a group having any characteristic kef must be 1, i.e.
2N−2∑
kef=0
W (kef ) = 1. (1.34)
We can write average material payoffs in new notation
ūrc = (d2 − cp)
k∗−2∑
kef=0
W (kef ) + (c2 − cr)
2N−2∑
kef=k∗−1
W (kef ) (1.35)
ū+ = d2
k∗−1∑
kef=0
W (kef ) + (c2 − cr)
2N−2∑
kef=k∗
W (kef ) (1.36)
ū− = (d2 − cp)
k∗−1∑
kef=0
W (kef ) + c2
2N−2∑
kef=k∗
W (kef ) (1.37)
ūs = d2
k∗∑
kef=0
W (kef ) + c2
2N−2∑
kef=k∗+1
W (kef ) (1.38)
An equilibrium with γrc > 0 can only be stable if ūrc = ūs (by lemma 4) and if ū+ ≤ ūrc
and ū− ≤ ūrc:
Lemma 5 The following conditions are all necessary for a stable equilibrium with a
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fraction γrc > 0:
1.
cp
k∗−2∑
kef=0
W (kef ) + cr
2N−2∑
kef=k∗−1
W (kef ) = (c2 − d2) (W (k∗ − 1) + W (k∗)) (1.39)
2.
cp
k∗−2∑
kef=0
W (kef ) ≤ (c2 − d2 − cr)W (k∗ − 1) (1.40)
3.
cr
∑
kef=k∗
W (kef ) ≤ (c2 − d2 − cr + cp)W (k∗ − 1) (1.41)
The next corollary follows directly from condition 1.39:
Corollary 5 If
sup
γrc∈[0,1]
(γ++γ−)∈[0,1−γrc]
(W (k∗ − 1) + W (k∗)) < min{cp, cr}
c2 − d2 (1.42)
then there is no stable equilibrium with γrc > 0, i.e. the stable equilibria of proposition 8
are the only ones.
We now analyze the conditions under which there exists a stable equilibrium consisting
only of self-interested and reciprocal preferences, i.e. γ+ = γ− = 0 = γ+ + γ−. Notice
that
WN−1,0,γrc(kef ) =



0 if kef odd
(N−1)!(
kef
2
)
!
(
N−1− kef
2
)
!
γ
(
kef
2
)
rc (1− γrc)N−1−
kef
2 if kef even.
(1.43)
It follows directly that, for even k∗, condition 1.40 and condition 1.41 cannot be
both fulfilled. Hence for even k∗ there is no stable equilibrium consisting only of
self-interested and reciprocal preferences.
For odd k∗, on the other hand, things are different. If an equilibrium with a positive
fraction of reciprocal and self-interested preferences is stable in the subspace of this
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two types, it is stable also for invasion of preferences for rewarding or preferences for
punishing. This can be seen directly from average payoffs. In such an equilibrium,
the probability WN−1,0,γrc(kef = k
∗) of a group with characteristic kef = k∗ is 0, but
these are the only groups where preferences for rewarding or preferences for punishing
perform better than self-interested ones. To check existence of a stable equilibrium
in the subspace of self-interested and reciprocal preferences we just have to consider
differences in average material payoffs of this two types, i.e.
ūrc(γrc)− ūs(γrc) = (1.44)
cp
k∗−2∑
k=0
BN−1,γrc(k) + (c2 − d2 − cr) (BN−1,γrc(k∗ − 1) + BN−1,γrc(k∗)) + cr
N−1∑
k=k∗+1
BN−1,γrc(k)
For k∗ ≥ 2, this difference is negative for γrc sufficiently close to zero or one. Hence
there exists a stable equilibrium if, and only if,
sup
γrc∈[0,1]
(ūrc(γrc)− ūs(γrc)) > 0. (1.45)
This is summarized in the following
Corollary 6 Consider case 3:
a) For even k∗ there is no stable equilibrium consisting of only reciprocal and self-
interested preferences.
b) For odd k∗ and k∗ ≥ 2 there exists a stable equilibrium of only self-interested and
reciprocal preferences if, and only if,
sup
γrc∈[0,1]
(ūrc(γrc)− ūs(γrc)) > 0. (1.46)
Finally, we give the intuition for why there are no stable equilibria with a mixture
of three or all four different preference-types in case 3. An equilibrium with positive
fractions of self-interested preferences and preferences for punishing is not stable be-
cause preferences for punishing become more successful than self-interested ones if a
small deviation in their favor occurs. Similarly, an equilibrium with positive fractions
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of preferences for rewarding and reciprocal preferences is not stable because a small
deviation in favor of reciprocal preferences makes reciprocal preferences more success-
ful than preferences for rewarding. Hence, in case 3 maximally two preference types
coexist in equilibrium.
1.5.5 Some Definitions from Evolutionary Game Theory
Most standard concepts in evolutionary game theory are formulated for the evolution
of strategies. Here we look at the evolution of preferences. The main reason is that
this term captures better the aim of this chapter - we want to understand why people
might have reciprocal preferences. The following definitions are analogous to their
counterparts in evolutionary game theory.
Let t1, t2, . . . , tn be a finite number of possible preference types and γ1, γ2, . . . , γn their
fractions of the total population, i.e. γ1, γ2, . . . , γn ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 γi = 1. We call the
vector γ ≡ (γ1, γ2, . . . , γn) a population state. The set of all possible population states
is therefore a n − 1 dimensional simplex in Rn. We call this set ∆. The following
definitions concerning selection dynamics is analogous to the ones commonly used in
evolutionary game theory (see e.g. Weibull [95]). We focus on continuous selection
dynamics defined on the simplex ∆ in terms of growth rates gi(γ) for the population
shares associated with each preference type i ∈ n as follows
γ̇i = gi(γ)γi (1.47)
where g is a function with open domain X containing ∆.
Definition 3 A regular growth rate function is a Lipschitz continuous function g :
X → Rn with open domain X containing ∆, such that g(γ) · γ = 0 for all γ ∈ ∆
For any regular growth rate function there exists a unique solution ξ(t, γ0) to equa-
tion 1.47 through any initial value γ0. Moreover ξ is continuous in t ∈ T and γ0 ∈ ∆
(Picard-Lindelöf theorem).
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Definition 4 A regular growth rate is called payoff monotonic if for all γ ∈ ∆
u(ti, γ) < u(tj, γ) ⇔ gi(γ) < gj(γ), (1.48)
where u(ti, γ) stands for the average material payoff of type ti when the state of the
total population is γ.
Hence payoff monotonicity means that the fraction of types receiving higher average
material payoffs grow with a higher rate.
To check the stability of a population state, we look at asymptotic stability. We will
refer in all proofs to the metric induced by the maximum-norm. The proofs would
extend straightforward to other metrics (e.g. the Euclidian-metric).
Definition 5 A population-state γ is called Lyapunov stable if every neighborhood
B of γ contains a neighborhood B0 of γ such that ξ(t, γ0) ∈ B for all γ0 ∈ B0 ∩ Cand
t ≥ 0.
A state γ ∈ C is called asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and there exists
a neighborhood B∗ such that limt→∞ ξ(t, γ0) = γ holds for all γ0 ∈ B∗ ∩ C.
Definition 6 A closed set A ⊂ C is Lyaponnov stable if every neighborhood B of
A contains a neighborhood B0 of A such that γ+(B
0 ∩ C) ⊂ B. A closed set A ⊂ C is
asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and if there exists a neighborhood B∗
of A such that ξ(t, x0)t→∞ → A for all x0 ∈ B∗ ∩ C.

Chapter 2
The Costs and Benefits
of the Separation of Powers∗
- an incomplete contracts approach
2.1 Introduction
“There can be no liberty where the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
are under one person or body of persons because the result is arbitrary despo-
tism (tyranny)”
Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1748) “L’Esprit des
Lois”
This chapter analyzes the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive
in an incomplete contracts framework: The legislature sets up a decision-making frame-
work that leaves the executive with the residual control rights on the implementation
of public projects.
At least since the famous work of Montesquieu [65], the separation of political
power into executive, legislature, and judiciary is the most prominent mechanism to
protect democratic systems against the abuse of power. The constitutions of most
∗This chapter is joint work with Kira Börner, University of Munich.
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democracies today prescribe such a separation of the political bodies. Yet, while the
principle of a separation of powers is unquestioned as an essential ingredient for modern
democratic constitutions, the nature and the degree of a separation between executive
and legislature remains a contested issue. Is a strict separation of powers always better
than a single political body that fulfills both executive and legislative tasks? What are
the costs and benefits of separating the task of writing laws from the task of taking
a concrete decision in every single case? Is the trade-off different for the local, the
national, or the supra-national level?
In order to assess the advantages and the disadvantages of a separation of the exec-
utive and the legislature, we propose an incomplete contracts approach. The executive
can choose to implement policies. Each policy entails a public good project that may
have positive or negative welfare consequences. Under a system of separation of powers,
the legislature provides a decision-making framework by writing laws. The executive
is left with the residual decision-making rights. Thus, the legislature can constrain
the executive by law or empower it to decide in some circumstances. The executive
has private interests which may distort the policy choice with respect to the social
optimum. Laws written by an independent legislature have the advantage of curbing
this abuse of executive power.
It is prohibitively costly, however, to write different laws for every single possibly
upcoming project in advance. Laws must be written in general terms and cannot condi-
tion on every particular characteristic of each policy project. It is therefore not possible
to write a complete contract for the executive’s decisions. Laws can be contingent only
on some general features which categorize potential projects in general terms. A law
prescribing an action affects therefore the entire category and may be suboptimal for
some of the affected projects. Prescribing no action, on the other hand, leaves the de-
cision to the executive that is influenced by its private interests. Thus, the legislature
faces a trade-off between granting unchecked political power to the better-informed
executive and avoiding extreme policy outcomes by a law prescribing the decision.
This definition and formalization of the separation of powers in an incomplete con-
tracts framework proposes an explicit division of tasks of the political bodies. Such a
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definition of the separation of powers can be found in the political science literature,
e.g., Schultz (pp. 191) [81]. Our approach is complementary to the existing formal po-
litical economy literature on the separation of powers that does not clearly distinguish
between a division of tasks and mechanisms of mutual control of otherwise equivalent
political bodies. There are some theoretical models that see constitutions as incom-
plete contracts: Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi [1], Aghion and Bolton [2], and Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini [70]. Yet, these papers do not focus on the incompleteness of the
contract between legislature and executive, but see the whole constitution as an incom-
plete contract between the sovereign, the citizens, and the political decision-makers.
We extensively review the literature in section 2.3.
Why is it precisely the task of writing laws that should be separated from the tasks
of implementing policies and making day-to-day, case-dependent decisions? We want
to identify the trade-off that is implicit in a separation of the executive and legislative
bodies in a political system. For this purpose, we compare the system of separation of
powers to a system with a single, unconstrained executive. Whenever the legislature
does not maximize social welfare but pursues private interests, also the separation of
powers leads to distortions: The laws that control the behavior of the executive are
biased in the direction of the legislature’s private interests. Depending on the intensity
of private interests in executive and legislature, there are cases where a separation of
powers is dominated by a political system with a single ruler.
The differences in how strictly executive and legislative bodies are separated be-
comes particularly clear if we consider different levels of government. On the one hand,
we find the strictest separation of powers on the national or supranational levels of gov-
ernment. Examples are the United States, but also the European Union, where we have
a clear distinction between the executive tasks of the European Commission as opposed
to the legislative powers of the Council (even with the new European Constitution, the
European Parliament can hardly be considered as the main legislative body). The Eu-
ropean Union is an extreme case also in the sense as it does not directly legitimize its
two most important institutions via elections.1 On the other hand, the farther we go
1Tabellini [90] discusses the issue of political accountability of the EU institutions.
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down to lower levels of government, we find that a separation of powers receives much
less emphasis. Local governments usually put more weight on their executive and on
the implementation of specific policy projects.
A separation of powers seems to be especially attractive for national or even supra-
national levels of government. It serves to avoid extreme decisions by the better in-
formed executive. To achieve this is particularly important when large damage can re-
sult from extreme decisions. This is the case on the national level, where far-reaching
decisions, as, for example, about peace or war, are made. Even more, decisions on
the supranational level are taken unchecked by any higher sovereign power and affect
several countries and their constituencies at once. On the local level, in turn, govern-
ments are restricted in their action space by the provisions made by the higher levels
of government. Thus, extreme decisions have a much smaller scope and affect smaller
constituencies. A separation of powers thus seems to be most important where political
power is not checked by a higher instance, where large damages can be effected, and
where private interests differ strongly.
In most modern democratic constitutions, the separation of powers is complemented
by other mechanisms of checks and balances, such as elections. As our focus lies on the
separation of powers, we do not include elections in our model. Intuitively, elections
provide an incentive scheme that will draw the political decisions towards the social
interest. However, they are unable to give the right incentives in case of extreme
private interests of the executive. Such extreme decisions can only be prevented by a
law, enacted by a separate legislature - at least if the private bias of the legislature is
not too large.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 sets up the
incomplete contracts model of a separation of powers and derives our main results.
In section 2.3, we review the literature that is related to our work. In section 2.4 we
discuss our results and finally conclude.
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2.2 The Model
First, we present the basic model in which the political bodies are not restricted by
elections. Politicians are randomly chosen from the total population and are assumed
to maximize their personal benefits if the constitution gives them the right to decide.
In order to keep the model tractable we model policy choices as simply as possible:
Opportunities for public projects arise, which may have a positive or negative expected
net social benefit. A policy choice is simply the decision whether to implement such a
project or not.2
The legislature can only set a general decision-making framework by writing laws
that constrain the executive, whereas the executive can condition its decision on the
particular characteristics of each single project. We consider this to be the key differ-
ence of the tasks of legislature and executive. At the legislation stage, when the laws
are written, there are many potentially upcoming projects. Laws can only categorize
these projects in very general terms. Thus, each potential project falls into one cat-
egory. This category can be described by one general feature, that distinguishes all
projects of this category from other projects. The expected social benefit of a project
conditional on its general category is denoted by g ∈ [−G; G]. For simplicity, g is
assumed to be uniformly and independently distributed on [−G; G].
When the executive takes a decision it knows the particular project in question.
Thus, the executive can condition its decision on the specific characteristics of each
single project - in addition to the general feature g of the project’s category. The
difference of the social value of the specific project and the expected value for projects
of this category is denoted by s ∈ [−S; S]. We assume, again for simplicity, that s is
uniformly and independently distributed on [−S; S]. The net social benefit of a public
project with general feature g and specific characteristic s is thus (g + s).
For example, the broader categories of general features g might be “building streets”,
2This way of modelling policy choices captures only the temptation of a politician to distort
decisions in his own interest. We do not consider the problem of how far a constitution protects
itself against its abolition or a circumvention. Implicitly we assume that there is an independent
properly functioning judiciary and/or a civil society that is committed to enforce the constitution as
well as constitutional laws.
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“providing electricity” or “use of torture”. Laws can condition on this broad categories.
A law could state: “electricity must be provided”, “nobody must be tortured” or “the
decision whether to build a street is left to the responsible official of the executive”.
But laws cannot be conditioned on each particular case. It is, for example, prohibitively
costly to write a law for the building of every single street. Therefore, complete con-
tingent contracts among legislature and executive are not possible.
Citizens Preferences We assume an infinite number of citizens i ∈ {1, . . . ,∞}.
For each project j each citizen i has a personal individual interest λij ∈ [−Λj, Λj]
which denominates the difference between his private utility from the project and the
project’s social value gj +sj. Ex ante, these λij are assumed to be uniformly distributed
over [−Λj, Λj]. The personal interest is not known to the citizen at the beginning, but
will be revealed at a later stage of the game. Ex ante, the citizens have no information
about the social benefit (gj + sj) of an potentially upcoming project j. They do,
however, know the distributions of all relevant parameters.
For notational simplicity, we neglect the index for the project j in the remainder
of the paper. The net utility of a public project with general feature g and specific
characteristic s for citizen i is thus
Ui = g + s + λi. (2.1)
We normalize the citizen’s utility when no project is implemented to U i = 0.
Citizen i would like a project to be implemented if and only if
g + s + λi > 0. (2.2)
The citizens are the sovereign in the model. In the beginning, they choose whether
they would like to set up a constitution with a separation of powers or a system with
a single ruler. They then delegate their decision-making power to the government.
The government, learning ex ante about the characteristics of the policy projects,
has some additional information. This makes the government’s choices better than
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direct decisions by the citizens, as, for example, in a direct democracy. We think of
the government as agents who specialize in information gathering and are therefore
granted the decision-making rights. Hence, the function of government is to collect the
information necessary for the political decision-making process.
Due to the symmetry of the distribution of the λi and the infinite number of citizens
3
it is socially optimal to realize a public project if and only if
g + s ≥ 0. (2.3)
As the citizens’ private interests are independently and uniformly distributed over
[−Λ, Λ], this coincides with the median voter’s decision.
The finite size of the support of g, s and λ requires a number of case distinctions.
We concentrate on the most interesting cases by making the following
Assumption 6 Λ > 2G; Λ > 2S
Assumption 6 states that for every project there exists somebody who wants to imple-
ment it (even when the social value is very low) and somebody who does not want to
implement it (even if the social value is very high). Hence, there is always a risk that
a politician, who is picked randomly from the distribution of citizens, might take the
wrong decision.
The Legislature The legislature writes laws and thereby sets the decision-making
framework for the executive. The legislature can therefore only take into account an
expected private interest averaged over all potential projects of a general category.
This private bias of the legislature at the stage of writing laws is denoted by γ ∈ R.
If this bias of legislature were larger than the range of general features G, it would
never be interesting for the constituency to have a separated legislature. We concen-
trate on the interesting case, by making
Assumption 7 |γ| < G.
3The law of Varadarajan ensures that the empirical distribution of citizens converges weakly to
the distribution of the λi.
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Since the legislature can condition laws only on the general category of a public
project, it might be willing to leave certain decisions to the executive. The reason is
that the executive can include the specific characteristics of the particular project in
its decision. In order to keep the model simple, we assume that there are only three
types of laws: For public projects of a certain category a law can
• either prohibit the implementation
• or prescribe the implementation
• or leave the decision to the executive (not write a law).
The Executive The executive has the residual decision-making rights. Whenever
there is no law prescribing what to do, it may choose whether or not to implement
a project. We call the private interests of the executive λex. We assume that the
executive is a single person who is chosen randomly from the population. If law does
not prescribe a certain action, the executive will implement a project if and only if
λex ≥ −(g + s). (2.4)
Timing of Events The timing of events is as follows:
• Period 0: Citizens choose their constitution behind a “veil of ignorance”. They
do not know their personal interests at that time. Their only information is the
distribution of the g, s, λi, and the absolute value of γ. They decide on the basis
of this information whether to separate legislature and executive or whether to
have a single ruler. That is, in period 0, citizens choose the socially optimal
constitution.
• Period 1: In this legislative period, the legislature is writing laws - if the consti-
tution is one of separated powers. It may write laws conditioning on the general
feature g of possible upcoming public projects and on its private bias γ for this
general category. These laws can prescribe that possible upcoming projects of a
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certain category have to be implemented and can forbid to implement projects
of other categories. The legislature may also write no law for some categories of
public projects. With this, it leaves the implementation decision to the executive.
• Period 2: Opportunities for public projects arise. The executive observes the
general feature g, the specific characteristic s and its personal interest λex for a
project. If there is a law, the executive has to comply with it. If the decision is
left to the executive, it decides whether or not it wants to implement the project
following its private interests.
2.2.1 Benchmark Case: The Legislature as a Social Planner
First, we want to consider a benchmark case: What kind of laws would a social planner
write in order to maximize social welfare? This is the case when the legislature does not
take its personal interests into account at the time of writing the law. The legislature
as a social planner then understands that the executive has more detailed information
about the concrete projects as it can observe the special characteristics s. However, it
also knows that the executive will take its decisions in order to maximize its personal
interests.
The expected social benefits of a law on projects in a category with general feature
g are:
1. If the law prohibits the implementation of projects in this category:
Wproh(g) = 0 (2.5)
2. If the law enforces the implementation of projects in this category:
Wenf (g) = g (2.6)
3. If no law is written for this category, then the executive will decide in his own
interest. It will implement the project if and only if λex > −(g + s). For the
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uniform distribution of λex, the probability of implementation is therefore
prob (λex > − (g + s)) = 1
2
+
g + s
2Λ
(2.7)
The expected social welfare of a project with general feature g if no law is written
is4
WnoLaw(g) =
∫ S
−S
(g + s)prob (λex > − (g + s)) 1
2S
ds =
g2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
, (2.8)
for g + S < Λ. This is guaranteed by assumption 6.
The social planner chooses the contract that maximizes total welfare for each category
of public projects.5 We call these laws the socially optimal laws. This, however, does
not mean that the first best is implemented. In our setting of incomplete contracts,
the socially optimal laws constitute the welfare-maximizing choice. It is obvious that
the first best could be reached if complete contingent contracts were possible. In the
first best, a social planner would simply implement all projects with (g + s) > 0.
Proposition 13 (The Socially Optimal Law) Total welfare is maximized by the
legislature if projects of a category with general feature g are



prohibited if −G ≤ g ≤ −Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
executive’s decision if −Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
< g < Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
enforced if Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
≤ g ≤ G
The proof is in appendix 2.5.
The intuition for this result is simple: If the general feature g has a value close
to zero, the social planner has little information whether the project should be imple-
mented or not. The special characteristic s is then decisive. As the private interests
of the executive are distributed around g + s, it takes the right decision with a high
probability. Therefore, the decision should be left to the executive. If on the other
4For details of the calculation see appendix 2.5.
5The utility of the executive and legislature are negligible for total social welfare: as the population
is infinite, a finite number of individuals has a weight of 0.
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hand the general feature g has a high absolute value, the legislature has already a good
idea whether the project should be implemented or not. If now the executive would
like to decide differently, this would reflect more likely its private interests than its
more detailed information. Hence, a law should prescribe the action.
Comparative Statics for the Optimal Law How does the optimal law change
when the legislature is less well informed about the social value of a project? From
proposition 13 we can see how a wider range [−S, S] of the specific project character-
istics influences the optimal law:
Corollary 7 If the range S of specific characteristics increases, then the socially op-
timal law leaves the decision to the executive for a larger range of g.
Corollary 7 and corollary 8, below, follow directly from proposition 13. The intuition
is straightforward: If the specific characteristics of a project become more important,
the social planner is less able to infer the total social benefit of a project. Then the
executive, who can take this details into account, is more apt to decide.
Similarly, we can see from proposition 13 how a wider range [−Λ, Λ] of the private
interests of the executive influences the optimal law. Such a wider range of private
interests means that there are more citizens with extreme private interests, from whom
the executive could be picked.
Corollary 8 If the range Λ of private interests increases, then the socially optimal law
leaves the decision to the executive for a smaller range of g.
The intuition is that a broader range of private interests makes it more likely that
the executives private benefit is not in line with the public benefit of a project. From
this, we can the already the benefits of a separation of powers: A separated legislature
avoids extreme decisions by the executive. If the executive is more prone to take
extreme decisions, the legislature can neutralize that by choosing a law that is more
restrictive.
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2.2.2 Legislature with Private Interests
Not only the executive, but also the legislature has private interests.6 In this section,
we consider how an independent legislature with private interests may distort laws in
its own favor. The legislature can only write laws conditioning on the general project
characteristics g. As there are many projects for each general category of projects, the
legislature cannot condition the law directly on its private interest λleg. We thus assume
that the legislature conditions the law on its expected value of its private interest, γ,
which we call the private bias of the legislature. This bias γ quantifies how the private
interests of the legislature differ from the public interest at the stage of writing laws.
Consider a public project of a category with general feature g. Then, the expected
private benefit of this project for the legislature is g + γ, as s and λleg for each project
are not known at this stage.
Hence, the legislature’s utility of an implemented public project with general fea-
ture g, expected private interest of the legislature γ, and special characteristic s is
U leg(g, γ, s) = g + γ + s (2.9)
Notice that laws can only be conditioned on g and γ. Now the legislature maximizes
its private benefits. When writing a law, the legislature compares:
1. If the law prohibits the implementation of projects in this category, the expected
utility of the law is:
EU legproh(g, γ) = 0 (2.10)
2. If the law enforces the implementation of projects in this category, the expected
utility of the law is:
EU legenf (g, γ) = g + γ (2.11)
3. If no law is written for this category, the executive decides in its own interest
6These private interests of the legislature may arise, e.g., due to party ideologies or due to an
imperfect representations of the citizens in the legislative body. Most constitutions take measures,
such as a large parliament of representatively chosen deputies to keep the bias of legislature moderate.
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and implements the project if and only if λex > −(g + s). The probability of
implementation remains prob (λex > − (g + s)) = 12 + g+s2Λ , as given in equation
2.7. The expected private benefit for legislature if no law is written is therefore
(under assumptions 6 and 7)7
EU legnoLaw(g, γ) =
∫ S
−S
(g+s+γ)prob (λex > − (g + s)) 1
2S
ds =
g2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
+
(
1 +
g
Λ
) γ
2
.
(2.12)
For each project category, the legislature writes the law which maximizes its private
benefits:
Proposition 14 (Law chosen by legislature) A law maximizes the legislature’s ex-
pected benefits if projects of a category with general feature g and expected private in-
terest of the legislature γ are



prohibited if −G ≤ g ≤ −Λ+γ2 +
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2
− S23
executive’s decision if −Λ+γ2 +
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2
− S23 < g < Λ−γ2 −
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2
− S23
enforced if Λ−γ2 −
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2
− S23 ≤ g ≤ G.
The proof is in the appendix 2.5. In order to get a better intuition on how the
bias γ of the legislature distorts the law, we use the Taylor approximation around
γ = 0 for the lower threshold glΛ,S(γ) ≡ −Λ+γ2 +
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3
and the upper thresh-
old guΛ,S(γ) ≡ Λ−γ2 −
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3
:
glΛ,S(γ) ≈ glΛ,S(0)−
1
2

1 +
Λ
2√(
Λ
2
)2 − S23

 γ −
S2
3
8
(√(
Λ
2
)2 − S23
)3 γ2 + . . .
guΛ,S(γ) ≈ guΛ,S(0)−
1
2

1 +
Λ
2√(
Λ
2
)2 − S23

 γ +
S2
3
8
(√(
Λ
2
)2 − S23
)3 γ2 + . . . (2.13)
In general, a Taylor approximation is good only for sufficiently small γ. Yet, we show
in appendix 2.5 that the intuition described below holds for all γ.
7For details of the calculation see appendix 2.5.
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In first order both thresholds are shifted by the same amount. The shift is directed
opposite to the sign of γ and the absolute value of the shift is larger than γ. For
intuition consider a γ > 0: The legislature is more likely to prefer the implementation
of a project than the social planner. Hence, it enforces projects of categories which the
social planner would leave to the decision of the executive. It also leaves projects to
the executive’s decision that the social planner would prohibit. This means that both
thresholds are shifted towards more negative values for positive γ. In fact, they are
shifted by more than −γ. The reason is that the legislature knows that the executive
has private interests which are on average more centered. The executive therefore has
a tendency to counterbalance the bias of the legislature. The legislature shifts the
project categories in order to neutralize this effect.
From proposition 14 we can directly derive the comparative statics for the law
chosen by a biased legislature, analogously to corollary 7 and 8:
Corollary 9 If the range Λ of private interests of the executive increases then the
law chosen by legislature leaves the decision to the executive for a smaller range of g.
Furthermore, if Λ goes to infinity then the range of g for which the executive decides
becomes an arbitrarily small interval around the general feature g = −γ.
The proof is in appendix 2.5. The intuition is similar to the one in corollary 8. Yet,
the range for which the executive decides is now centered around −γ, due to the
legislature’s bias.
2.2.3 The Optimal Constitution
In period 0, citizens choose their constitution behind the “veil of ignorance”. At
this stage, they know neither their later position nor their private interests. They
know only the structure of the game and the probability distributions of all relevant
variables.8 Citizens can separate the legislature from the executive (then the resulting
laws are described by proposition 14) or install a “single ruler”. Such a single ruler is
8This concept of a veil that takes away from citizens the possibility to decide on the basis of their
private interests, and makes them decide in the social interest, goes back to Rawls [74] and is widely
used in political philosophy and in formal political economy.
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an executive that is not constrained and will not constrain himself by laws but decides
each single case according to his private interests.9
Citizens choose to separate the legislature from the executive if and only if this
maximizes their expected social welfare. For given distributions of s, λex, and g and
a given parameter γ, we can calculate expected social welfare under both constitu-
tions and compare them. But, even for the uniform distribution, calculations become
quite cumbersome. Therefore, we relegate the formal analysis to the appendix 2.5 and
analyze the important features referring to figure 2.1. Notice that the regime of sep-
Figure 2.1: Choice of the Constitution
Socially Optimal Law
prohibit
glΛ,S(0) 0
executive decides
guΛ,S(0)
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Separated Legislature (γ > 0)
prohibit
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0 guΛ,S(γ)
enforce H
g
©
Single Ruler
0
executive decides H
g
©
Which Constitution is better?
Separation
better
0
Both constitutions equally good Single
Ruler
better
Separation
better
H
g
©
aration of powers as well as a system with a single ruler may be optimal under certain
circumstances. Which constitution is better depends crucially on the range [−G,G] of
possible general project characteristics. We can state
9Even a single ruler might enact some laws in order to regulate inter-citizen relationships or in
order to stimulate investment of citizens by committing himself not to expropriate their gains ex post.
These kind of laws are not the focus of this paper.
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Proposition 15 Separation of powers is not always optimal. The range of general
project features [−G,G] influences the constitutional choice. Consider γ > 0. Then
• for G < guΛ,S(γ) both constitutions do equally well.
• for guΛ,S(γ) < G < guΛ,S(0) the single ruler is more attractive.
• for G > guΛ,S(0) separation of powers becomes more attractive with an increasing
G.
This result follows directly from figure 2.1. Intuitively, an independent legislature,
that is, a regime of separation of powers, is particularly valuable if there are a number
of categories where the general feature gives already a clear signal whether it contains
beneficial projects or not. Then, the legislature can get quite reliable information about
the nature of a project. When the range of possible general project characteristics is
smaller, this signal is more likely to be dominated by the special project characteristics.
Therefore, the relative attractiveness of a system with a single ruler increases. For an
intermediate range of G a constitution with a single ruler is socially optimal. This
results from the bias of the legislature which distorts the law under a system of separa-
tion of powers. This distortion is felt at the thresholds of the law (for an intermediate
range of G).
Which constitution is better also depends on the absolute value of the bias of the
legislature γ. Separation of powers is optimal for instance when γ is close to zero (and
if G is not too small). Then, the laws under the separation of powers are arbitrarily
close to the socially optimal law and dominate the outcome under a single ruler.
Proposition 16 The expected welfare under a single ruler increases relative to the
expected welfare under separation of powers if the absolute value of the bias of the
legislature γ becomes larger. For γ = 0 separation of powers is always optimal, and for
|γ| → G a system with a single ruler yields a higher expected welfare.
The proof is in appendix 2.5. For an intuitive explanation, please refer to proposition 14
and to figure 2.1. An increase in the absolute value of γ shifts the thresholds glΛ,S(γ) and
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guΛ,S(γ) away from their socially optimal values. The larger the bias of the legislature,
the more is the law distorted with respect to the social optimal law. That is, the
range of general project characteristics g where, for γ > 0, projects are enforced which
should be left for the executive to decide (or, for γ < 0, projects are prohibited which
the executive should decide), becomes larger. This makes the regime of a single ruler
more attractive.
The constitutional choice is also influenced by the range [−Λ, Λ] of possible private
interests of the executive and the range [−S, S] of special project characteristics:
Proposition 17 If the range [−Λ, Λ] of private interests of the executive is sufficiently
large and/or the range [−S, S] of special project characteristics is sufficiently small
separation of powers leads to higher expected welfare in comparison with a single ruler.
The proof is in appendix 2.5. Intuitively, for large Λ, the private interests of the execu-
tive dominate its decision and its private information about s does hardly influence its
choice. Similarly, a small s means that the executive has few additional information
on the projects value. If the executive would decide differently from the legislature,
the reason is most likely its private interests and not its better information on s.
Thus, a regime of separation of powers is not always optimal. In particular, a system
with a single ruler becomes more attractive if the bias of the legislature is large, general
project characteristics G are not too widely spread and special project characteristics
S are spread in a large range. Also, the single ruler becomes a better constitutional
choice if the range of possible private interests of the executive is small.
2.3 Related Literature
The literature on the principle of separation of powers and the optimal constitutional
choice in political science and political philosophy, following the tradition of Mon-
tesquieu, is extensive. A classic are the Federalist Articles by Hamilton, Madison and
Jay [43]. They prepared, and argued for, the constitution of the United States as a
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federal state with a strong central government.10 A recent overview of the research
investigating the implementation of the principle of separation of powers in the US
political practice is Schramm and Wilson [80]. As our model presents a formal politi-
cal economy approach to the question of separation of powers, we do not discuss this
political science literature further.11
Without referring directly to the issue of the separation of powers, Rawls [74] cre-
ated a theoretical framework to evaluate normatively the choice of political institutions.
Individuals choose the basic principles and rules for their society behind a veil of igno-
rance, i.e., without being informed about their individual endowment and capabilities.
This idea has become the basis for the more recent formal models of the optimal en-
dogenous constitutional choice.
While there is a vast formal political economy literature that treats political insti-
tutions as exogenous constraints for policy-making, the strand of research that seeks
to explain the choice or the emergence of political institutions is both more recent
and much smaller. The paper that most explicitly focusses on the effects of a separa-
tion of powers on political accountability is Persson, Roland, and Tabellini [70]. The
constitution is interpreted as an incomplete contract between the voters and the polit-
ical decision-makers. Thus, the incentive schemes that voters offer to the politicians,
e.g., by elections, can only be implicit. Due to informational asymmetries and their
decision-making power, politicians are able to appropriate rents from holding office.
The authors demonstrate that having two selfish decision-makers may be worse than
having a single one due to a common pool problem.12 With separation of powers, or
rather, with the institutionalization of two political decision-makers, the right timing
and a clear accountability of decisions to the two political bodies as well as a require-
10An interesting discussion of the relevance of the Federalists’s ideas for the contemporary study of
political institutions is given in Grofman and Wittman [39].
11A related literature is the one on the delegation of decision-making power from the legislature
to the executive. In this context, Volden [94], building on Epstein and O’Halloran [23] models the
effects of a separation of power on bureaucratic discretion, assuming that the executive receives the
power to veto legislative decisions. Buchanan [16], Mueller [66], and Voigt [92] and the collection of
essays by Voigt [93] give an overview over classic and recent papers on the more general question of
constitutional design.
12In an earlier related paper, Brennan and Hamlin [15] argue that a separation of powers is harmful
for the voters as it introduces an externality between the political bodies that is not internalized.
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ment of consent, where no political body can independently claim the use of government
resources, may solve the common pool problem and successfully curb rent extraction
by the policy-makers. The constitution then specifies the rules of interaction between
the two decision-makers or political bodies. Yet, while the authors discuss that, e.g.,
the budget authority may be granted to only one of the two political bodies, they do
not model a truly functional separation of powers in legislature and executive. Rather,
they see the separation of powers as a prerequisite for the institutionalization of checks
and balances, that is, of mutual control mechanisms of the executive and the legisla-
ture. For this argument, it is not necessary that the two powers fulfill different tasks.
The important feature instead is that both political bodies have decision-making rights
and control each other.
Also Laffont (chapter 3) [53] interprets constitutions as contracts among the voters
and the politicians. He focusses on the design of the incentive structure within gov-
ernmental institutions. In his view, checks and balances improve efficiency and should
be able to abolish politicians’ incentives for collusion. Furthermore, he shows that
information extraction may be easier if there is more then one informed agent. Yet,
the focus in his work also lies on checks and balances. The separation of powers is seen
only as a means of creating several bodies of government that can be used to control
each other.
Most of the rest of the formal political economy literature on endogenous constitu-
tional choice has a different focus. Rather than analyzing a separation of powers within
government, they look at the relation of the sovereign and the political decision-makers.
The constitution is seen as an incomplete contract between the sovereign, i.e., the peo-
ple, and the policy makers. In most papers of this kind, the political institutions within
the government are not modelled in detail. Building on the work of Romer and Rosen-
thal [78], and Laffont [54], Aghion and Bolton [2] analyze the endogenous choice of
decision-making procedures. They argue that if complete social contracts, i.e., consti-
tutions that specify policy outcomes for all possible states of the world, are impossible,
majority rules are preferred over unanimity as the future decision-making rule. Then,
the political decision-making process consists of agenda-setting by the majority coali-
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tion and an eventual compensation to make citizens who loose from the policy join the
majority coalition.13 The optimal majority rule is derived from a trade-off between
minimizing the scope of expropriation by the majority and the costs of compensating
vested interests. In an extended version of the model by Aghion and Bolton [2], Erlen-
meier and Gersbach [24] introduce flexible majority rules that depend on the scope of
a proposed policy, e.g., by requiring majorities both in the group of affected taxpay-
ers and in the group of people that do not pay taxes under a new policy. This rules
can in many cases implement the social optimum. Gersbach [35] further extends this
approach.
A recent paper by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi [1] focusses on the optimal consti-
tutional choice of a minimum blocking minority and derives a similar basic trade-off
for the delegation of unchecked power to the political decision-makers.14 The abuse
of power is the more probable, the more unchecked power is transferred to a political
leader. On the other hand, too many checks and balances make necessary reforms
unlikely, as these can then easily be blocked by a minority of citizens. Also in this
model, the constitution is an incomplete contract between the citizens and the polit-
ical decision-makers. The political decision-maker is controlled directly by the con-
stituency. There is no further separation of governing tasks within the government.
Thus, the paper focusses exclusively on the majority needed to implement a policy as
an instrument to control political power.
The approach of our paper clearly differs from this formal literature on checks
and balances by focussing on the functional division of tasks between legislature and
executive. This view is in line with the non-formal political science literature that
acknowledges the functional division between the legislature and the executive and
considers the separation of powers as qualitatively different from other institutions of
checks and balances (see, e.g., Schulz [81]). In our model, the interaction between leg-
islature and executive is governed by incomplete contracts where the executive retains
the residual decision-making rights. The legislature in our model sets out a decision-
13Standard models of agenda-setting are, e.g., Romer and Rosenthal [77], or Baron and Ferejohn [5]
14In a paper by Messner and Polborn [64] voters choose also endogenously such a super-majority
rule in the context of overlapping generations.
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making framework which prescribes some actions to the executive but also empowers
it to take own decisions. We argue that such a separation of tasks goes hand in hand
with the informational endowment of the two political bodies. As laws are to be used in
several instances, the legislature, at the stage of lawmaking, is not informed about the
characteristics of all special cases to which the law might apply. By explicitly assuming
different tasks for executive and legislative bodies, we can derive the trade-offs that are
present in the institution of a separation of powers on the one hand and a system with
an elected single ruler on the other hand. Compared to the recent formal literature, we
thus concentrate on a specific, but important, question: Why is a functional separation
of powers installed in most constitutions and what are its costs and benefits?
2.4 Conclusion
We analyze costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete
contracts model. Laws - the task of the legislature - set only a framework for decision-
making. The executive takes the residual decisions. Laws have the advantage of
curbing the abuse of executive power due to private special interests. But laws can
not condition on the specific characteristics of each single project. In particular when
also the legislature pursues its private interests, laws may restrict the executive for the
wrong project categories.
According to our model, it is not always optimal to have a separation of powers.
However, a system with a legislature separated from the executive is important under
three circumstances: First, if private interests of the executive can strongly deviate
from the public interest. Secondly, if the bias of legislature at the stage of writing laws
tends to be moderate. Finally, if for some general categories of projects the public
interest is clearly visible ex ante and the details of each single project are of minor
importance for the social value of these projects.
Our results can be used to explain the constitutional design of different levels of
government: On the national level, where it is difficult for citizens to assess the social
benefits of a project (for example national security), separation of powers is optimal.
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On lower levels of government, where the welfare implications of a single project (such
as a local road) are more clearly visible to the voters, a single ruler may be the optimal
choice of constitution. This result can thus explain the observation that low levels of
government often show a combination of executive and legislative powers in only one
body of government.
When the distortions of laws by a biased legislature are kept low, this strengthens
the case for a regime of separation of powers. A number of constitutional designs
try to take account of this: The legislature tends to be a parliament, representing
most groups of the population. Furthermore, the requirement of public debate in
parliament could be seen to enhance the abilities of voters to monitor the process of
lawmaking. Most importantly, the general character of laws makes it more difficult
for the legislature to hide private interests from the voters. Of course, there are many
ways by which a legislature can be influenced, a prominent one being lobbying. When
lobbies are supporting very extreme interests, this might again reinforce the bias of the
legislature. However, it seems plausible that a single ruler and the executive in general
will at least be as sensitive to lobbying as the legislature.15
The paper can also contribute some thoughts to the discussion about a constitution
for the European Union: As a supranational European government would be very hard
to monitor for citizens, the model would argue for a strict separation of powers. An
additional problem in the case of the EU is that the most important political bodies
are not directly elected. Members of the Council are only indirectly elected, being the
governments of the member states. Members of the Commission are hardly disciplined
by any electoral process. For this constellation, our model suggests that a separation of
powers is even more important, as, except for the European Parliament, the EU lacks
direct legitimation by elections. Of course, this is more a way of organized thinking
about the issue than a concrete recommendation. The model has to neglect many
aspects of the new constitution, most importantly, that it represents a federal system.
15The relative sensitivity of different political powers to lobbying is an interesting issue for further
research.
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2.5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 13
First, we calculate the probability that an executive decides to implement a project with
general feature g and special feature s. Remember that λex is uniformly distributed on
[−Λ, Λ] and that −Λ < −(g + s) < Λ due to assumption 6. Hence,
prob (λex > − (g + s)) =
∫ Λ
−(g+s)
1
2Λ
dλex
=
1
2
+
g + s
2Λ
. (2.14)
Second, we calculate the social welfare for a project with general feature g if the
decision is left to the executive. The probability that this project has a special feature
between s and s + ds is ds
2S
. Such a project is implemented by the executive with
probability prob (λex > − (g + s)) and then yields a social benefit of (g + s). With
probability 1 − prob (λex > − (g + s)) such a project is not implemented. Then the
social benefit is 0. Integrating over all s we obtain for g + S < Λ:
WnoLaw(g) =
∫ S
−S
(g + s)prob (λex > − (g + s)) 12S ds
=
∫ S
−S
(g + s)
(
1
2
+
g + s
2Λ
)
1
2S
ds
=
1
2S
∫ S+g
−S+g
(s′)
(
1
2
+
s′
2Λ
)
ds′ =
1
2S
∫ S+g
−S+g
(
s′
2
+
(s′)2
2Λ
)
ds′
=
1
2S
([
s2
4
]S+g
−S+g
+
[
s3
6Λ
]S+g
−S+g
)
=
(S + g)2 − (−S + g)2
8S
+
(S + g)3 − (−S + g)3
12ΛS
=
4Sg
8S
+
2S3 + 6Sg2
12SΛ
=
g2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
. (2.15)
Third, the social planner chooses the law with the highest expected social welfare.
For a general feature g > 0, enforcing a project yields a higher expected social benefit
than prohibiting the project. Hence, the social planner compares ”enforcing” projects
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of this category with ”writing no law”. The decision is left to the executive if and only
if
WnoLaw(g) > Wenf (g)
⇔ g
2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
> g
⇔ g2 − 2Λ
2
g +
(
Λ
2
)2
−
(
Λ
2
)2
+
S2
3
> 0
⇔
(
g − Λ
2
)2
>
(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
⇔
∣∣∣∣g −
Λ
2
∣∣∣∣ >
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
⇔ g < Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
or g >
Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
.
(2.16)
Due to assumption 6 the second case is not relevant. Hence, the socially optimal law
should leave the decision to the executive if 0 < g < Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
and enforce the
project if Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
≤ g ≤ G.
Similarly, for a general feature g ≤ 0 the social planner compares the benefits
of prohibiting such projects with the expected benefits of leaving the decision to the
executive. He will leave the decision to the executive if and only if
WnoLaw(g) > Wproh(g)
⇔ g
2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
> 0
⇔
∣∣∣∣g −
(
−Λ
2
)∣∣∣∣ >
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
⇔ g < −Λ
2
−
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
or g > −Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
.
(2.17)
Due to assumption 6 the first case is not relevant. Hence, the socially optimal law
should leave the decision to the executive if 0 ≥ g > −Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
and prohibit
Chapter 2 Separation of Powers 83
the project if −Λ
2
+
√(
Λ
2
)2 − S2
3
≥ g ≥ −G,
q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 14
We calculate the expected benefits for the legislature if the decision on a project of a
category with general feature g and private interests for the legislature γ is left to the
executive:
EU legnoLaw(g, γ) =
∫ S
−S
(g + s + γ)prob (λex > − (g + s)) 12S ds
=
∫ S
−S
(g + s + γ)
(
1
2
+
g + s
2Λ
)
1
2S
ds
=
1
2S
∫ S+g
−S+g
(s′ + γ)
(
1
2
+
s′
2Λ
)
ds′
=
1
4S
∫ S+g
−S+g
(
s′
(
1 +
γ
Λ
)
+
(s′)2
Λ
+ γ
)
ds′
=
1
4S
((
1 +
γ
Λ
)[s2
2
]S+g
−S+g
+
[
s3
3Λ
]S+g
−S+g
+ γ [s]S+g−S+g
)
=
g2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
+
γ
2
(
1 +
g
Λ
)
. (2.18)
The legislature chooses the law which yields it the highest expected private benefits.
For g+γ > 0, enforcing a project yields a higher expected social benefit than prohibiting
the project. Hence, the legislature compares ”enforcing” projects of this category with
”writing no law”. It leaves the decision to the executive if and only if
EU legnoLaw(g, γ) > EU
leg
enf (g, γ)
⇔ g
2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
+
γ
2
(
1 +
g
Λ
)
> g + γ
⇔ g2 + 2γ − Λ
2
g +
(
γ − Λ
2
)2
>
(
γ − Λ
2
)2
+ Λγ − S
2
3
⇔
(
g − Λ− γ
2
)2
>
(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
. (2.19)
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For
(
Λ+γ
2
)2
< S
2
3
⇔ −Λ − 2√
3
S < γ < −Λ + 2√
3
S this inequality would hold for all g.
But due to assumptions 6 and 7 we have γ > −
(
1− 1√
3
)
Λ > −Λ + 2√
3
S, and thus
this case is excluded. Hence, the legislature leaves the decision to the executive only if
⇔
∣∣∣∣g −
Λ− γ
2
∣∣∣∣ >
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
⇔ g < Λ− γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
or g >
Λ− γ
2
+
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
.
(2.20)
The second case is impossible. To show this consider the function
f(Λ, γ, S) ≡ Λ−γ
2
+
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3
. This function is decreasing in S and increasing in
γ (since, ∂f
∂γ
= −1
2
+ 1
2
(Λ+γ2 )√
(Λ+γ2 )
2−S2
3
> 0). Hence, f(Λ, γ, S) > f(Λ, γ = −0.4Λ, S =
0.5Λ) > Λ−(−0.4Λ)
2
> 0.5Λ > G. This contradicts the second case. Hence, we obtain for
g + γ > 0 that the legislature leaves the decision to the executive if
−γ < g < Λ− γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
. (2.21)
For g + γ < 0, enforcing a project yields a lower expected private benefit for the
legislature than prohibiting the project. Hence, the legislature compares ”prohibiting”
projects of this category with ”writing no law”. It leaves the decision to the executive
if and only if
EU legnoLaw(g, γ) > EU
leg
proh(g, γ)
⇔ g
2
2Λ
+
g
2
+
S2
6Λ
+
γ
2
(
1 +
g
Λ
)
> 0
⇔ g2 + 2γ + Λ
2
g +
(
γ + Λ
2
)2
>
(
γ + Λ
2
)2
− Λγ − S
2
3
⇔
(
g +
Λ + γ
2
)2
>
(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
. (2.22)
For
(
Λ−γ
2
)2
< S
2
3
⇔ Λ− 2√
3
S < γ < Λ + 2√
3
S this inequality would hold for all g. Yet,
due to assumptions 6 and 7, we have γ <
(
1− 1√
3
)
Λ < Λ− 2√
3
S, and hence this case
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is excluded. Hence, the legislature leaves the decision to the executive only if
⇔
∣∣∣∣g −
(
−Λ + γ
2
)∣∣∣∣ >
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
⇔ g < −Λ + γ
2
−
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
or g > −Λ + γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
.
(2.23)
Now the first case is impossible.The function h(Λ, γ, S) ≡ −
(
Λ+γ
2
−
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3
)
is monotonically increasing in S and γ (since ∂h
∂γ
= −1
2
+ 1
2
(Λ−γ2 )√
(Λ−γ2 )
2−S2
3
> 0). Hence,
h(Λ, γ, S) < h(Λ, γ = 0.4Λ, S) < −Λ+0.4Λ
2
< −0.5Λ < −G, what contradicts the first
case. Hence, for γ + g < 0 only the second case remains and the legislature leaves the
decision to the executive if
−γ > g > −Λ + γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
, (2.24)
q.e.d.
Derivation of the Comparative Statics on glΛ,S (γ) and g
u
Λ,S (γ)
Proof of the Generality of the Intuition suggested by the Taylor Approxi-
mation
From the Taylor Approximation we derived intuitively that an legislative bias of γ
shifts the law chosen by legislature compared to the optimal law by more than γ. More
precise the lower as well as the upper threshold are shifted by more than −γ. In fact,
this is true for all γ as
(
glΛ,S (γ)
)′
=

−Λ + γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


′
= −1
2

1 +
(
Λ−γ
2
)
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3

 < −1,
(
guΛ,S (γ)
)′
=

Λ− γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


′
= −1
2

1 +
(
Λ+γ
2
)
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3

 < −1,
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and the thresholds of the optimal law are identical to γ = 0. Furthermore, the distance
between both thresholds increases with γ, since for all γ
(
guΛ,S (γ)− glΛ,S (γ)
)′
=
1
2


(
Λ−γ
2
)
√((
Λ−γ
2
))2 − S
3
−
(
Λ+γ
2
)
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3

 > 0. (2.25)
The las inequality follows from the fact that
(
Λ−γ
2
)
<
(
Λ+γ
2
)
and the observation that
the function f̃(x) ≡ x√
x2−c is strictly monotonic increasing. Monotonicity follows e.g.
from f̃ ′(x) = − c√
x2−c < 0.
Dependence of glΛ,S (γ) and g
u
Λ,S (γ) on Λ
First, we calculate
∂
∂Λ
glγ,S (Λ) =
∂
∂Λ

−Λ + γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3

 = −1
2
+
Λ−γ
2
2
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3
> 0,
∂
∂Λ
guγ,S (Λ) =
∂
∂Λ

Λ− γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3

 = 1
2
−
Λ+γ
2
2
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3
< 0.
Hence, glΛ,S (γ) increases in Λ, g
u
Λ,S (γ) decreases in Λ, and the difference - the
interval where the decision is left to the executive - shrinks with an increasing range Λ
Chapter 2 Separation of Powers 87
of private interests of the executive. Furthermore,
lim
Λ→∞
glγ,S (Λ) = lim
Λ→∞

−Λ + γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


= lim
Λ→∞

−γ − Λ− γ
2
+
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


= −γ + lim
x→∞
(
−x +
√
x2 − S
2
3
)
= −γ + lim
x→∞
−1 +
√
1− S2
3x2
1
x
= −γ + lim
x→∞
2S2
(3x3)2
√
1− S2
3x2
− 1
x2
= −γ + lim
x→∞
S3
3
x
√
1− S2
3x2
= −γ (2.26)
lim
Λ→∞
guγ,S (Λ) = lim
Λ→∞

Λ− γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


= lim
Λ→∞

−γ + Λ + γ
2
−
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


= −γ + lim
x→∞
(
x−
√
x2 − S
2
3
)
= −γ, (2.27)
where we applied L’Hôpital’s rule. Hence, for Λ → ∞ the range of g for which the
decision is left to the executive becomes an arbitrarily small interval around −γ.
Auxiliary Calculations on the Optimal Constitution
First, we calculate the expected difference in social welfare between a single ruler and
a constitution of separated powers, in which the legislation has a private bias of γ. To
simplify notation let gl ≡ glΛ,S(γ) and gu ≡ guΛ,S(γ). Furthermore, let −G ≤ gl ≤ gu ≤
G. Then
∆ (EWSgR (γ)− EWSepPow (γ))
=
1
2G
([
g3
6Λ
+
g2
4
+
S2g
6Λ
]gl
−G
+
[
g3
6Λ
− g
2
4
+
S2g
6Λ
]G
gu
)
=
2
((
gl
)3 − (gu)3
)
+ 3Λ
((
gl
)2
+ (gu)2
)
+ 2S2
(
gl − gu)
24GΛ
+
G2
6Λ
− G
4
+
S2
6Λ
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Digressions:
gl − gu = −Λ +
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
+
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
(2.28)
(
gl
)2
+ (gu)2 = Λ2 + γ2 − 2S
2
3
− (Λ + γ)
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
− (Λ− γ)
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
(
gl
)3
− (gu)3 = −Λ3 + ΛS2 +
(
Λ2 + Λγ + γ2 − S
2
3
) √(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
+
(
Λ2 − Λγ + γ2 − S
2
3
) √(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
. (2.29)
Hence,
(EWSgR (γ)− EWSepPow (γ))
=
Λ2 − 2S2 + 3γ2
24G
+
−Λ2 + 2γ2 + 4
3
S2 − γΛ
24GΛ
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
+
G2 + S2
6Λ
− G
4
+
−Λ2 + 2γ2 + 4
3
S2 + γΛ
24GΛ
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
. (2.30)
Proof of Proposition 16
Notice in equation 2.30 that the expected difference in social welfare between both
constitutions depends only on the absolute value of γ. We can therefore concentrate on
the case γ > 0, without loss of generality. Then, we want to show that the constitution
of a single ruler becomes more attractive relative to a separation of powers, when the
bias of the legislature, γ, increases. We show
∂
∂γ
(EWSgR (γ)− EWSepPow (γ)) > 0
⇔ 6Λγ + (4γ − Λ)
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
−
(
−Λ2 + 2γ2 + 4
3
S2 − γΛ
) Λ−γ
2
2
√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3
+ (4γ + Λ)
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
+
(
−Λ2 + 2γ2 + 4
3
S2 + γΛ
) Λ+γ
2
2
√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3
> 0
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⇔ 6Λγ + 4γ


√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
+
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


+Λ


√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
−
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


+2
((
Λ
2
)2
− S
2
3
)


1√(
1− 3S2
3(Λ−γ)2
) −
1√
1− 4S2
3(Λ+γ)2


+γ
(
Λ
2
+ γ
) Λ+γ
2√(
Λ+γ
2
)2 − S2
3
+ γ
(
Λ
2
− γ
) Λ−γ
2√(
Λ−γ
2
)2 − S2
3
> 0. (2.31)
For γ ≥ 0 all terms are positive. This proves that for an increasing absolute value of γ
separation of powers becomes socially less attractive compared to a single ruler.
Proof of Proposition 17
We want to consider the effect of S and Λ on the optimal constitution.
Small S:
Consider first S = 0. Then
(EWSgR (γ)−EWSepPow (γ))
=
Λ2 + 3γ2
24G
+
−Λ2 + 2γ2 − γΛ
24GΛ
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
+
G2
6Λ
− G
4
+
−Λ2 + 2γ2 + γΛ
24GΛ
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
=
γ2 −G2
4G
+
G2
6Λ
< 0, (2.32)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that γ < G. Hence, separation
of powers is better than a non-elected single ruler, if s = 0. As the expected difference
in welfare between both constitutions is continuous in S, separation of powers is better
for all sufficiently small S (given γ < G).
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Large Λ: Consider
lim
Λ→∞
(EWSgR (Λ)− EWSepPow (Λ))
=
3γ2 − 2S2
24G
− G
4
+
2γ2 + 4
3
S2
24G
lim
Λ→∞


√(
1
2
− γ
2Λ
)2
− S
2
3Λ2
+
√(
1
2
+
γ
2Λ
)2
− S
2
3Λ2


+
1
24G
lim
Λ→∞

Λ2 − (Λ + γ)
√(
Λ− γ
2
)2
− S
2
3
− (Λ− γ)
√(
Λ + γ
2
)2
− S
2
3


=
3γ2 − 2S2
24G
− G
4
+
2γ2 + 4
3
S2
24G
+
1
24G
lim
Λ→∞


1−
√(
1−( γΛ)
2
2
)2
− (Λ+γ)2S2
3Λ4
−
√(
1−( γΛ)
2
2
)2
− (Λ−γ)2S2
3Λ4
1
Λ2


L’Hôpital
=
5γ2 − 2
3
S2
24G
− G
4
+
1
24G
lim
Λ→∞


−
(1−( γΛ))γ2+ 23S2(1+
γ
Λ)(1+
2γ
Λ )
2Λ3
√√√√√

 1−(
γ
Λ)
2
2


2
− (Λ+γ)2S2
3Λ4
+
(
1−( γΛ)
2
)
γ2+ 2
3
S2(1− γΛ)(1−
2γ
Λ )
2Λ3
√√√√√

 1−(
γ
Λ)
2
2


2
− (Λ−γ)2S2
3Λ4
−2 1
Λ3


=
5γ2 − 2
3
S2
24G
− G
4
+
1
4 · 24G

γ
2 + 2
3
S2√(
1
2
)2 +
γ2 + 2
3
S2√(
1
2
)2

 = γ
2 −G2
4G
. (2.33)
For γ < G this term is clearly negative. Hence, separation of powers is better than a
single ruler, if Λ is sufficiently large, q.e.d.
Chapter 3
Contractual Incompleteness as a
Signal of Trust
3.1 Introduction
This paper demonstrates how the fear to signal distrust can lead endogenously to
incomplete contractual agreements.
According to standard results in contract theory an optimal contract should be
conditional on all verifiable information containing statistical information about an
agent’s action or type.1 Most real world contracts, however, condition only on few
contingencies and often no explicit contract is signed at all. The costs of writing
a complete contract or the limited ability to foresee all relevant contingencies can
only partially explain the observed contractual incompleteness. There remain many
relationships in which a simple contract could help to avoid potentially severe incentive
problems at relatively low costs. Nonetheless, many people abstain from writing a
complete contract. Why?
This paper argues that designing a sophisticated complete contract with fines, pun-
ishments and other explicit incentives signals distrust to the other party.
Consider the example of a scientist hiring a research assistant. Some potential
incentive problems could be avoided by simple contractual arrangements. For instance,
1See e.g. Holmstöm [47] or Laffont and Tirole [55].
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if one part of the assistant’s work consists of collecting some data, the scientist could
give him the right incentives by announcing to spot-check his work and to fire the
assistant in case she detects some faked data. The potential damage for the scientist
in case her research relies on faked data is considerable and may far outweigh her
costs of spot-checking. She may, nonetheless, abstain from such an announcement,
because the research assistant is likely to interpret such checks as a signal of distrust
regarding his scientific dedication. The feeling that the scientist distrusts him destroys
the assistant’s motivation in other parts of the relationship. For instance, the assistant
may expect a lower success from some potential, mutually beneficial, joint research
projects if the scientist doubts his scientific dedication. He would therefore invest less
effort in searching for such joint projects - to the disadvantage of the scientist.
More generally, consider a principal (“she”) who is interested in the success of a
project that she can only realize with the help of an agent (“he”). There are two types
of agents. The trustworthy type has an intrinsic interest in the success of the project
and is therefore willing to exert effort even without any contractual incentives.2 The
untrustworthy type is not intrinsically interested in the success of the project. Only
explicit contractual incentives can motivate him to exert effort.
The principal may hold different beliefs about the type of the agent depending on
some private signals.3 We call the belief of the principal that the agent is trustworthy
the “trust” of the principal in the agent. More trust means that the principal considers
it more likely that the agent exerts effort even in absence of explicit incentives. The
more a principal trusts the agent the lower are her expected costs (and her expected
marginal costs) from contractual incompleteness. A principal can therefore try to sep-
arate herself from less trusting types by using contractual incompleteness as a signaling
device.
Why should the principal have an interest in signaling trust? In our model trust is
relevant in some parts of the relationship which are non-contractible by assumption.
The more the principal trusts the agent, the more she is willing to rely on the agent.
2Equivalently, the agent could be motivated by some fairness motives.
3Such a signal could be private information about the agent, could stand for past experiences of
the principal with other agents, or could symbolize a more or less optimistic nature of the principal.
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She may, for instance, follow his advice more often or give the agent more discretion
in his decisions. This, in turn, increases the productivity of the agent’s effort in the
joint project. Thus, if a trustworthy agent believes to be distrusted by the principal,
he invests less effort and the project is less successful.
Our model focuses on the point that the concern to avoid a signal of distrust may
spread contractual incompleteness from non-contractible parts to the contractible parts
of a relationship.4 Even in a perfectly contractible world, however, the concern to signal
distrust causes contractual incompleteness whenever the belief to be distrusted leads
to a negative reaction of the agent. We discuss other, more psychological, reasons for
such reactions after presentation of our main model.
The literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts is extensive. A recent
survey of this literature is Tirole [91]. Spier [87] points out most explicitly that signaling
can cause contractual incompleteness.5 In her model a risk-averse principal hires a risk-
neutral agent. The principal has private information on whether the probability that
her project results in high profits is high or low. In the refined equilibrium the principal
offers an unconditional wage and thereby (inefficiently) forgoes some insurance in order
to signal to the agent that the success probability is high. Notice, however, that, in
general, asymmetric information at the contracting stage can equally well lead to more
instead of less complete contracts.6 For instance, slightly changing the setting of Spier
to an informed risk-averse principal selling a risky asset to a less informed risk-neutral
agent (potentially with some transaction cost for writing the contract conditional on
outcome) results in a too complete contract: The principal can signal a good risk
asset by conditioning the proposed contract on the outcome, although under symmetric
information the agent should pay a fixed price for the asset independently of the asset’s
4Holmström-Milgrom [48] and Bernheim-Whinston [8] give two different arguments, why it can be
optimal to leave some verifiable aspects of a relationship unspecified when other aspects cannot be
verified. Holmström-Milgrom show in a multi-task setting, that it may be optimal to give no explicit
incentives if the agent has some intrinsic motivation, tasks are substitutes and when the unverifiable
task is sufficiently important. Bernheim-Whinstons argument is based on the observation, that writing
no contract may give both sides more discretion to punish the other side. This can be important in a
repeated games framework where harsh out of equilibrium punishments may be necessary to sustain
the desired equilibrium.
5See also Allen-Gale [3] for similar ideas in the context of financial economics.
6See also Tirole [91], p.764 for this point.
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outcome. Hence, in general, the effect of signaling concerns on contractual completeness
is ambiguous.
In our paper, in contrast, there is a clear prediction that contracts should be less
complete when the principal wants to signal trust: The trustworthy type is defined as
someone who chooses the desired action even without contractual enforcement. Hence,
the more the principal trusts, the lower she estimates the costs of an incomplete con-
tract. More contractual incompleteness therefore signals more trust and the equilibrium
contract is distorted towards less completeness whenever the principal wants to signal
trust.
Furthermore, our paper adds a new perspective to the literature on the detrimental
effects of sanctions and explicit incentives. A number of authors7 and recent experi-
mental studies8 suggest that sanctions, control and explicit incentives can crowd out
intrinsic motivation and may even be counterproductive. Sanctions seem to have a
particularly detrimental effect in cases where they are deliberately designed by one of
the involved parties.
Bénabou-Tirole [6] and Fehr-Klein-Schmidt [29] suggest two different channels through
which explicit incentives can negatively affect performance. In Bénabou-Tirole [6] a
better informed principal wants to give explicit incentives to the agent if a task is
unpleasant or the agent has a low ability. The less informed agent understands that
explicit incentives are a signal for an unpleasant task or for his low ability. Explicit in-
centives therefore crowd out intrinsic motivation and are thus less powerful than under
symmetric information. The model of Bénabou-Tirole requires that the principal has
superior knowledge about the agent’s type (or his task). Our model, in contrast, focuses
on the better knowledge of the principal about her own beliefs about the agent’s type.
This seems a natural assumption in almost any setting with asymmetric information.
The paper by Fehr-Klein-Schmidt [29] addresses the question of how fairness con-
cerns affect the choice of contracts. They show experimentally that it may be optimal
for a principal to rely on implicit incentives (the promise of a bonus for good per-
7See e.g. Etzioni [26], Deci-Ryan [19] and Frey [33].
8See Fehr-Rockenbach [30], Gneezy-Rustichini [37],[38], and Fehr-Klein-Schmidt [29] In section 3.3
we briefly discuss the experimental findings of Falk-Kosfeld [27] in the light of our model.
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formance) rather than on explicit incentives (a commitment to a limited fine after
poor performance). They demonstrate by a calibration that the experimental results
are consistent with a heterogeneous population where some players are inequity-averse
while others act selfishly. Our argument may complement their explanation: It is nat-
ural to define trust in their setting as the belief that the agent is of a fair type. The
existence of some fair-types gives implicit incentives their strength. The heterogeneity
of preference types and of beliefs about these types can, in addition, make the choice
of explicit incentives counterproductive, as they signal distrust.
After presenting and analyzing our model in section 3.2 we discuss our results in
section 3.3 before concluding in section 3.4.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setting
Consider the following principal-agent relationship: A principal needs to hire an agent
to realize a project. The agent is one of two types, trustworthy (T ) or untrustwor-
thy (U); the proportion of trustworthy types in the economy, π, is strictly between zero
and one. The trustworthy type of agent is intrinsically interested in the success of the
project,9 whereas the untrustworthy type does not care about the project per se.
The principal cannot observe the agent’s type. She receives, however, a binary,
private signal s ∈ {+,−} about the type of the agent. In case the agent is trustworthy,
the principal receives a positive signal with the exogenously given probability σT .
In case the agent is untrustworthy, the principal receives a positive signal with the
exogenously given probability σU , with σU < σT . These two moves by “nature” are
illustrated in figure 3.1
By Bayes’ rule a principal with a positive signal believes that she faces the trustwor-
thy type with probability π+ =
π
π+
σU
σT
(1−π) > π and a principal with a negative signal
believes that she interacts with a trustworthy type with probability π− = π
π+
1−σU
1−σT
(1−π)
<
9Instead of being intrinsically interested in the project the agent may also have preferences for
fairness and therefore, deliberately, exert high effort.
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Figure 3.1: Nature’s moves
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π. Notice that π+ > π−, i.e. a principal with a positive signal has a stronger belief in
the agent’s trustworthiness. In other words, the principal with a positive signal trusts
the agent more strongly than the principal with a negative signal.
The project consists of two parts, the contractible part 1 and the non-contractible
part 2. The project’s success in the contractible part 1, B1 ∈ {0, B1} depends only
on an unobservable effort e1 ∈ {0, e1} by the agent. High effort e1 benefits the project
deterministically by B1 ≡ B1(e1) > e1. Low effort e1 = 0 leads to B1 = 0. A
contract can condition on the outcome B1(e1) which is realized at the very end of the
relationship, i.e. after both players have chosen their actions in the second part of the
relationship. Although effort e1 is not directly observable, it can be inferred from the
realized value of B1.
10 A sufficiently harsh punishment in case of B1 = 0 therefore
implements a high effort level e1 = e1 in this contractible part 1.
The success of the project in part 2 depends firstly, on an unobservable effort
decision e2 ∈ R+0 of the agent, secondly, on a decision of the principal whether to rely
on the agent or whether to play safe, and finally, on an unobservable choice by the
agent, whether to work honestly or dishonestly.
Consider again our introductory example of the scientist and the research assistant.
Part 2 of the relationship then corresponds to a jointly beneficial research project.
10By assuming that e1 is only ex post (indirectly) observable we avoid complication of e1 signalling
something about the agent’s type.
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Firstly, the assistant has to decide how much (unobservable) effort he wants to exert in
studying the literature of the research topic. Then, the scientist has to decide whether
to share an interesting idea with the assistant and to start a mutually beneficial joint
research project. Joint work can be mutually beneficial. Yet, if the the assistant does
not work reliably this could ruin the scientist’s reputation. If the scientist prefers to
play it safe she can instead choose a projet in which the assistant’s trustworthiness is
of minor importance.
More generally, in case the principal chooses to rely on the agent, the project’s
success is very sensitive to the agent’s honesty. If the agent works honestly the project
benefits by Bh(e2), where Bh(·) is a twice differentiable function of the agents ef-
fort e2 ∈ R+0 , with B′h > 0, B′′h < 0, Bh(0) ≥ Bh > 0, lime2→∞ Bh(e2) ≤ Bh ∈ R and
lime2→0 B
′
h(e2) = ∞, where Bh > Bh > 0 are two, exogenously given boundaries. If
the agent works dishonestly he gains a private benefit of Md > 0, but causes a damage
to the project of Bd > Md. In case the principal chooses to play safe, the agent’s
decision is only of minor importance: all payoffs are multiplied by a small constant ε,
with 0 < ε ¿ 1. The interaction is illustrated in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Reliance Game
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with Bd > Md > 0, Bh > Bh(·) > Bh > 0 and 1 > ε > 0.
Let B2(e2, ·) denote the project’s success resulting from this interaction in part 2.
Due to this second non-contractible part the principal has an interest to signal her
trust in the agent.
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The total success B of the project is the sum of the successes, B1(e1) and B2(e2, ·),
in both parts of the relationship, i.e.
B(e1, e2, ·) ≡ B1(e1) + B2(e2, ·). (3.1)
Timing of events
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Timeline
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Reliance Game
After nature has randomly chosen the agent’s type and the principal’s signal, princi-
pal and agent sign a contract. Then, the agent chooses his effort levels e1 and e2. Both
effort choices are unobservable. Finally, principal and agent interact in the reliance
game.
Contracting Stage
At the contracting stage, the principal proposes a contract. This contract can, by
assumption, only be conditional on B1(e1), the project’s success in the first part. The
most relevant feature of this contract is, whether the contract enforces high effort e1
by a sufficiently harsh punishment in case of B2(e2) = 0. In general, however, the
principal can design a sophisticated wage scheme and the agent’s decision whether to
accept or reject the proposal may potentially reveal information about his type.
Here, we want to demonstrate our main point as concise as possible. For the
moment, we thus restrict the set of contractual choices of the principal to a binary
choice C ∈ {contract (c), no contract (n)}. In appendix 3.5.2, we demonstrate that our
main argument remains valid if we allow for more general contracts and if we take care
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of the agent’s participation constraint.
The contract prescribes high effort e1 = e1 in the contractible part 1. A court
enforces the contract by the threat of a sufficiently harsh punishment in case of B1(e1) =
0. In case of writing no-contract the principal refrains from such an enforcement.
A possible interpretation for this simple setting is that principal and agent are
working together already, and that there exists a binding agreement fixing the wage.
In particular, let this existing agreement give the principal the discretion to enforce
high effort of the agent in the contractible part 1 of the relationship through a contract
or to abstain from doing so. Notice that in this simple setting, the agent takes no
observable action. After the first exogenous signal s, the principal’s belief (i.e. her
trust) about the agent’s type remains fixed at π±.
Preferences
For simplicity, let the principal and the agent be risk neutral. The untrustworthy type
of agent maximizes his private, monetary and non-monetary, payoffs M minus his total
effort costs e ≡ e1 + e2. He does not care about the project.
The utility-function of the untrustworthy-agent is given by
UU(M, e, B(·)) = M − e. (3.2)
The trustworthy type of agent is intrinsically interested in the success of the project B(·).
We allow for the possibility that the trustworthy agent puts a lower weight, κ ≤ 1, on
the project’s success than the principal (in monetary units). The utility function of a
trustworthy agent is therefore
UT (M, e, B(·)) = M − e + κB(·). (3.3)
We need, however, that the trustworthy agent sufficiently cares about the project
to deliberately exert high effort e1 in part 1 and to work honestly in part 2. This is
ensured by
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Assumption 8
1 ≥ κ ≥ max
{
e1
B1
,
Md
Bd
}
. (3.4)
The principal’s utility is given by
V (WP , B(·)) = B(·)−WP , (3.5)
where WP is the wage payed by the principal. Wage payments are relevant only for the
extended version in appendix 3.5.2. Here, we normalize WP = 0. Hence, the principal
maximizes simply the expected total success of the project B(·) .
3.2.2 Analysis of the Principal-Agent Relationship
We analyze this principal-agent relationship backwards.
Reliance Game
Consider the last subgames of the reliance game. An untrustworthy agent works
dishonestly since he does not care about the project and is tempted by the pri-
vate benefit Md > 0 (or εMd > 0). A trustworthy agent, however, works honestly,
since κBh(e2) > 0 ≥ Md − κBd. A trustworthy agent values the additional success of
the project more than his private benefits from working dishonestly.
Should the principal rely on the agent? She anticipates that the agent works hon-
estly if and only if he is trustworthy. Depending on her private signal the principal has
a belief π± that the agent is of a trustworthy type. It is optimal for her to rely on the
agent if and only if π±Bh(ê2)− (1− π±) Bd ≥ 0, or, equivalently, if and only if
π± ≥ Bd
Bh (ê2) + Bd
. (3.6)
Notice, that in case of
π± >
Bd
Bh + Bd
(3.7)
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the principal plays rely independently of her expectations on the effort choice ê2 of a
trustworthy agent. Similarly, if
π± <
Bd
Bh + Bd
(3.8)
the principal plays safe independently of her expectations on the effort choice e2 of a
trustworthy agent.
Assumption 9 We assume:
π+ >
Bd
Bh + Bd
and π− <
Bd
Bh + Bd
. (3.9)
In other words, a trusting principal with a positive signal relies on the agent, whereas
a distrusting principal with a negative signal plays safe.
The Agent’s Effort Choice
An untrustworthy agent dislikes effort and does not care about the project. Thus, he
always chooses e2 = 0. Furthermore, in the first part of the project he chooses low
effort e1 = 0, too, unless high effort is enforced by a contract.
A trustworthy agent chooses high effort e1 = e1 in the contractible part 1, even
without any explicit incentives by a contract. Since κB1 > e1, by assumption 8, he
cares more about the value added to the project than about his effort costs. In the
non-contractible part 2 the trustworthy agent’s effort e2 depends on his belief about
whether the principal trusts him. In case he expects the principal to play safe, effort e2
increases the project’s success only by εBh(e2); whereas if he expects the principal to
rely on him, effort e2 increases the project’s success by Bh(e2).
The agent understands that the principal relies on him if and only if she received
a positive signal. Ex ante, i.e. before the principal chooses a contract, the trustworthy
agent has the rational belief of σT that the principal received a positive signal and the
untrustworthy agent has a belief of σU . The agent may, however, change his belief after
observing the principal’s contract choice.
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Let αT denote the trustworthy agent’s belief that the principal received a positive
signal after he observed her contractual choice. In particular, we denote by αcT the
belief of a trustworthy agent if the principal chose to write a contract and αnT the belief
of a trustworthy agent if the principal chose to write no contract.
Then, a trustworthy agent chooses his effort e2 in order to maximize
max
e2∈R+0
(αT Bh(e2) + (1− αT ) εBh(e2)− e2) (3.10)
FOC: B′h (e2) =
1
ε + αT (1− ε) . (3.11)
B′h(·) is a strictly decreasing function (since B′′h < 0). Hence, the inverse function
(B′h)
−1 exists and is strictly decreasing, too. The optimal effort e∗2 for the trustworthy
agent given the belief αT is therefore
e∗2(αt) = (B
′
h)
−1
(
1
ε + αT (1− ε)
)
. (3.12)
Notice that e∗2(·) is strictly increasing in αT . Hence, B∗h(αT ) ≡ Bh(e∗2(αT )) is strictly
increasing in αT , too. The more the trustworthy agent believes to be trusted the more
effort e∗2 he exerts. This effort of the agent increases the success of the project and
thereby benefits the principal.
Analysis of the Contracting Stage
The principal’s decision of whether or not to write a contract is observed by the agent
and influences the trustworthy agent’s belief αT of whether the principal trusts him.
This belief, in turn, influences the agent’s effort decision e∗2(αt).
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium the contractual choice C+ ∈ {c, n}, of a principal
with a positive signal, and C− ∈ {c, n}, of a principal with a negative signal, must both
be optimal given the principal’s type (i.e. his belief π±) and given the trustworthy
agent’s beliefs αcT and α
n
T . On the other hand, the trustworthy agent’s beliefs α
c
T after
observing the choice of a contract and αnT after observing the choice of no-contract
must be rational given the equilibrium contractual choices C+ and C−.
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Consider a potential equilibrium candidate which we denote, in a slight abuse of
notation11, by (C+, C−, αcT , αnT ). Let V n± denote the expected payoff of a (±)-principal
from the choice of writing no-contract, and V c± the expected payoff from the choice of
writing a contract. Then,
V n+ = π+
(
B1 + B
∗
h (α
n
T )
)− (1− π+) Bd (3.13)
V c+ = B1 + π+B
∗
h (α
c
T )− (1− π+) Bd (3.14)
V n− = π−
(
B1 + εB
∗
h (α
n
T )
)− (1− π−) εBd (3.15)
V c− = B1 + π−εB
∗
h (α
c
T )− (1− π−) εBd. (3.16)
The following relations are useful for the further analysis:
V n+ T V c+ ⇔ B∗h (αnT )−B∗h (αcT ) T
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.17)
V n− T V c− ⇔ B∗h (αnT )−B∗h (αcT ) T
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
(3.18)
The left hand sides of the rearranged inequalities are identical for the trusting
and the distrusting principal and depend on the trustworthy agent’s beliefs after the
contract choice. The right hand side is greater for the trusting principal than for the
distrusting one. Thus, the distrusting principal is less willing to chose no-contract
compared to the trusting principal..
Even a trusting principal only considers to refrain from the option to enforce high
effort in part 1 by means of a contract if the expected costs (1− π+) B1 are below the
maximal possible expected gains from such a signal π+ (B
1
h −B0h), where we defined
B
αT
h ≡ B∗h(αT ) (≡ Bh (e∗2 (αT ))) , (3.19)
i.e. B1h ≡ B∗h(αT = 1) and B0h ≡ B∗h(αT = 0). Otherwise, both types of principal
always pool on writing a contract. Thus, we concentrate on the interesting case:
11The beliefs of the untrustworthy agent are payoff irrelevant. The remaining equilibrium actions
are the unique best responses given (C+, C−, αcT , αnT ).
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Condition 1
B1 <
π+
1− π+
(
B1h −B0h
)
. (3.20)
Refinement by the Intuitive Criterion: Signaling games suffer from a multiplicity
of perfect Bayesian equilibria that are often sustained by pessimistic out of equilibrium
beliefs. We mainly focus on equilibria that are consistent with the intuitive criterion,
an equilibrium refinement introduced by Cho and Kreps [17].12 It constrains the set of
out-of-equilibrium-beliefs by the following equilibrium domination argument: Consider
an out-of equilibrium action in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. If one
type A can never expect to profit from this deviation (given that all players play best-
responses to some out of equilibrium belief) whereas a different type potentially could
profit, then any “intuitive” belief should assign probability 0 to type A. The precise
definition of the intuitive criterion is in the appendix. We introduce the following
Definition 7 An intuitive equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that is
consistent with the intuitive criterion.
In the appendix we specify and derive all perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.
Here, we concentrate on our main point and summarize the most relevant results in
the following propositions.
Proposition 18 Under assumption 8, 9 and condition 1, there always exists an intu-
itive equilibrium in which the trusting principal chooses to write no-contract.
Remark 5 These intuitive equilibria are
a) for B1 ≥ π−1−π− ε (B1h −B0h):
the separating equilibrium in which the trusting principal chooses to write no
contract and the distrusting principal chooses to write a contract.
12In our context we need the somewhat more elaborate definition of the intuitive criterion used by
Maskin-Tirole [61], because we deal with more stages than the standard two-stage signaling game.
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b) for π−
1−π− ε
(
B
σT
h −B0h
)
< B1 <
π−
1−π− ε (B
1
h −B0h):
the hybrid equilibrium in which the trusting principal chooses to write no con-
tract and the distrusting principal chooses to write no contract with probability
q =
σT
1−σT
1−αnt
αnt
.
c) for B1 ≤ π−1−π− ε
(
B
σT
h −B0h
)
:
the pooling equilibria on writing no contract, in which both types of principal
forbear from writing a contract.
To see the intuition for proposition 18 and remark 5, notice that the expected costs
of refraining from writing a contract are smaller for the trusting principal, (1−π+)B1,
than for the distrusting principal, (1 − π−)B1. In addition, the expected gains from
signaling trust are higher for the trusting principal. Firstly, she considers it more likely
that she interacts with a trustworthy agent, the type who invests more effort when he
believes in being trusted. Secondly, since she plays “rely” in the relaince game, her
payoff is more sensitive to the agent’s investment.
Consider a very large B1, such that condition 1 does not hold. Then, the expected
losses from signaling trust by writing no contract are too large compared to the poten-
tial gains; the trusting as well as the distrusting principal pool on writing a contract.
Decreasing B1 until condition 1 just holds, a second equilibrium emerges, the sepa-
rating equilibrium of remark 5 a. In the range of remark 5 a the trusting principal takes
the risk to forgo B1 in part 1 of the project to separate herself from the distrusting
type. For a distrusting principal writing no contract, to imitate the trusting type, is
too expensive.
As we decrease B1 further the costs of signaling trust, by forbearing from writing
a contract, become smaller. Perfect separation of the trusting and distrusting prin-
cipal becomes unsustainable when the expected costs of writing no contract for the
distrusting type fall below the gains from being mistaken for a trusting type.13 Then,
a fraction of distrusting principals starts imitating the signal. The larger this fraction
of distrusting imitators, the lower, in equilibrium, the belief of the rational agent after
13Notice that this threshold, π−1−π− ε
(
B1h −B0h
)
, is close to zero if ε is small.
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observing the signal “no contract”. In the hybrid equilibrium of remark 5 b the frac-
tion of distrusting principals imitating the signal takes exactly the value that makes a
distrusting principal indifferent between choosing “contract” or “no contract”.
Decreasing B1 further, decreases, in this hybrid equilibrium, the probability that
a distrusting principal reveals his type by writing a contract. When this probability
reaches zero, we end up in the pooling equilibrium of remark 5 c, sustained by an out
of equilibrium belief, that a “contract” is a signal of a distrusting type.
In addition to the equilibria in proposition 18 and remark 5 there exist further
perfect Bayesian equilibria, in particular the pooling equilibria on writing a contract.
For an intermediate range of B1, however, these additional equilibria do not pass the
intuitive criterion and intuitive equilibrium actions are unique.
Proposition 19 Under assumption 8, 9, condition 1, and in case of
π−
1− π− ε
(
B1h −BσTh
)
< B1 <
π+
1− π+
(
B1h −BσTh
)
(3.21)
the equilibria of remark 5 are the only intuitive equilibria. In particular, the trusting
principal chooses to write no contract in any intuitive equilibrium.
Corollary 10 Under assumption 8, 9, condition 1, and inequality 3.21 there is a
unique outcome in all intuitive equilibria. More precisely,
a) for B1 ≥ π−1−π− ε (B1h −B0h): the separating equilibrium, in which the trusting prin-
cipal chooses to write “ no contract”, is the unique intuitive equilibrium.
b) for π−
1−π− ε
(
B
σT
h −B0h
)
< B1 <
π−
1−π− ε (B
1
h −B0h): the hybrid equilibrium in which the
trusting principal chooses to write no contract and the distrusting principal chooses
to write no contract with probability q =
σT
1−σT
1−αnt
αnt
is the unique intuitive equilib-
rium.
c) for B1 ≤ π−1−π− ε
(
B
σT
h −B0h
)
: all intuitive equilibria are pooling equilibria on writing
no contract; these equilibria differ only in their out-of-equilibrium beliefs, αcT .
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The intuition for proposition 19 follows from two observations. Firstly, under con-
dition 3.21 there exists no hybrid equilibrium in which the trusting principal uses a
mixed strategy. Secondly, the pooling equilibrium on writing a contract requires that
the out of equilibrium belief for writing no contract, αnT , is smaller than 1. Under
condition 3.21, however, the intuitive criterion requires an out of equilibrium belief of
1, as the distrusting principal can never expect to profit, whereas the trusting principal
does profit for αnT = 1.
These propositions confirm the main point of our paper; the principal may choose
to leave contracts incomplete to avoid a signal of distrust. Proposition 18 states that,
under condition 1, there always exists an equilibrium in which at least the trusting
principal abstains from writing a contract, and that these equilibria pass the intuitive
criterion. Under condition 3.21 these are the only equilibria that are not excluded by
the intuitive criterion - as stated in proposition 19. Then, there is a unique intuitive
equilibrium outcome, in which the trusting principal forbears from writing a contact.
.
3.3 Discussion
Our model demonstrates that the fear to signal distrust can endogenously cause con-
tractual incompleteness. The trusting principal, in particular, prefers to to write no
contract, although under symmetric information she would strictly prefer to write such
a contingent contract. She is more afraid of being mistaken for the distrusting principal,
than of being exploited by an untrustworthy agent.
In the simple model, with a binary contractual choice, contract or no contract, such
an equilibrium, in which the trusting type refrains from writing a contract, exits only
if the exogenously given costs of contractual incompleteness are not to high. The range
for uniqueness of the intuitive equilibrium is even smaller.
In appendix 3.5.2 the principal can design more general wage schemes. This compli-
cates the analysis and requires additional assumptions to ensure that the principal can
not separate the trustworthy and the untrustworthy agent by a screening contract. In
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return, however, we get a clear cut prediction about the intuitive equilibrium outcome:
In any intuitive equilibrium the distrusting principal chooses the complete contract
and the trusting principal chooses the least-cost separating contract. In other words,
the trusting principal chooses a degree of contractual incompleteness just sufficient to
separate herself from the distrusting type.
Intuitively, the principal can choose any degree of contractual incompleteness by
designing the contract properly, i.e. she can choose any loss in case the agent turns
out to be untrustworthy.14 In an intuitive equilibrium, the trusting principal never
proposes a contract that is chosen by the mistrusting principal with a strictly positive
probability. Marginal and absolute costs of contractual incompleteness are lower for
a trusting principal while the gains from signaling trust are larger. In a candidate
equilibrium contract chosen by both types of principal the trusting type can separate
herself by choosing an additional degree of contractual incompleteness just sufficiently
high that the distrusting type strictly prefers the candidate equilibrium contract. By
the intuitive criterion the agent should assign a belief of αT = 1 when observing such a
deviating contract. Then, however, the trusting principal has a strict preference for this
deviation and the candidate equilibrium could not have been an intuitive equilibrium
in the first place.
In our model, the value of signaling trust comes from an under-investment of the
agent in a non-contractible part of the relationship in case he believes to be distrusted.
If we are willing to depart further from standard economic preferences and take a more
sociological or psychological standpoint then the negative consequences of signaling
distrust become even more relevant. The proposal of a detailed complete contract with
sophisticated fines and rewards basically states “I believe you are one of those types
who exploits me if he can”. Most people would perceive such a statement as an insult
and lose any motivation to invest in this relationship. In addition, trust seems to have
a strong mutual component. How can I trust you if you do not trust me? In a relation
14Losses smaller than B1 > 0 can be generated by a lottery over contracts - with some probability
complete, with the counter probability incomplete. Losses larger than B1 > 0 can be generated by
giving the agent no explicit incentives and a commitment by the principal to burn some money in
case the agent turns out to be untrustworthy, i.e. in case of B1 = 0.
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of similar partners this inference can be rational to some degree and may be amplified
by the false consensus effect.15
In particular sociologist emphasize that human behavior and well-being is strongly
influenced by social status and what other people think about them. Feeling distrusted
lowers one’s utility directly and a signal of distrust may destroy the potential surplus
from a relationship. Only if we feel trusted we attach positive emotions to a rela-
tionship, we are willing to invest in it and to forgo some instant profits to maintain
the impression of being trustworthy.16 Luhmann [59] coined the expression of the
“self-fulfilling prophecy of distrust”. This effect is demonstrated neatly in a recent
experimental study by Falk-Kosfeld [27]. An agent can spend any amount from his en-
dowment of 120 token in an investment which benefits only the principal (by the double
amount of the investment). Upfront, the principal can choose whether she wants to
force the agent to invest at least 10 token, or whether she abstains from any control
(then the minimum investment is 0). The large majority of principals chose not to
control the agent and, in fact, on average agents invested significantly more when the
principal chose to not control. An additional control-treatment where the minimum
investment was exogenously given demonstrates that it is not the control per se that
leads to lower investments of the agent, but the fact that the principal has deliberately
chosen to control. This clearly suggests that a principal choosing to control the agent
signals distrust and that this crowds out trustworthiness of the agent.
3.4 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that the fear to signal distrust can lead to endogenous con-
tractual incompleteness, even when there are no costs of writing a contract and all
types of principal would prefer to write a complete contract under symmetric informa-
15To see this consider the following stylized model: The world can be either good or bad. In a
good world most people are trustworthy while in a bad world most people are untrustworthy. If
someone knows only his own preferences he should assign a higher probability to a bad world if he is
untrustworthy, himself. Hence, people who distrust others may be more likely to be untrustworthy
themselves. See also Englemann [22].
16Recent studies suggest (see Sunnafrank-Ramirez [89]) that the first impressions are decisive for
the long-term nature of a relationship. Contract proposal are often the starting point in a relation.
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tion about their beliefs. Our results are driven, firstly, by asymmetric information on
the principal’s beliefs about the agent’s type and ,secondly, by the importance of trust,
and the belief to be trusted, for the relationship.
This fear to signal distrust by proposing to write a contract can cause considerable
inefficiencies. Carefully designed policies may therefore become relevant and can help to
mitigate these inefficiencies. Many couples are reluctant to sign a prenuptial agreement
as they are afraid of signaling distrust to their spouse. A well designed, fair, standard
regulation, at least for the case that no contract is written, may therefore be very
important. In fact, most states do regulate the consequences in case of a divorce to
some degree.
Similarly, parents who funded their children’s education should, in return, receive
support from their children in case they need help when becoming elderly. Most par-
ents, however, will be very reluctant to insist on any explicit contract with their children
- for not showing distrust. Again, some prudential regulation by a government may
help to mitigate such problems.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proofs and all Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
Separating Equilibrium: Under condition 1, there exists a separating, perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if and only if
B1h ≤ B0h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.22)
In this equilibrium the trusting principal with belief π+ chooses to write no contract,
(i.e. C+ = n), and the distrusting principal with belief π− chooses to write a contract,
(i.e. C− = c).
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Pooling on writing No Contract : There exist perfect Bayesian pooling equilibria
on writing no-contract if and only if
B
σT
h ≥ B0h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.23)
On the equilibrium path the belief of the trustworthy agent is αnT = σT and the equi-
librium is sustained by an out of equilibrium belief αcT ≤ (B∗h)−1
(
B∗h (σT )− 1−π−π− B1ε
)
.
Pooling on writing a Contract : There always exist perfect Bayesian pooling equi-
libria on writing a contract. On the equilibrium path, the belief of the trustworthy agent
is αcT = σT and the equilibrium is sustained by an out of equilibrium belief
αnT ≤ (B∗h)−1
(
B∗h (σT ) +
1−π+
π+
B1
)
.
Hybrid Equilibria with a random contractual choice of the distrusting prin-
cipal:
Under condition 1, there exists a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the
trusting principal chooses to write no-contract with certainty and the distrusting prin-
cipal randomly mixes between both contractual choices if and only if
B
σT
h ≤ B0h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
≤ B1h. (3.24)
In this equilibrium the trustworthy agent’s beliefs are αct = 0 and
αnt = (B
∗
h)
−1
(
1−π−
π−
B1
ε
+ B0h
)
. The mixing probability for the distrusting principal
to choose no-contract is q =
σT
1−σT
1−αnt
αnt
.
Hybrid Equilibria with random contract choice of the trusting principal:
Under condition 1 there exists a hybrid perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the dis-
trusting principal writes a contract with certainty and the trusting principal randomly
mixes between “contract” and “no contract if and only if
B1h −BσTh <
1− π+
π+
B1. (3.25)
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In this equilibrium the trustworthy agent’s beliefs are αct = (B
∗
h)
−1
(
B1h − 1−π+π+ B1
)
and
αnt = 1. The mixing probability for the trusting principal to choose to write no-contract
is q′ = 1− 1−σT
σT
αct
1−αct .
Refinement by the Intuitive Criterion: Which of the perfect Bayesian equilibria
are affected by the refinement of the intuitive criterion? The separating and hybrid
equilibria have no out-of-equilibrium belief and therefore pass the intuitive criterion,
anyway. Pooling equilibria on writing no contract pass the intuitive criterion too,
since both types of principal could potentially profit from a deviation to the complete
contract.
The only equilibria that potentially fail to pass the intuitive criterion are the pool-
ing equilibria on the complete contract. The intuitive criterion requires the out-of-
equilibrium belief after the choice of no contract to be αnt = 1 if for this belief
17 the
trusting principal expects to profit from the deviation, whereas the distrusting prin-
cipal does not. In fact, no pooling equilibrium on the complete contract passes the
intuitive criterion if (and only if)18
1− π+
π+
B1 < B
1
h −BσTh <
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.26)
In the remainder of this paper we denote a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that passes
the intuitive criterion as an intuitive equilibrium.
Proofs and Derivation of the Equilibria
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and Intuitive Equilibria
The following definition is useful in the further analysis:
17Clearly, αt = 1 leads to maximal profits for the principal.
18In case of 1−π+π+
B1
∆δ+∆Bh
= 1−σT , the intuitive criterion still requires αt(cc = 0) = 1, but pooling
on the complete contract remains incentive compatible.
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Definition 8
e
αT
2 ≡ e∗2(αT ), in particular, (3.27)
e02 ≡ e∗2(αT = 0) and e12 ≡ e∗2(αT = 1). (3.28)
Separating Equilibrium In the only possible separating equilibrium19 the trusting
principal chooses to write no contract and the distrusting principal chooses to write
a contract. In this perfect-Bayesian-equilibrium the agent has the right beliefs the
principal’s signal, i.e. he holds the beliefs αnt = 1 and α
c
t = 0.
The trustworthy agent therefore invests e12 if and only if the principal writes no
contract.
C+ = n and C− = c are best responses for both types of principal if and only if
(IC+) V
n
+ ≥ V c+ (3.29)
(IC−) V n− ≤ V c−, (3.30)
i.e. by equivalences 3.17 and 3.18
B1h −B0h ≥
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.31)
B1h −B0h ≤
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.32)
Equation 3.31 is already implied by condition 1. Summarizing, under condition 1,
there exists a perfectly separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if condi-
tion 3.32 holds.
Pooling Equilibria on “no contract” (n): If both types of principal choose in
equilibrium to write no contract then the agent’s belief remains unchanged when he
19There can be no separating equilibrium in which the distrusting principal chooses to write no
contract since incompleteness is costly for her and she prefers to not being separated from the trusting
type.
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observes this action, i.e. αnT = σT (and α
n
U = σU ). Out of equilibrium the trustworthy
agent has some belief αcT ∈ [0, 1]. This forms a perfect-Bayesian-Equilibrium if and
only if
(IC+) V
n
+ ≥ V c+ (3.33)
(IC−) V n− ≥ V c−, (3.34)
which by equivalence 3.17 and 3.18 corresponds to
(IC+) B
σT
h −B∗h (αcT ) ≥
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.35)
(IC−) B
σT
h −B∗h (αcT ) ≥
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.36)
(IC+) is already implied by (IC−). Pooling on no contract can be sustained as a
perfect-Bayesian-Equilibrium by an out-of-equilibrium-belief αcT ∈ [0, 1] if and only if
the equilibrium can be sustained by αcT = 0. This is the case if and only if
σT ≥ (B∗h)−1
(
B0h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
)
. (3.37)
Pooling Equilibria on “contract” (c): If both types of principal choose in equi-
librium to write a contract (c) then the belief of the agent remains unchanged when
observing this action, i.e. αcT = σT (and α
c
T = σU ). Out of equilibrium the agent has
some belief αnT ∈ [0, 1]. These beliefs and contractual choices form a perfect-Bayesian-
Equilibrium if and only if
(IC+) V
n
+ ≤ V c+ (3.38)
(IC−) V n− ≤ V c−, (3.39)
which by equivalence 3.17 and 3.18 corresponds to
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(IC+) B
∗
h (α
n
t )−BσTh ≤
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.40)
(IC−) B∗h (α
n
t )−BσTh ≤
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.41)
(IC+) α
n
t ≤ (B∗h)−1
(
B
σT
h +
1− π+
π+
B1
)
(3.42)
(IC−) αnt ≤ (B∗h)−1
(
B
σT
h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
)
. (3.43)
(IC−) is already implied by (IC+). Hence, pooling on writing a contract can always be
sustained as a perfect-Bayesian-Equilibrium, e.g. by the out-of-equilibrium-belief αnT =
0.
Hybrid-Equilibrium with C+ = n and q ≡ prob(C− = n) ∈ (0, 1): In this equilib-
rium the agent knows, when observing a contract that the principal is distrusting, i.e.
αcT = 0. In case he observes no contract he updates his beliefs by Bayes-rule:
αnT ≡ prob(+|C = n) =
prob (C = n|+) prob (+)
prob(C = n) =
σT
σT + (1− σT ) q
. (3.44)
Notice that σT < α
n
T < 1 for every q ∈ (0, 1). Vice versa, for any σT < αnT < 1 there
exists a q ∈ (0, 1) that leads to this αnT , namely q = σT1−σT
1−αnT
αnT
. These beliefs and
contractual choices form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if
(IC+) V
n
+ ≥ V c+ (3.45)
(IC−) V n− = V
c
−, (3.46)
which by equivalence 3.17 and 3.18 corresponds to
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(IC+) B
∗
h (α
n
t )−B0h ≥
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.47)
(IC−) B∗h (α
n
t )−B0h =
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.48)
(IC+) is implied already by (IC−). Hence, there exists a perfect Bayesian hybrid
equilibrium in which the trusting principal chooses “no contract” and the distrusting
principal mixes between “contact” and “no contract” if and only if
B
σT
h < B
0
h +
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
< B1h. (3.49)
Hybrid-Equilibrium with q′ ≡ prob(C = n) ∈ (0, 1) and C = c: In this equilibrium
the agent knows, when observing “no contract”, that the principal is of the trusting
type, i.e. αnT = 1. In case he observes a contract he updates his beliefs by Bayes-rule:
αct =
prob (C = c|+) probT (+)
probT (C = c) =
(1− q′) σT
(1− q′)σT + (1− σT )
. (3.50)
Notice that 0 < αcT < σT for every q
′ ∈ (0, 1). These beliefs and contractual choices
form an equilibrium if and only if
(IC+) V
n
+ = V
c
+ (3.51)
(IC−) V n− ≤ V c−, (3.52)
which by equivalence 3.17 and 3.18 corresponds to
(IC+) B
1
h −B∗h (αct) =
1− π+
π+
B1 (3.53)
(IC−) B1h −B∗h (αct) ≤
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.54)
(IC−) is implied already by (IC+). Hence, there exists a perfect-Bayesian hybrid
equilibrium in which the distrusting principal chooses to write a contract and the
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trusting principal mixes between “contract” and “no contract” if and only if
B0h < B
1
h −
1− π+
π+
B1 < B
σT
h . (3.55)
The first inequality is guaranteed already by condition 1.
It is straightforward to check that there do not exist any further perfect Bayesian
equilibria.
Equilibrium Refinement by the Intuitive Criterion In our context of only two
types of principals and more than the standard two stages of a signaling game the
intuitive criterion by Cho-Kreps [17] (CK) takes the following form (see also Maskin-
Tirole [61]):
Let T = {+,−} denote the set of the two types of principals. Let BR(w, αt) denote
the (unique) equilibrium strategies of the continuation game between the principal and
the agent after w has been offered and has led the trustworthy agent20 to update his
belief to αt. Consider a candidate perfect Bayesian equilibrium that leads in equilibrium
to an expected utility V ∗i for a principal of type i.
We denote an out-of-equilibrium contract proposal w̃ as equilibrium dominated
for type i ∈ T , if and only if
V ∗i > max
αt∈[0,1]
Vi (BR (w̃, αt)) . (3.56)
Definition 9 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium passes the intuitive criterion if and
only if the out-of-equilibrium beliefs αt(w̃) assign zero probability to type i (i.e. αt(w̃) =
0 if i = + and αt(w̃) = 1 if i = −) whenever w̃ is equilibrium dominated for type i
and not equilibrium dominated for the other type j.
All separating or hybrid equilibria are not affected by this additional constraint
on the out of equilibrium beliefs since “contract” and “no contract” are both played
20Notice that the equilibrium strategies are independent of the belief αu of the untrustworthy agent.
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in equilibrium by some type with a strictly positive probability. Only the pooling
equilibria need to be analyzed.
Pooling Equilibria on “Contract” (c): In equilibrium the expected payoffs for
the trusting principal and distrusting principal are
V c,eq+ = B1 + π+B
σT
h − (1− π+) Bd (3.57)
V c,eq− = B1 + π−εB
σT
h − (1− π−) εBd. (3.58)
In case a principal deviates to writing “no contract”, the trustworthy agent plays a
best response to some belief. For both types of principal the best they can hope for
is that this belief is αnT = 1 and the trustworthy agent invests e2 = e
1
2. The maximal
resulting expected payoffs for the trusting principal and for the distrusting principal
are therefore:
V n,max+ = π+
(
B1 + B
1
h
)− (1− π+) Bd (3.59)
V n,max− = π−
(
B1 + εB
1
h
)− (1− π−) εBd. (3.60)
Writing “no contract” is equilibrium dominated for the trusting principal if and only
if
V c,eq+ > V
n,max
+ (3.61)
⇔ B1h −BσTh <
1− π+
π+
B1. (3.62)
For the distrusting principal writing “no contract” is equilibrium dominated if and
only if
V c,eq− > V
n,max
− (3.63)
⇔ B1h −BσTh <
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
. (3.64)
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Hence, for
1− π+
π+
B1 < B
1
h −BσTh <
1− π−
π−
B1
ε
, (3.65)
the intuitive criterion demands αnT = 1 and a pooling-equilibrium on writing a “con-
tract” does not pass this refinement due to (IC+)
21.
The Pooling Equilibria on “No Contract” (n): all pooling equilibria on “no
contract” pass the intuitive criterion, since both types could, potentially, profit from a
deviation to “contract” (e.g. when αcT = α
n
T ).
3.5.2 Wage Scheme Contracts
In the second scenario we allow for a more general class of contracts and take the
participation constraint of the agent into account. Payments can condition on B1 and
thereby indirectly on the agents effort e1. We still assume that the contract can not
condition on anything in the non-contractible part 2 of the relationship.
We have a problem of two-sided asymmetric information. The focus of this paper
is on a signaling story: The principal signals her trust by proposing some contractual
incompleteness. In general, however, the principal might also try to screen between
both types of agents. Firstly, she could try to propose a contract, that fulfills only the
participation constraint of the trustworthy agent. In other words the principal would
make the trustworthy agent pay for the right to work for him. In most settings, this is
completely implausible and just an artefact of how we modeled the trustworthy agent’s
preferences. We therefore change our modeling of the trustworthy agent’s preferences
slightly: Instead of gaining from a successful projects we assume that a trustworthy
agent suffers from working for a projet that is less successful than it could be. Then
the trustworthy agent still works deliberately, but he is not willing to to pay for his
21In case of 1−π+π+ B1 = B
1
h − B
σT
h equilibrium domination still requires α
n
T = 1, but (IC+) is
nonetheless satisfied.
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job.22 The trustworthy agent’s utility is then given by
UT (m, e, B) = m− e + κ(B −Bmax), (3.66)
where Bmax = B1+Bh is the maximal success the project could ever have. Furthermore,
we assume that both types of agent have an outside option of 0.
A second way the principal could try to screen between both types of agent is by
offering a menu of contracts. In case of perfect screening, the principal would learn
the type of the agent by his choice of contract and change her belief (i.e. her trust)
correspondingly. Then the agent would understand that the principal knows his type
and all asymmetric information would be resolved in equilibrium. Such complications
can not arise, however, if being trusted is sufficiently important for the untrustworthy
agent (i.e. if Md is sufficiently large). Then screening is impossible. The untrustworthy
type always mimics the behavior of the trustworthy agent at the contracting stage.
Under the following assumption the principal can not screen the type of the agent23:
Assumption 10 (No Screening Condition (sufficient))
Md >
κ
(
B1 + Bh
)
min{σU , 1− σU}
(3.67)
Lemma 6 Under assumption 10 the untrustworthy agent chooses the same contract
as the trustworthy agent in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The proof is at the end of the appendix.
The Contract Proposal The contract-proposal is designed by an informed party:
The principal has relevant private information when proposing the contract and may
therefore signal something about her private information to the agent.
In general, the principal may propose any probability distribution over a set of
22The following to arguments lead to the same result: either we can assume that the trustworthy
agent has a higher outside option, or that the principal needs to hire always the agent and cannot risk
that the untrustworthy agent rejects the offer.
23Even if this assumption does not hold, screening may well be too expensive for being optimal.
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contracts24. Each of these contracts can only condition on the realization of B1, i.e. a
contract specifies a tuple w ≡ (wP , wP , wA, wA) with wP ≥ wA and wP ≥ wA. wP is
the principals payment in case of B1 = 0 and wP her payment in case of B1 = B1. wA
is the wage the agent receives in case of B1 = 0 and wA the wage the agent receives
if B1 = B1. The requirements wP ≥ wA and wP ≥ wA capture that the wage of the
agent has to be payed by the principal. In case of wP > wA the principal commits
to“burn some money”.
After the principal’s contract proposal the agent updates his beliefs about the prin-
cipal’s type. Then, he accepts the contract if and only if his expected utility under the
contract equals at least his outside option. Otherwise, the agent receives his outside
option of 0. We assume that the principal always wants to hire the agent.
When the agent accepted a court draws a realization from the proposed probabil-
ity distribution. The court is committed to enforce this realized deterministic con-
tract (wP , wP , wA, wA).
25
The Reduced Form of the Contract Proposal We simplify the analysis by treat-
ing only those contract proposals as different, that lead to different payoffs for at least
one of the relevant types.
When the principal offers a contract, she has to care only about the belief and
the participation constraint of the trustworthy agent. The untrustworthy agent always
accepts the contract, when the trustworthy does and since the untrustworthy agent
exerts no effort anyway, his beliefs do not affect the principal. The only way the
untrustworthy agent reacts to a contract is that he plays e1 = e1 if and only if ∆wA ≡
wA−wA > e1.26 For any given contract the principal can directly incorporate this into
24Maskin and Tirole [61] discuss in detail the problem of contract design by an informed principal
with common values. They allow the principal to design (almost) any contracting mechanism. In
particular the principal can propose a menu of contracts from which she herself chooses one contract
after the agent accepted. This gives the signaling game screening properties. However, their analysis
is not directly applicable to our setting since here the agents beliefs on the principal’s type do matter
even after the contract is written. Nonetheless, we conjecture that our results do still hold in this
more general setting, since their techniques select also the least-cost separating equilibrium (as we
do).
25Thus we avoid any potential problems of ex post incentives to renegotiate the contract.
26For convenience, we assume the tie breaking rule that the untrustworthy agent plays e1 = 0 if
∆wA = e1.
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her calculation of her expected payoff.
Only the expected payoffs of the trusting principal, the distrusting principal and
the trustworthy agent should therefore be relevant for the equilibrium analysis. When
the trustworthy agent accepted the contract proposal of the principal, he has a certain
belief αT about the principal’s type and we can calculate the expected equilibrium
payoffs for each type, given this belief αT . We simplify the analysis by
Definition 10 Two contract-proposals µ(w) and µ′(w) are payoff equivalent if for
every αT (µ) = αT (µ′) both contract proposals lead in equilibrium to the same expected
payoffs for the trusting principal, the distrusting principal and the trustworthy agent.
At the end of this appendix we demonstrate that each equivalence class can be
described by a tuple (w, l, lu) where w ∈ R, l ≥ 0 and lu ≥ min{0, B1−e1−l}. W.l.o.g.,
consider only contracts in which the trustworthy agent has an incentive to chose27 e1 =
e1: w is the expected wage payment from the principal to the trustworthy agent, l is an
unconditional loss of utility for the principal and lu is a loss in utility for the principal
from contractual incompleteness in case the agent turns out to be untrustworthy. The
possibility to choose l > 0 (i.e. to commit to always burn some money) will play
only a minor role for the further analysis and is only included for completeness. The
possibility to commit to a loss conditional on meeting an untrustworthy type, however,
is crucial. The expected costs of such a commitment are lower for the trusting principal
than for the distrusting principal. Choosing a high lu can therefore serve as a signal of
trust.
The expected payoffs from a contract (w, l, lu) conditional on the belief αT (w) ≡
αT (w, l, lu) are for the trusting and distrusting principal, respectively :
V+(w, l, lu, αT (w)) = − (w + l)− (1− π+) lu +π+BαT (w)h +
[
B1 − (1− π+) Bd
]
,
V−(w, l, lu, αT (w)) = − (w + l)− (1− π−) lu +π−εBαT (w)h +
[
B1 − (1− π−) εBd
]
.
The respectively last terms in rectangular brackets are independent of the contract
27This no real restriction as we show in appendix 3.5.2 that there is such a contract in each equiv-
alence class.
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(and independent of the belief resulting from the contract-proposal). It is convenient
to re-normalize the principals utilities to
V+(w, l, lu, αT (w)) = − (w + l)− (1− π+) lu + π+BαT (w)h , (3.68)
V−(w, l, lu, αT (w)) = − (w + l)− (1− π−) lu + π−εBαT (w)h . (3.69)
The expected utility of the trustworthy agent is
UT (w, l, lu, αT (w)) = w − e1 − e∗2 (αT (w)) + κ
(
(αT (w) (1− ε) + ε) BαT (w)h −Bh
)
,
where we used that Bmax = B1 + Bh. Thus, if the trustworthy agent has the belief
αT (w) after a contract-proposal w, then he accepts the contract if and only if
w ≥ e1 + e∗2 (αT (w)) + κ
(
Bh − (αT (w) (1− ε) + ε) BαT (w)h
)
. (3.70)
The right hand side decreases in αT , it is the stronger the belief of the agent that he is
trusted, the lower the minimum wage offer that he requires to accept the offer. Thus,
a wage w ≥ e1 + e02 +κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
assures acceptance of the t-agent for any belief αT .
It is typical for signaling games to suffer from a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian
equilibria. We have a (3 dimensional) continuum of contracts, correspondingly many
possible out of equilibrium beliefs and, therefore, a large number of equilibria. We
derive and specify them in the next section. Given this multiplicity it is remarkable
that only one of this equilibria passes the intuitive criterion - the least cost separating
equilibrium:
Proposition 20 The only perfect Bayesian equilibrium passing the intuitive criterion
is the least cost separating equilibrium:
w+ =
(
w+ = e1 + e12 + κ
(
Bh −B1h
)
, l+ = 0, l+u =
e02 − e12 + (κ + επ−) B1h − (κ + π−) εB0h
1− π−
)
w− =
(
w− = e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
, l− = 0, l−u = 0
)
. (3.71)
Before we prove proposition 20, we briefly discuss the result. Intuitively the bite of the
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intuitive criterion in this more general set of possible contracts comes from the fact
that marginally increasing incompleteness of the contract (i.e. the costs lu of meeting
the untrustworthy type) is less costly for the trusting principal. Whenever the agent
might mistake her for the distrusting type, she could gradually increase incompleteness
until the bad type would not follow her.
lu was defined as the loss of the principal compared to a complete contract in case
the agent turns out to be untrustworthy (for a fixed belief αT ). Such a loss exists only
when the contract provides insufficient incentives for the untrustworthy type to exert
high effort e1. An lu > 0 means therefore that the contract is incomplete (at least with
some strictly positive probability).
In the unique intuitive equilibrium the trusting principal chooses to propose an
incomplete contract to signal her trust in the agent’s trustworthiness.
Derivation of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure strategies and proof of
proposition 20 in scenario 2:
Separating equilibria Let w+ ≡ (w+, l+, l+u ) denote the contract proposal of the
(+)-principal and w− ≡ (w−, l−, l−u ) the contract proposed by the (-)-principal. Then
in any perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium: αT (w+) = 1 and αT (w−) = 0.
The proposal of w− can only be optimal for the (-)-principal in such a separating
equilibrium if
w− = (w = e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
, l = 0, lu = 0). (3.72)
There exist some out of equilibrium beliefs that sustain w+ and w− as a separating
equilibrium if and only if the beliefs αT (w) ≡ 0 ∀w 6=w+ sustain the equilibrium. Notice
that with these out of equilibrium beliefs w− is more attractive for both types of
principal than any out of equilibrium contract proposal.
In the separating equilibrium the t-agent accepts the proposal w+ if and only if
w+ ≥ e1 + e12 + κ
(
Bh −B1h
)
. (3.73)
Chapter 3 Trust & Contractual Incompleteness 125
Furthermore, it must be optimal for each type of principal to choose the corresponding
proposal, i.e.
(IC+) Ṽ+(w
+, l+, l+u , αT (w
+)) ≥ Ṽ+(w−, l−, l−u , αT (w−)) (3.74)
(IC−) Ṽ−(w+, l+, l+u , αT (w
+)) ≤ Ṽ−(w−, l−, l−u , αT (w−)). (3.75)
Rearranging leads to
(IC+)
(
w+ + l+
)
+ (1− π+) l+u ≤ e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
+ π+
(
B1h −B0h
)
(3.76)
(IC−)
(
w+ + l+
)
+ (1− π−) l+u ≥ e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
+ επ−
(
B1h −B0h
)
. (3.77)
Hence, w+ and w− can be sustained as an perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium
if and only if w− = (w = e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
, l = 0, lu = 0) and w
+ fulfills
conditions 3.73, 3.76 and 3.77.
Separating equilibria passing the intuitive criterion The intuitive criterion
selects the least cost separating equilibrium with w+ = e1 + e
1
2 + κ
(
Bh −B1h
)
, l+ = 0
and l+u having the value just sufficiently high to fulfill condition 3.77, i.e.
l+u =
e02 − e12 + (κ + επ−) B1h − (κ + π−) εB0h
1− π− (3.78)
First we proof by contradiction that all perfect Bayesian separating equilibria with
w+ + l+ > e1 + e2 do not pass the intuitive criterion. The intuition is that it is simply
cheaper for the trusting principal to separate via l+u than by w
+ or l+ as the latter two
losses have for both types of principal the same expected value, whereas in case of l+u
the trusting principal expects a lowers loss than the distrusting one. More formally,
suppose (w+, l+, l+u ) fulfills conditions 3.76 and 3.77 and ξ ≡ w+ + l+ − e1 − e2 > 0.
Then the contract ŵ+ ≡ (ŵ+ = e1 + e2, l̂+ = 0, l̂+u = l+u + ξ1−π++π−
2
) must, by the
intuitive criterion lead to the belief αT (ŵ+) = 1 and thus V+(ŵ+) > V+(w+) which
contradicts optimality of w+.
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Hence, we must have w+ = e1 + e
1
2 + κ
(
Bh −B1h
)
, l+ = 0, and
e02 − e12 + (κ + π+) B1h − (κε + π+) B0h
1− π+
(IC+)≥
l+u
(IC−)≥ e
0
2 − e12 + (κ + επ−) B1h − (κ + π−) εB0h
1− π− .
Under the intuitive criterion a contract with l+u >
e02−e12+(κ+επ−)B1h−(κ+π−)εB0h
1−π− cannot
be an equilibrium, as for sufficiently small ε > 0 the contract with l̂+u ≡ l+u − ε >
e02−e12+(κ+επ−)B1h−(κ+π−)εB0h
1−π− has to lead to αT (l̂
+
u ) = 1 and leads therefore to a higher
payoff to the (+)-principal.
Hence l+u =
e02−e12+(κ+επ−)B1h−(κ+π−)εB0h
1−π− .
Lemma 7 The only separating equilibrium passing the intuitive criterion is the least
cost separating equilibrium:
w+ =
(
w+ = e1 + e12 + κ
(
Bh −B1h
)
, l+ = 0, l+u =
e02 − e12 + (κ + επ−) B1h − (κ + π−) εB0h
1− π−
)
w− =
(
w− = e1 + e02 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
, l− = 0, l−u = 0
)
. (3.79)
Pooling Equilibria Here, a contract w = (w, l, lu) can be sustained by some beliefs
as a pooling equilibrium if and only if it can be sustained by the out of equilibrium be-
liefs αT (w′) = 0 ∀w′ 6=w. In case all out of equilibrium beliefs are 0 the most attractive
alternative to the pooling contract w is the contract
(
w′ =
(
e1 + e
0
2 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
))
, l′ = 0, l′u = 0
)
. In equilibrium the belief of the trust-
worthy agent is αT (w) = σT . The equilibrium contract is therefore accepted by the
t-agent if and only if
(PCT ) w ≥ e1 + e∗2(σT ) + κ
(
Bh − (σT (1− ε) + ε) BσTh
)
. (3.80)
The incentives to deviate from the equilibrium contract are higher for the distrusting
principal as the trusting principal expects lower costs from an lu > 0 and values more
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when the agent beliefs to be trusted. The (-)-principal has no incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium contract if and only if
(IC−) V− (w, σT ) ≥ V−
(
w′ =
(
e1 + e
0
2 + κ
(
Bh − εB0h
))
, l′ = 0, l′u = 0, αT = 0
)
.
Hence a contract w = (w, l, lu) is sustainable as a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium
if and only if
(PCT ) w ≥ e1 + e∗2(σT ) + κ
(
Bh − (σT (1− ε) + ε) BσTh
)
, (3.81)
(IC−) (w + l) + (1− π−)lu ≤ e1 + e02 + π−ε
(
B
σT
h −B0h
)
+ κ
(
Bh − εB0h
)
.(3.82)
In such a pooling equilibrium the payoffs for the (+) and (-) principal are respectively
Ṽ pool+ (w, l, lu) = −(w + l)− (1− π+)lu + π+BσTh (3.83)
Ṽ pool− (w, l, lu) = −(w + l)− (1− π−)lu + π−εBσTh . (3.84)
None of the pooling equilibria passes the intuitive criterion In these pooling
equilibria the intuitive criterion demands that an out of equilibrium belief αT (w′, l′, l′u) =
1 if the (-)-principal does for any belief strictly worse under the alternative contract
(w′, l′, l′u) compared to her equilibrium payoff and if the (+)-principal may profit for
some beliefs. In other words αT (w′, l′, l′u) = 1 if
(IC−) Ṽ
pool
− (w, l, lu) > Ṽ−(w
′, l′, l′u, αT = 1)
(IC+) Ṽ
pool
+ (w, l, lu) ≤ Ṽ+(w′, l′, l′u, αT = 1),
or equivalently
(IC−) (w′ + l′)− (w + l) + (1− π−)(l′u − lu) > π−ε
(
B1h −BσTh
)
(3.85)
(IC+) (w
′ + l′)− (w + l) + (1− π+)(l′u − lu) ≤ π+
(
B1h −BσTh
)
. (3.86)
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Consider e.g. the contract (w′ ≡ w, l′ ≡ l, l′u ≡ lu + π+1−π+ ε
(
B1h −B
σT
h
)
. The intuitive
criterion demands αT (w′, l′, l′u) = 1 and then the trusting principal does strictly better
when proposing contract w′ then in the pooling equilibrium. Hence, none of the pooling
equilibria survives the intuitive criterion.
No Hybrid equilibrium passes the intuitive criterion The argument is similar
to the pooling-equilibria. In a hybrid equilibrium there must exist at least one contract
(w, l, lu) that is chosen by both types of principal with a strictly positive probability,
and hence 0 < αT (w, l, lu) < 1. Consider e.g. the contract (w′ ≡ w, l′ ≡ l, l′u ≡
lu +
π+
1−π+ ε
(
B1h −B
αT (w,l,lu)
h
)
. The intuitive criterion demands αT (w′, l′, l′u) = 1 and
then the trusting principal does strictly better when proposing contract (w′, l′, l′u) then
in the equilibrium contract (w, l, lu). Hence, none of the hybrid equilibria passes the
intuitive criterion.
Proof of Lemma 6
Let w ≡ (w, ∆w) denote a contract that pays the agent a wage of w in case of B1 = 0
and a wage of w = w + ∆w in case of B1 = B1. We want to show that under the
No-Screening Condition 10 the principal can not even partially separate the trustwor-
thy from the untrustworthy agent by a menu of contracts {(wU , ∆wU), (wT , ∆wT )}
(from which the agent can choose his preferred contract). Let π±(wi) denote the belief
of the (±)-principal that the agent is trustworthy when the agent chose the contract
wi from the menu. Furthermore, let αT /U(wi) denote the belief of the (T /U)-agent,
that the principal trusts him (in the trust-game at the last stage) when he has cho-
sen contract wi. The expected utility of the agent from choosing contract wi are in
dependence of his type
UU(wi) = wi + max{0, ∆wi − e1}+ (αU (wi) (1− ε) + ε) Md
UT (wi) = wi + max{0, ∆wi − e1 + κB1} − e∗2 (αT (wi))
+κB
αT (wi)
h (αT (wi) (1− ε) + ε)− κBmax.
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Necessary conditions for the menu {(wU , ∆wU), (wT , ∆wT )} to screen (or partially
screen) between both types of agents are
(ICU) UU(wU) ≥ UU(wT ) (3.87)
(ICT ) UT (wU) ≤ UT (wT ). (3.88)
Equivalently
max{0, ∆wT − e1} −max{0,∆wU − e1}+ (1− ε) (αU (wT )− αU (wU ))Md
(ICU )≤ wU − wT
(ICT )≤ max{0, ∆wT − e1 + κB1} −max{0, ∆wU − e1 + κB1} − (e∗2 (αT (wT ))− e∗2 (αT (wU )))
+ (αT (wT ) (1− ε) + ε) κBαT (wT )h − (αT (wU ) (1− ε) + ε) κB
αT (wU )
h
A necessary condition for the existence of an wT and wU for which (ICU) and (ICT )
both hold is that
(αU (wT )− αU (wU)) Md ≤ max{0, ∆wT − e1 + κB1} −max{0, ∆wT − e1}
+ max{0, ∆wU − e1} −max{0, ∆wU − e1 + κB1}
− (e∗2 (αT (wT ))− e∗2 (αT (wU))) .
+ (αT (wT ) (1− ε) + ε) κBαT (wT )h
− (αT (wU) (1− ε) + ε) κBαT (wU )h .
The first line on the right hand side is always greater or equal to B1 and the second
line is always greater or equal to 0. A necessary condition for that (ICU) and (ICT )
can both hold is therefore
(αU (wT )− αu (wU)) Md ≤ κB1 + (αT (wT ) (1− ε) + ε) κBαT (wT )h
− (αT (wU) (1− ε) + ε) κBαT (wU )h
− (e∗2 (αT (wT ))− e∗2 (αT (wU)))
≤ κB1 + κBh, (3.89)
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where we used 0 ≤ αT (wU) ≤ αT (wT ) ≤ 1 and B1h < Bh for the last inequality. If
the trustworthy agent would be fully separated from the untrustworthy, then Bayesian
updating requires: αU (wT ) = 1 and αU (wU) = 0 and therefore (αU (wT )− αU (wU)) =
1.
In the hybrid case in which the trustworthy agent chooses contract wT for sure and
the untrustworthy agent is indifferent between both contracts and mixes with some
probability we have αU(wU) = 0 and αU(wT ) ≥ σU , hence (αU (wT )− αU (wu)) ≥ σU .
In the hybrid case in which the untrustworthy agent chooses contract wU for sure
and the trustworthy agent is indifferent between both contracts and mixes with some
probability we have αU(wU) ≤ σU and αU(wT ) = 1, hence (αU (wT )− αU (wU)) ≥
1− σU .
In any case holds (αU (wT )− αU (wU)) ≥ max{σU , (1 − σU )}. Together with con-
dition 3.89 we have shown that screening is impossible if
Md >
κ
(
B1 + Bh
)
min{σU , (1− σU )}
. (3.90)
Mapping on the Reduced Form Contract Proposal
After writing down the expected payoffs for the different contracts for the (+)-principal,
the (-)-principal, and the trustworthy agent we show in step 1 that for any contract-
proposal µ((wP , wP , wA, wA)) there exist a payoff equivalent reduced-form contract
(w, l, lu). In step 2 we show that for every reduced-form contract (w, l, lu), there is at
least one payoff equivalent contract-proposal µ((wP , wP , wA, wA)) that gives at least the
trustworthy agent the incentive to choose e1 = e1. In step 3 we show that (for a given
αT ) the expected payoffs under two reduced-form contracts (w, l, lu) and (w′, l′, l′u) are
equal for the trusting principal, the distrusting principal, and the trustworthy agent
only if (w, l, lu) = (w
′, l′, l′u).
Within this subsection we only want to establish payoff equivalences for given be-
liefs αT . Then neither the second investment e2 nor the behavior in the trust game are
influenced by the contract. For this section we can therefore simplify the analysis by
re-normalizing each players utility by substracting the expected payoff resulting from
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investment e2 and the trust-game. Then the expected (re-normalized) payoffs of an
original-form deterministic contract (wp, wp, wA, wA) (with ∆wA ≡ wA − wA):
1. If ∆wA > e1 (complete contract: both type of agents: e1 = e1):
V̂+(wp, wp, wA, wA) = −wP + B1 (3.91)
V̂−(wp, wp, wA, wA) = −wP + B1 (3.92)
ÛT (wp, wp, wA, wA) = wA − e1 (3.93)
2. If e1 ≥ ∆wA > e1 −B1 (incomplete contract: t-agent: e1 = e1, u-agent: e1 = 0):
V̂+(wp, wp, wA, wA) = π+(−wp + B1)− (1− π+)wP (3.94)
V̂−(wp, wp, wA, wA) = π−(−wp + B1)− (1− π−)wP (3.95)
ÛT (wp, wp, wA, wA) = wA − e1 (3.96)
3. If ∆wA < e1 −B1 (both type of agents choose e1 = 0):
V̂+(wp, wp, wA, wA) = −wp (3.97)
V̂−(wp, wp, wA, wA) = −wp (3.98)
ÛT (wp, wp, wA, wA) = wA −B1. (3.99)
Notice any contract (wp, wp, wA, wA) of the last category (∆wA < e1−B1) has always a
corresponding payoff-equivalent contract (w′p, w
′
p, w
′
A, w
′
A) in the first category (∆wA >
e1), e.g. w
′
P ≡ wp + B1, w′A ≡ wA + e1 − B1 and w′P ≡ w′A < w′A − e1. Hence, we
can restrict the analysis to contracts of categories 1 and 2. By “complete contract” we
denote a contract of category 1 and by “incomplete contract” we denote a contract of
category 2.
Now consider the general case of a probability distribution µ over a set of contracts
of category 1 or 2. Let µc denote the total mass of complete contracts and therefore
1 − µc the total mass of incomplete contracts. Let wA denote the expected value of
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the wA over all contracts. Furthermore, let w
i
P and w
i
P denote the expected values
of wP and wP conditional on having an incomplete contract. Correspondingly, let w
c
P
denote the expected values of wP conditional on having a complete contract. Then the
expected payoffs of a random contract-proposal µ(wp, wp, wA, wA) are
V̂+(µ) = µ
c(−wcP + B1) + (1− µc)
(
π+
(−wiP + B1
)− (1− π+) wiP
)
(3.100)
V̂−(µ) = µc(−wcP + B1) + (1− µc)
(
π−
(−wiP + B1
)− (1− π−) wiP
)
(3.101)
ÛT (µ) = wA − e1, (3.102)
or equivalently
V̂+(µ) = −
(
µcwcP + (1− µc)wiP
)− (1− π+) (1− µc)
(
B1 −∆wiP
)
+ B1 (3.103)
V̂−(µ) = −
(
µcwcP + (1− µc)wiP
)− (1− π−) (1− µc)
(
B1 −∆wiP
)
+ B1 (3.104)
ÛT (µ) = wA − e1. (3.105)
The expected (re-normalized) payoffs from a reduced-form contract (w, l, lu) are for
the (+)-principal, (-)-principal and the trustworthy agent are
V̂+(w, l, lu) = − (w + l)− (1− π+) lu + B1, (3.106)
V̂−(w, l, lu) = − (w + l)− (1− π−) lu + B1. (3.107)
ÛT (w, l, lu) = w − e1. (3.108)
Step 1: For a given original-form contract proposal µ we choose w ≡ wA,
l ≡ (µcwcP + (1− µc) wiP
)− wA, and lu ≡ (1− µc)(B1 −∆wiP ). Then l ≥ 0 and
lu ≥ 0 and the payoffs are equal to the original-form contract for both types of
principal and the trustworthy agent.
Step 2: For a given reduced-form contract (w, l, lu) distinguish two cases
Case 1: If lu ≥ B1 − e1
we can choose the deterministic incomplete contract wA ≡ w, wP ≡ w + l,
Chapter 3 Trust & Contractual Incompleteness 133
wP ≡ w + lu −B1 and wA ≡ w − e1 − ε with ε ∈]0, B1 − e1[.
Case 2: If lu < B1 − e1
we can choose a stochastic contract proposal mixing between two contracts:
With probability µc the complete contract wA ≡ w, wP ≡ w+l, wP ≡ wA ≡
w − e1 − ε with 0 < ε < B1 − e1 is drawn.
With the counter probability (1−µc) ≡ lu
(−1)B1+l+e1 the incomplete contract
wA ≡ w, wP ≡ w + l, wP ≡ w + B1 − e1, and wA ≡ w − e1 + ε with
0 < ε < B1.
Step 3: Consider two reduced-form contracts (w, l, lu) and w
′, l′, l′u with equal ex-
pected payoffs for (+)-principal, (-)-principal and (t)-agent. Then w = w′ due to
equation 3.108 and l′ + (1− π+)(l′u − lu) = l = l′ + (1− P −−)(l′u − lu), due to
equations 3.106 and 3.107. Since π+ 6= π− this equations can only hold if l′u = lu
and l′ = l, q.e.d.

Bibliography
[1] Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi (2004): Endogenous Po-
litical Institutions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2), 565-611
[2] Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (2003): Incomplete Social Contracts, Journal
of the European Economic Association 1(1), 38-67
[3] Allen, F. and D. Gale 1994 “ Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing” Cambridge:
MIT Press
[4] Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W. and Vesterlund, L. (2003),“The Carrot or the Stick:
Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation” American Economic Review Vol. 93, 3,
893-902
[5] Baron, David, and John Ferejohn (1989): Bargaining in Legislatures, American
Political Science Review 83(4), 1181-1206
[6] Bénabou and Tirole 2003 “Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Motivation”, Review of Economic
Studies, Vol 70(3), 489-521
[7] Benaim, M. and Weibull, J.W. (2003),“Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic
Evolution in Games” Econometrica Vol. 71, 873-903
[8] Bernheim, B. Douglas and Whinston, Michael D. 1998 ”Incomplete Contracts and
Strategic Ambiguity” American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 902-932
[9] Bergstrom, Theodore C. (2001), “The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the
Evolution of Cooperation”, to appear in: International Game Theory Review
Chapter 3 Bibliography 136
[10] Bergstrom, Theodore C. (2002), “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and
Group Selection”, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 16, 2, pp. 67-88
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